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Abstract 
The myth of the criminal immigrant and the criminogenic effects of immigration is deeply embedded 
in public and political discourses across the globe. The consequences these perceptions are non-
trivial. Conservative governments tend to manipulate the public’s fear of ‘crime prone’ immigrants 
to garner support for restrictive immigration policies, hard-line anti-terrorism strategies and 
deportation practices. Further, certain groups are likely to be subjected to heightened levels of 
alienation and discrimination in the community - particularly at times of economic crises and threats 
to national security. This perceived association is also linked to increased social anxiety in the 
neighbourhoods where immigrants live. Yet whether immigration actually leads to measurable 
increases in crime is highly questionable.  
To date, much of what we know about the immigration-crime link is based on the United 
States. Yet, contextual features unique to the United States are likely to produce distinct outcomes 
for immigration and crime that do not translate to other settings. In this thesis, I test the applicability 
of ecological frameworks largely derived from the United States experience (namely, social 
disorganisation theory and the immigration revitalisation thesis) to the Australian context. 
Specifically I question whether similar relationships will unfold in a country with a greater mixture 
of ethnic groups and where immigration policy is highly controlled and focused on the recruitment of 
skilled immigrants. To address this question, I draw on three waves of Australian census data and 
nine years of official recorded crime incident data. Comprised of three quantitative studies, I 
consider in this thesis how immigrant growth, concentration, diversity and segregation impacts 
violent crime across over 800 neighbourhoods situated in two Australian cities: Sydney - an 
established immigrant gateway and Brisbane - a relatively new immigrant destination.  
In Study 1, I utilise an innovative hybrid modelling approach and set the baseline for 
Australian research. In doing so, I examine how changes in immigrant concentration impact changes 
in violent crime within neighbourhoods over time in addition to comparing levels of immigrant 
concentration and violent crime between neighbourhoods. Building on Study 1, I disaggregate the 
immigrant population in Study 2 by two key indicators of ethnicity - language and religion. Here, I 
assess the group specific effects of immigrant concentration on crime as well as the effects of ethnic 
diversity and in turn, rigorously test the central tenets of social disorganisation theory (by testing 
diversity effects) and the immigration revitalisation thesis (by considering ethnic group concentration 
effects). In Study 3, I investigate the effect of immigrant segregation on neighbourhood crime - a 
largely understudied aspect of the literature to date. Drawing on highly spatialized yet underutilised 
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measures of local segregation, I assess whether the spatial distribution of the immigrant population 
and the co-location of immigrant neighbourhoods impacts violent crime. 
Together, the findings of these three studies demonstrate that regardless of how immigration 
is measured (by growth, concentration or segregation) or the ethnic group under consideration 
(measuring ethnicity by both language and religion) - there is little evidence to suggest immigration 
is linked to greater violent crime in either city. However, the effect of ethnic diversity on violent 
crime is more problematic, particularly when comparing across neighbourhoods. Specifically, I find 
neighbourhoods with greater language and religion diversity encounter more violent crime problems. 
This points to a breakdown in informal social control in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that ethnic diversity comprises only a small piece of the 
overall puzzle when explaining variations in violent crime across place.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best... They're sending people that have lots 
of problems, and they're bringing those problems to us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing 
crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.  
- Donald Trump, June 16, 2015 
1.1 Introduction  
At a time of financial crises and ongoing threats to national security, immigration issues have 
catapulted to the top of the political agenda eliciting divisive public debate. In launching his bid for 
presidency in 2015, Donald Trump explicitly albeit erroneously linked Mexican immigrants to 
crime. Throughout his campaign, Trump repeatedly referred to “illegal immigrants” as violent 
criminals and drug lords, refusing to acknowledge the extensive research which suggests otherwise 
(Butcher & Piehl, 1998a; Butcher & Piehl, 1998b; Butcher & Piehl, 2007; Hagan & Palloni, 1999; 
Morenoff & Astor, 2006; Rumbaut et al., 2006; Sampson, 2008). Similar rhetoric is echoed across 
the United Kingdom, Europe and Australia. In a recent interview, ex UKIP leader Nigel Farage 
attributed an increase in sexual crimes in Sweden to the admittance of Syrian refugees. Farage went 
on to declare Malmo “the rape capital of Europe, possibly the world” (BBC News, 2017). In the 
Netherlands, populist far-right politician Geert Wilders openly and unapologetically labelled 
Moroccan residents as “scum who make the streets unsafe” (McKie, 2017). In Germany, the leader 
of the Alternative for Deutschland (AfD), Frauke Petry, effectively criminalised Syrian refugees by 
proposing border guards turn their guns on migrants who cross the country’s borders illegally 
(Connolly, 2016). While in Australia, newly re-elected conservative senator Pauline Hanson used her 
maiden address to parliament to warn that “antisocial behaviour is rampant” amongst Muslims and is 
“fuelled by hyper-masculine and misogynist culture” (Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, 2016, p. 
939).   
Sensationalist media reports further reinforce these negative stereotypes of immigrants. 
Evidence from the United States suggests immigrants are overrepresented in news stories about 
crime relative to their actual presence in crime statistics (Kim, Carvakho, Davis & Mullins, 2011; 
Santa Ana, 2013). When immigrants do appear on the news, the stories in which they feature 
overwhelmingly concentrate on crime problems. In analysing four online news sources, Chavez and 
colleagues (2010) found over 50% of the 160 stories on Mexican immigration dealt with crime. This 
disproportionate and biased coverage is not limited to the United States. A content analysis of the 
leading newspaper in the Netherlands found that 34% of the coverage on immigrants and ethnic 
minorities focused on law violations (Lubbers, Scheepers, & Wester, 1998). While in Belgium, 
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Jacobs (2016) found that immigrants not only appeared in more televised news stories about crime 
but were depicted in a more threatening manner.  
Within this climate of misinformation and fearmongering, individuals form their views about 
immigrants, immigration and crime (Gil de Zuniga, Correa & Valenzuela, 2012). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly then, attitudinal studies and polling data consistently find that a relatively large 
proportion of respondents associate immigration with crime problems. In the European Social 
Survey (ESS), almost three quarters of native born Western Europeans reported that immigration 
worsens crime (Fitzgerald, Curtis & Corliss, 2012). Similar views are held in the United States. 
Here, perceptions vary depending on political preference with 71% of registered Republican voters 
convinced immigrants exacerbate crime compared to just 34% of registered Democrat voters (Pew 
Research Centre, 2015). Yet only a small proportion from either side of the political fence perceived 
immigration to actually reduce crime problems (3% of Republicans and 10% of Democrats) (Pew 
Research Centre, 2015). 
While the perceived link between immigration and crime is relatively robust across contexts, 
whether increased immigration actually leads to measurable increases in crime is highly 
questionable. Empirical scholarship examining this association tends to address one of two broad 
research questions. First, do immigrants offend at a higher rate than natives? And second, do areas 
with more immigrants or a growing number of immigrants experience higher rates of crime? To date, 
the bulk of empirical work interested in answering these questions is situated in the United States. In 
this setting, scholars consistently find that once appropriate controls are considered, neither first nor 
second generation immigrants are more likely to engage in crime than their native born counterparts 
(Butcher & Piehl, 1998a; Butcher & Piehl, 2007; Hagan & Palloni, 1999; Morenoff & Astor, 2006; 
Rumbaut et al., 2006; Sampson, 2008). Further, evidence at the local and national level indicates that 
immigrant concentration is not associated with more crime (Chavez & Griffiths, 2009; Desmond & 
Kubrin, 2009; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Kubrin & Ousey, 2009; Martinez, Stowell & Lee, 2010). 
Contrary to popular opinion, some studies actually find a negative relationship between immigration 
and crime (Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Ousey & Kubrin, 2014; Stowell et al., 2009; Wadsworth, 2010) 
with the effect particularly strong in disadvantaged areas (Velez, 2009). In fact, several scholars 
point to the growth in the immigrant population over time as a plausible explanation for the violent 
crime drop in the United States (Sampson, 2008; Stowell et al., 2009; Wadsworth, 2010).     
Although the rhetoric that links immigration to social problems like crime is evident in all 
western liberal democracies, research outside of the United States is less clear cut. This suggests that 
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contextual factors may play an important role in shaping both the immigrant-crime and immigration-
crime link. At the individual level, the results are mixed. For example, immigrants in the United 
Kingdom are not involved in more property or violent crime than native residents (Papadopoulos, 
2010), neither are immigrants in Australia (although some variation exists between groups) 
(Mukherjee, 1999). Yet scholarship across several European countries reveals a different picture. 
Studies in Germany, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Switzerland find immigrants 
are overrepresented in official crime statistics (Albrecht, 1997; Lehti, 2015; Martens, 1997; Martens 
& Holmberg, 2005; Skardhamer, Aaltonen & Lehti, 2014). In fact, this relationship persists after 
accounting for demographic differences. Yet Beckley and colleagues (2014) warn such analyses that 
rely on official crime data do not account for potentially discriminatory criminal justice practices.  
Findings also vary across contexts at the more aggregate level. Bell and Machin (2013) find 
immigrant concentration is associated with lower crime rates in England yet in France, the presence 
of immigrants is significantly related to more crime across police districts (Aoki & Todo, 2009). 
Bircan and Hooghe (2011) find no significant relationship between total immigrant concentration 
and crime across Belgian municipalities but when focusing on group specific effects, concentrations 
of non-EU nationals and African nationals are associated with higher crime (Bircan & Hooghe, 
2011). Taken together, these findings suggest that in some countries, under certain conditions, 
increased immigration may have a crime-generating effect while in others, increased immigration 
may have a crime-reducing effect.  
 As context plays an important role in determining the significance and direction of the 
immigration-crime association, understanding how this relationship plays out across different 
national contexts is worthwhile. As such, the overarching aim of this thesis is to determine whether 
the theories commonly used to explain the immigration-crime link in the United States translate to 
Australia - a multi-ethnic setting where the focus is on the admittance of skilled immigrants and 
where neighbourhoods are rarely dominated by people from a single birthplace. Of particular interest 
is the effect of immigration on violent crime across neighbourhoods located in two cities with 
differing immigration histories. Given the bulk of immigration-crime research to date has employed 
measures of violent crime (see for example, Martinez et al., 2004; Martinez et al., 2010; Ousey & 
Kubrin, 2009; Ousey & Kubrin, 2014; Stowell & Martinez, 2009; Velez, 2009; Wadsworth, 2010), I 
focus solely on violent offences in order to provide a point of comparison to international research. 
In this chapter, I detail the consequences of the perceived immigration-crime link, introduce the key 
theoretical arguments which form the basis of my research, establish Australia as an important 
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comparative site against the American-centric literature and outline the key research questions which 
guide this thesis.  
1.2 Consequences of the perceived immigration-crime link  
The consequences of the perceived immigration-crime link are non-trivial. In Britain, concern 
about unfettered mass immigration was central to the decision of 17 million voters to leave the 
European Union (EU) despite the threat of substantial economic fallout (Pettifor, 2017). In the 2016 
election, immigration was a key and unifying concern for Trump supporters with 80% in favour of 
building a wall along the Mexican border (Pew Research Center, 2016). Considering 67% believe 
undocumented migrants are more likely to commit a serious criminal offense than American citizens, 
their support for tighter border control - and subsequently Trump - is not overly surprising (Pew 
Research Center, 2016).  
Recent election results across Europe show increasing public support for anti-immigration 
parties who mobilise the criminal immigrant discourse. Empirical evidence suggests it is an effective 
strategy - data from the ESS shows that voters who link immigration to crime are more likely to vote 
for the radical right (Rydgren, 2008). Strong public backlash against Chancellor Merkel’s open door 
refugee policy, particularly following recent events in Cologne, has contributed to the rapid rise of 
the AfD (Richter, 2016). Established in 2013, the party has quickly moved from the fringes of the 
German political landscape into the mainstream. Currently represented in 10 of Germany’s 16 state 
parliaments, the AfD is set to become the country’s third largest political party by September 2017 
(Payton, 2016). Although Geert Wilders recently fell short of forming a majority government in the 
Netherlands, his party - the Party for Freedom (PVV) - secured 20 of the 150 seats in federal 
parliament, an additional 5 since the previous election (Kroet, 2017). In an increasingly splintered 
parliament, the PVV is now the second largest political group in the Netherlands. Far-right, anti-
immigration parties in France, Austria, Sweden, Greece, Hungary and Slovakia are gaining similar 
traction (Golder, 2016). Even in Australia, a context typically more receptive to immigrants, recent 
elections have seen a noticeable shift to the right. In particular, the re-election of Pauline Hanson and 
members of her One Nation Party to the senate reflects growing discontent amongst a certain 
subsection of Australia’s population (McNair, 2016).  
In addition to securing votes and propelling conservative politicians into power, the perceived 
link between immigration and crime has important consequences for immigration policy. Studies 
find individuals who blame immigrants for crime have more restrictive immigration preferences and 
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are significantly more likely to support a reduction in the immigration intake (McLaren & Johnson, 
2007; Palmer, 1996). Additionally, those who feel their safety is threatened by immigrants are more 
likely to support punitive actions. In particular, support for deportation is high with 75% of ESS 
respondents backing the expulsion of immigrants convicted of a serious criminal offense (Jowell and 
the Central Coordinating team, 2003). Thus by manipulating the public’s fear of “crime prone” 
immigrants, conservative politicians can garner support for restrictive and exclusionary immigration 
policies, hard line anti-terrorism strategies and deportation practices (Mears, 2001; Sniderman, 
Hangendoorn & Prior, 2004; Stumpf, 2006).  
President Trump is currently taking advantage of such perceptions. Since his inauguration, 
the president has targeted immigrants in a series of executive orders – threatening to slash federal 
funding for sanctuary cities (Chishti & Pierce, 2017) and hiring 10,000 additional immigration 
officers (Cowger, Bolter & Pierce, 2017). Trump also enacted an unprecedented travel ban (later 
deemed illegal) on the grounds of national security which restricted the entry of migrants from seven 
Muslim majority countries (Cowger, Bolter & Pierce, 2017; Pierce & Meissner, 2017). In the same 
executive order, Trump suspended the country’s refugee program for 120 days and introduced a cap 
on refugee numbers (Cowger, Bolter & Pierce, 2017). Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
is under direct instruction to deport any undocumented migrant with a criminal charge - regardless of 
the seriousness of the offense (Chishti & Mittelstadt, 2016) - and a specialised immigrant crime 
office is now operating as a branch of national security under the guise of victim services (Kopan, 
2017). Trump’s proposed federal budget includes significant funding for the wall and an array of 
other border protection strategies (Cowger, Bolter & Pierce, 2017).   
Although these measures are extreme, they are not isolated. Immigration policies across 
many Western countries have become increasingly restrictive and exclusionary in recent years. At a 
time where the number of forcibly displaced persons is at the highest recorded level since World 
War II (UNHCR, 2015), several countries have actually pared back the number of refugee and 
asylum seeker visas on offer. Although Sweden was celebrated in 2015 for welcoming over 160,000 
refugees, in 2016, the Swedish government introduced new laws that limit the intake to the EU 
minimum (Swedish Migration Agency, 2017). As a consequence, the number of refugees entering 
Sweden in 2016 plummeted to less than 30,000. Other countries have failed to respond to the Syrian 
refugee crisis all together by refusing to extend the number of capped visas available for refugees 
and asylum seekers (Ferris & Kirisci, 2016). In this climate, Australia continues to maintain one of 
the harshest border control policies in the world - enforcing an indefinite period of mandatory 
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detention on asylum seekers (including children) who do not arrive via “appropriate” channels 
(Australian Human Rights Commission, 2014).  
In addition to these macro level policy implications, fear of the criminal immigrant has a 
direct impact on the everyday lives of minority group members. Extensive research indicates that 
certain immigrant groups are subjected to heightened levels of discrimination and alienation in the 
broader community. Studies find that immigrants face discrimination in both the workforce and the 
housing market (Chavez & Griffiths 2009; Mayda 2006; Semyonov, Raijman, Tov & Schmidt, 2004; 
Sniderman et al., 2004). Further, these negative stereotypes can motivate the use of racial profiling 
practices. Evidence suggests immigrants who belong to visible minorities are overrepresented in stop 
and search statistics (Epp, Maynard-Moody & Haider-Markel, 2014). In fact, one police operation in 
Australia, “Operation Molto” explicitly targeted young African males (Police Accountability Project, 
2017). 
 At its worse, anxieties surrounding crime prone immigrants can manifest into violence. The 
vitriol touted by politicians and the media often provides the impetus for hate crimes targeting 
immigrants. In the ten days following Trump’s election, 280 incidents motivated by anti-immigrant 
sentiment were documented by the Southern Poverty Law Center (Southern Poverty Law Center, 
2016). The Brexit vote sparked similar anti-immigrant crimes across the United Kingdom. In the 
month following Brexit, 5,468 hate crimes were reported to police marking a 41% increase on July 
2015 (Corcoran & Smith, 2017). After accepting over one million refugees, attacks on refugee 
shelters in Germany increased fivefold in 2015 compared to the previous year (Bencek & Martin, 
2016). 
The detrimental effects of the perceived immigration-crime association extend beyond the 
foreign born population, negatively impacting residents in neighbourhoods where immigrants live. In 
an Australian study, perceptions of crime and disorder are distorted in neighbourhoods with higher 
proportions of foreign born residents who speak a language other than English or practice a religion 
other than Christianity (Wickes et al., 2013a). Studies also find that residents are more fearful of 
crime in immigrant neighbourhoods (Hooghe & Vroome, 2016). Even after controlling for the actual 
level of crime, Hooghe and Vroome (2016) find residents report greater fear of crime in areas with 
more non-EU nationals.  
The consequences of the perceived immigration-crime link are thus far-reaching. Although 
these perceptions are relatively consistent across contexts, evidence from the international literature 
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suggests the direction and significance of the immigration-crime association is not. Traditional 
criminological theories have linked increased immigration to greater crime whereas more recent 
theoretical developments propose the opposite. Problematically, these theories are derived entirely 
from the United States experience, where contextual factors unique to this setting may produce 
particular outcomes for the immigration-crime link that do not generalise to other settings. In the 
following section I outline the key theories used to explain the immigration-crime connection at the 
neighbourhood level and consider their utility in the Australian context.   
1.3 Key theoretical arguments  
Immigration changes the demographic, economic and social structures of cities and 
neighbourhoods (Reid et al., 2005). Whether these changes will have a positive or negative effect on 
crime is heavily contested. For example, some argue that an increased number of immigrants may 
heighten crime by adding to the share of the population with a high-risk crime profile (i.e. increasing 
the number of young males) (Andersen, 2012; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009). As immigrants tend to 
experience higher rates of victimisation than natives, higher crime rates in immigrant areas may also 
be a consequence of increasing the share of the population that is vulnerable to crime (Bell, Fasani & 
Machin, 2013). Others argue that increased immigration should lead to an overall reduction in the 
crime rate as first generation immigrants are typically found to exhibit relatively low criminal 
propensities (Butcher & Piehl, 1998a; Butcher & Piehl, 1998b; Butcher & Piehl, 2007; Hagan & 
Palloni, 1999; Morenoff & Astor, 2006; Rumbaut et al., 2006; Sampson, 2008). Similar arguments 
are put forward as part of the migration selection effects thesis. Here it is argued that the process of 
migration itself ‘selects’ individuals who are particularly responsive to deterrent mechanisms and 
possess fewer criminal tendencies (Butcher & Piehl, 2007). On a larger scale, increased immigration 
should therefore be associated with a drop in the crime rate by increasing the proportion of the 
population unlikely to offend (Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Sampson, 2008).  
Two theoretical frameworks - derived from the United States experience - are predominantly 
used by scholars to explain the negative or positive impact of immigration on neighbourhood crime: 
social disorganisation theory (Shaw & McKay, 1942) and the immigration revitalisation thesis 
(Martinez, Lee & Nielsen, 2004; Martinez et al., 2010; Stowell, 2007). Often presented as a 
competing dichotomy (although sharing common elements), social disorganisation theorists contend 
that immigration is likely to disrupt the development of key social networks important for the 
informal social control of crime whereas the immigration revitalisation thesis purports that 
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immigration can bring economic and social opportunities that reduce neighbourhood crime (Martinez 
et al., 2004; Martinez et al, 2010; Stowell, 2007).  
Social disorganisation theory   
At the turn of the 20th century, Shaw and McKay’s (1942) landmark study found that certain 
structural conditions of an area, namely heightened levels of poverty, ethnic diversity and residential 
instability, were linked to higher rates of juvenile delinquency in Chicago neighbourhoods. While 
they did not explicitly identify immigration as a direct cause of crime, it was argued that immigration 
altered both the socio-demographic composition of the neighbourhood and the social processes 
important for the regulation of crime. Within the social disorganisation framework, it is assumed that 
immigrants arrive at their new host country with limited social and economic capital. As a result, 
they often settle in resource poor neighbourhoods leading to further economic decline at the 
neighbourhood level (Stowell, 2007). The ethnic diversity that comes with increased immigration 
also leads to language and cultural barriers amongst residents, making it difficult to reach shared 
expectations of behaviour. Additionally, influxes of immigrants add to the share of the population 
who are “new” to the neighbourhood thereby increasing residential mobility. Taken together, these 
socio-demographic shifts make it difficult for residents to develop social networks and form strong 
ties to local organisations. Without these critical networks, a community’s regulatory capacity 
becomes limited and crime flourishes (Shaw & McKay, 1942; Sampson and Groves, 1989; Sampson 
and Raudenbush, 1999; Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls, 1997). Thus changes in immigration are 
indirectly linked to crime by weakening social networks and informal social control processes.  
Immigration revitalisation thesis  
However, empirical research in the United States investigating the immigration-crime link 
finds little support for the social disorganisation perspective (Alaniz, Cartmill, & Parker, 1998; 
Desmond & Kubrin, 2009; Feldmeyer & Steffensmeier, 2009; Ferraro, 2016; Kubrin & Ousey, 2009; 
Reid et al., 2005; Stowell et al., 2009; Wadsworth, 2010). Rather than increasing crime, Martinez 
and colleagues (Lee & Martinez, 2002; Martinez & Lee, 2000; Martinez et al., 2010) argue that 
increased immigration in ethnic enclaves can revitalise an area by encouraging opportunities to build 
social and economic ties with culturally similar individuals (Breton, 1964; Desmond & Kubrin, 
2009). Immigrant neighbourhoods often boast local ethnic economies that meet the needs of the 
immigrant population while also providing employment opportunities that stimulate economic 
growth (Velez, 2009). In immigrant neighbourhoods, residents are also typically active in local 
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organisations like schools and faith-based institutions (Foner & Alba, 2008; Portes & Rumbaut, 
2006). This involvement allows for the additional development of social networks and helps generate 
informal social control. These strong social ties may potentially mediate the effect of social isolation 
and deprivation on crime.   
There is extensive support for the immigration revitalisation thesis in the United States. In 
neighbourhoods and cities with concentrated immigration, strong social networks have effectively 
stabilised the community, offset the criminogenic conditions of the area and in turn reduced crime 
(Chavez & Griffiths, 2009; Desmond & Kubrin 2009; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Kubrin & Ousey, 
2009; Martinez et al., 2010). Indeed neighbourhoods that had previously experienced a population 
decline and were “destined to become crime ridden enclaves”, have become thriving social hubs 
following increased immigration (Martinez, Stowell & Lee, 2010, p. 822).  
1.4 Contextual considerations: How Australia and the United States compare  
There are notable exceptions to the revitalisation thesis internationally (Andersen, 2012; Aoki 
& Todo, 2009; Bircan & Hooghe, 2011; Francis, Armstrong & Totikidis, 2006) and within the 
United States (Martinez et al., 2004; Ramey, 2013). Martinez and colleagues (2004, p. 152) argue 
this is because “local conditions eclipse broad theoretical predictions.” Immigrant composition 
differs significantly across contexts and is determined by a range of factors such as geography, 
immigration policy, histories of colonisation, shared languages, economic opportunities as well as 
proximity to conflict/ humanitarian crises. It is likely that these macro level conditions play a key 
role in determining the significance and direction of the immigration-crime connection at the 
neighbourhood level. Australia’s immigration experience differs to the United States in several, 
important ways. Thus exploring the immigration-crime link in Australia, a multi-ethnic setting with a 
relatively recent immigration history, fills a gap in the United States centric literature and provides 
an evidence base for Australian immigration policy. I compare the key features of each context 
below.  
The United States is the leading destination country for immigrants globally. Founded as an 
immigrant nation, it is currently home to over 40 million foreign born persons who comprise around 
13% of the total population (Zong and Batalova, 2016). The 11.7 million Mexicans residing in the 
United States represent the largest immigrant group in the world and make up almost one third of all 
foreigners (Zong and Batalova, 2016). Other key groups and their respective share of the immigrant 
population include: India and China (5% each); Vietnam, Cuba and Korea (3% each); and the 
10 
 
Dominican Republic and Guatemala (2% each) (Zong and Batalova, 2016). In fact, the top ten 
countries of origin account for almost 60% of the total immigrant population (Zong and Batalova, 
2016). Further, the distribution of the foreign born population across cities in the United States is 
non-random with immigrants often settling with co-ethnics, forming ethnic enclaves (Martinez et al., 
2010). Thus while the United States hosts immigrants from a variety of ethnic backgrounds, there are 
clear ethnic groups that dominate at both the local and national level. 
Australia is also a nation of immigrants with over a quarter of the population born overseas – 
early twice the proportion seen in the United States (ABS, 2012). Almost one in every two 
Australians is a first or second-generation immigrant (ABS, 2012). As a lingering effect from what is 
colloquially referred to as the “White Australia” era (Jupp, 2002), immigrants from the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand continue to represent the largest foreign born groups in Australia (ABS, 
2012). These typically white, English speaking immigrants comprise 21% and 9% of the foreign 
born population respectively (ABS, 2012). However, the last decade has witnessed significant 
growth and diversification in the Australian immigrant population - largely driven by the Asian 
region. Between 2001 and 2011, an additional 200,000 Indian and 176,000 Chinese immigrants were 
added to the residential population (ABS, 2012). Yet while Indian and Chinese natives now represent 
the third and fourth largest immigrant groups in Australia (and the most sizeable ethnic minorities), 
their respective share of the foreign born population (around 6% each) is still relatively small (ABS, 
2012). Similar to the United States, certain Australian neighbourhoods attract large numbers of 
immigrants. Yet by comparison, these neighbourhoods are highly diverse with a much greater 
mixture of ethnic groups. Empirical studies find ethnic segregation is far less common in the 
Australian context when compared to cities in the United States (Johnston, Poulsen & Forrest, 2007).  
Therefore while the United States and Australia similarly boast incredibly diverse immigrant 
populations, they differ significantly in terms of ethnic group size and the settlement patterns of 
immigrants. These differences have important implications for theory. For example, the utility of the 
revitalisation thesis in explaining the immigration-crime connection may depend on the degree of 
homogeneity in the immigrant population. The process of neighbourhood revitalisation may require 
that there be a critical mass of one ethnic group located within a neighbourhood. Ethnic group 
concentrations may therefore not reach the size necessary for revitalisation in Australian 
neighbourhoods. Without concentrations of immigrants from the same origins, opportunities to 
develop strong social ties may be limited. As social disorganisation theory predicts higher crime in 
more ethnically diverse areas, this theory may be more applicable in the Australian context where 
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immigrant neighbourhoods are less likely to be dominated by a single birthplace. While social 
disorganisation theory suggests the language barriers created by increasing immigration will reduce a 
community’s regulatory capacity, this may not be the case in the United States if immigrants tend to 
settle with co-ethnics. Indeed, social disorganisation theory is much more interested in the effect of 
ethnic diversity rather than simply the impact of ethnic group concentration on crime (Bursik, 2006). 
By sharing a common language (for example, Spanish) and often a common religion (for instance, 
Catholicism), immigrant communities should be able to effectively communicate with one another 
and find a mutual ground in order to come together to solve local problems. 
In addition to ethnic group composition and size, the immigration programs of the United 
States and Australia are designed to attract very different types of immigrants. Family unification is 
prioritised in the United States with 480,000 family visas available annually compared to just 
140,000 skilled permanent visas and 70,000 refugee visas (American Immigration Council, 2014). 
Australia’s immigration program is designed to “cherry pick” high skilled immigrants, employing a 
point-based system similar to Canada (Bertone, 2009, p. 87). Each year, over 120,000 skilled visas 
are allocated compared to around 60,000 family visas and 13,000 humanitarian visas (Spinks, 2016). 
The number of immigrants who fail to use these legitimate routes varies considerably across the two 
contexts. Recent estimates suggest around 11 million unauthorised immigrants are currently residing 
in the United States (Zong and Batalova, 2016). However, due to Australia’s geographic isolation, 
undetected border crossings are particularly difficult. Persons who stay in the country after their visa 
expires constitute the only group of “illegal” immigrants in Australia (representing around 0.02% of 
the total population in 2010 and mostly from China, Malaysia, the United States and Britain) (DIAC, 
2013). Thus Australia’s controlled strategy has resulted in a relatively well-educated and employable 
foreign born population. In fact, 38% of Australia’s immigrant community is considered to be highly 
educated compared to an average of 31% across other OECD countries (OECD, 2012). Bertone 
(2009, p. 87) therefore contends, “while the United States has a thriving sub-program of skilled 
migration much like Australia’s, in most other respects the two immigration programs could not be 
more different.”  
As a consequence of Australia’s skilled migration program, new immigrants may rely less on 
community level ties and resources for successful settlement compared to their counterparts in the 
United States. This is because immigrants arriving in Australia typically have the resources to use 
services that are dependent on income rather than residential community and have avenues other 
than the local community (such as the workplace) to form social ties. Further, as many immigrants 
12 
 
(particularly those arriving through the skilled stream) possess access to human and economic 
capital, - it is unlikely influxes of new immigrants into Australian neighbourhoods will exacerbate 
poverty levels as predicted by social disorganisation theory. Indeed, the relationship between poverty 
and race/ethnicity is relatively weak across Australian neighbourhoods (as demonstrated in Chapter 
4), particularly when compared to the United States.  
1.5 Thesis aims and research questions  
This thesis provides one of the first neighbourhood level examinations of the immigration-
crime link in Australia. As part of this thesis, I will assess whether the theories commonly used to 
explain the immigration-crime link in the United States translate to the Australian context. To 
account for the spatial and temporal dimensions of the immigration-crime link, this thesis is 
comprised of three quantitative studies designed to better understand how immigrant growth, 
concentration, diversity and segregation impacts violent crime across neighbourhoods situated in two 
cities: Sydney - an established immigrant gateway and Brisbane - a relatively new immigrant 
destination (Singer, 2004). 
Study 1 
To date, most immigration-crime research has focused on how changes in immigrant 
concentration over time impact crime within a unit (see for example Martinez et al., 2010; Ousey & 
Kubrin, 2009) or how static levels of immigrant concentration are linked to more or less crime 
between units (see for example Stowell & Martinez, 2009; Velez, 2009). However, experiencing an 
influx of immigrants into a neighbourhood is inherently different to exhibiting a generally high level 
of immigrant concentration. As such, each process may differentially influence crime. Drawing on 
three waves of census data (2001, 2006 and 2011), Study 1 considers both measures by employing a 
unique hybrid modelling approach which captures within and between neighbourhood effects. By 
utilising a measure of total immigrant concentration and a measure of immigrant growth, this study 
provides a foundation for Australian research as well as a point of comparison to international 
scholarship.  
Additionally, research suggests that the effect of increases in immigration on crime will vary 
across different neighbourhoods. For example, it is argued that neighbourhoods with a large 
immigrant population are less likely to experience an increase in crime following an influx of new 
arrivals due to a greater availability of resources and access to social ties with co-ethnics. In other 
words, such contexts are better positioned to ‘absorb’ new arrivals when compared to 
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neighbourhoods without an established immigrant presence (Portes & Rumbaut 2006; Singer, 2004). 
The impact of immigration on crime is also thought to be dependent on the level of neighbourhood 
disadvantage. Studies in the United States find that the effect of immigrant growth is most 
pronounced in areas of concentrated disadvantage (MacDonald et al., 2013; Velez, 2009). It is 
argued that this is because influxes of new immigrants into disadvantaged areas can revitalise 
neighbourhood organisations and institutions, revive the local economy and reinforce social 
networks. In contrast, an increased presence of immigrants in advantaged communities is likely to 
disrupt social networks and informal social control and in turn, increase crime (Velez, 2009). With 
this in mind, three research questions guide Study 1: 
1. How do changes in immigrant concentration impact changes in violent crime within a 
neighbourhood over time?  
2. Do neighbourhoods with a higher concentration of immigrants encounter more or less 
violent crime?  
3. Is the effect of changes in immigrant concentration on crime moderated by the 
neighbourhood context (for example, the size of the immigrant population or the degree 
of disadvantage)?  
Study 2 
Public attitudes towards immigrants are not ethnically neutral with certain groups associated 
with social problems like crime. In Australia, immigrants from the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand experience incredibly low levels of anti-immigrant sentiment (Markus, 2013). In 2013, just 
3% of survey respondents voiced negative attitudes towards immigrants from these countries 
(Markus, 2013). Yet around 25% expressed unfavourable attitudes towards Muslim immigrants or 
immigrants from Arab countries (Markus, 2013). Negative attitudes are likely to impede the 
successful integration of some groups which in turn, could potentially impact neighbourhood crime 
outcomes. Therefore the conclusions drawn from the broad measure of immigrant concentration 
utilised in Study 1 may oversimplify the immigration-crime link and potentially wash out the effects 
of ethnicity on crime.  
Immigrant ethnicity is central to both theoretical perspectives considered in this research. 
According to the revitalisation thesis, the effect of immigrant concentration on neighbourhood crime 
should vary across ethnic groups depending on the size of the established co-ethnic population 
(Martinez et al., 2004). This is because established populations possess social capital that can aid 
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integration and insulate communities from the social structural factors associated with crime 
(Martinez et al., 2004). Without access to the resources and ties necessary for successful integration, 
the presence of newer groups may be linked to increases in neighbourhood crime in the short term. 
Successive waves of immigration to Sydney and Brisbane have seen migratory populations 
established at different times. Differences between sites are therefore expected with most ethnic 
groups settling more recently in Brisbane. Thus increases in the same ethnic group may differentially 
impact crime across the two cities, leading to more violent crime in Brisbane, but not in Sydney.  
Central to social disorganisation theory, although rarely tested in empirical immigration-
crime research -is the predicted effect of increasing ethnic diversity on crime (Feldmeyer, Harris & 
Lai, 2016; Graif & Sampson, 2006). From this theoretical lens, diversity leads to higher 
neighbourhood crime with communication barriers between residents breaking down the regulatory 
processes necessary for the informal social control of crime. As a relatively invisible migratory 
group, it is unlikely that increased immigration from countries like the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand will contribute to neighbourhood diversity. Conversely, an increased presence of visible 
ethnic groups in a neighbourhood may create greater language and cultural barriers between 
residents which obstruct community regulation (Sampson et al., 1997; Shaw & McKay, 1942). From 
this perspective, diverse immigrant populations are particularly detrimental to a community’s 
regulatory capacity (rather than merely a concentration of immigrants) as residents struggle to find 
the common ground necessary to come together to collectively solve local problems like crime.  
Therefore to tease apart any group specific effects, I disaggregate total immigrant 
concentration in Study 2 by two measures of ethnicity - language and religion. In addition, I include 
two corresponding diversity indices to measure the effect of ethnically diverse populations on crime. 
Thus by assessing both concentration and diversity effects, Study 2 robustly tests the central tenets of 
the revitalisation thesis and social disorganisation theory. Building on Study 1, Study 2 utilises the 
same analytic approach (negative binomial hybrid models) over the same time period (2001-2011). 
In Study 2, I ask three key questions:  
1. How do changes in immigrant group concentration and changes in ethnic diversity impact 
changes in violent crime within a neighbourhood over time?  
2. Do neighbourhoods with a higher concentration of certain immigrant groups or higher 
levels of ethnic diversity encounter more or less violent crime?  
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3. Is the effect of changes in ethnic group concentration or changes in ethnic diversity on 
crime moderated by neighbourhood factors such as the size of the immigrant population 
or the level of disadvantage?  
Study 3 
Most immigration-crime research to date has employed measures of immigrant growth or 
concentration with measures of segregation largely underutilised (see for exception Barranco, 2013; 
Feldmeyer, Harris & Scroggins, 2015). Yet theoretically, there are reasons to believe that the spatial 
separation of immigrant groups may impact neighbourhood structures in ways that either promote or 
reduce crime. In the United States, black-white segregation is thought to contribute to higher rates of 
crime by weakening social controls and undermining a community’s regulatory capacity through 
mechanisms associated with social inequality and social isolation (Peterson, Krivo & Browning, 
2009). Yet studies find mixed results. While some find a positive association between segregation 
and the overall crime rate (see for example Logan & Messener, 1987), others reveal significant 
variation when considering group specific crime rates (see for example Krivo, Peterson & Kuhl, 
2009; Peterson & Krivo; 1993; Shihadeh & Flynn, 1996). Further still, some scholars propose that 
the segregation of immigrant groups may uniquely impact neighbourhood structures. As immigrant 
enclaves offer residents a “protective shell of resources” (Feldmeyer et al., 2015, p. 2), it is argued 
that these strong social networks can potentially mediate the effect of isolation and deprivation on 
crime.  
Therefore in Study 3, I consider both the spatial distribution of the immigrant population and 
the co-location of immigrant neighbourhoods and whether these residential processes, in turn, 
influence crime. As previous research finds relatively low levels of residential segregation across 
Australian cities (Johnston et al., 2007), I begin this study by drawing on two highly spatialized yet 
underutilised measures of local segregation - Location Quotients (LQs) and Local Moran’ s I. I use 
these measures to address two questions:  
1. How are immigrant groups spatially distributed across Brisbane and Sydney?  
2. Are immigrant neighbourhoods co-located within each city or isolated? 
After establishing these spatial trends, I consider the effect of residential segregation on crime. 
Employing negative binomial regression and focusing on data from one time point (2011), I ask two 
additional questions: 
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3. How does the residential distribution of each immigrant group impact violent crime? 
4. Is the co-location of immigrant neighbourhoods associated with more or less 
neighbourhood violence?  
Together, these three quantitative studies address the overarching aim of this research - that is 
to determine whether the theories derived from the United States immigration-crime experience 
generalise to the Australian context.   
1.6 Thesis overview  
This thesis is comprised of 8 chapters. In this chapter, I introduced the global debate 
surrounding immigrants, immigration and crime, established Australia as an important research site 
and outlined the key research questions. In Chapter 2, I provide a comprehensive overview of the 
empirical literature starting with the immigrant-crime link (immigrants as perpetrators) and then 
moving to the immigration-crime link (the effect of immigration on crime). I outline in detail the 
central tenets of the key theories used to explain the immigration-crime link - with particular focus 
on social disorganisation theory and the immigration revitalisation thesis. I also address the role 
context plays in moderating the immigration-crime relationship by comparing research in new and 
established contexts and pointing to the inconsistencies in the international literature. 
 In Chapter 3, I narrow my focus to the Australian context. Here, I discuss historical trends in 
immigration and provide an overview of Australia’s immigrant population today. Reflecting on the 
contextual arguments outlined in Chapter 2, I describe Australia’s controlled migration program, 
attitudes towards immigrants and immigrant settlement patterns. To conclude this chapter, I review 
the limited research interested in the immigrant-crime link and immigration-crime link in Australia. 
In Chapter 4, I outline the methodology of my research. Specifically, I provide an in-depth overview 
of the two research sites, describe the data sources employed, and summarise the analytic approach 
utilised in each of the three studies. In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I present the results of the three empirical 
studies. In Chapter 8, I further discuss the key findings of this thesis and reflect on the implications 
for theory and policy. I conclude this chapter - and this thesis - by highlighting the limitations of this 
work and identifying areas for future research.  
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Chapter Two: Immigration and Crime  
 
2.1 Introduction  
Myths surrounding the criminal immigrant and the criminogenic effects of immigration are 
deeply rooted in public opinion, shaped by political rhetoric and fanned by sensationalist media 
accounts. However, whether or not these concerns reflect an empirical reality is highly questionable. 
This chapter reviews what is currently known about immigration and crime in the international 
context. Specifically, I discuss literature related to both the immigrant-crime link (immigrants as 
perpetrators) and the immigration-crime link (the effect of immigration on crime rates). In doing so, I 
explore empirical studies from the United States and abroad. I also outline the central tenets of the 
two competing ecological perspectives most commonly employed to explain the relationship 
between immigration and crime - social disorganisation theory and the immigration revitalisation 
thesis. I conclude this chapter by discussing new directions in immigration-crime research.   
2.2 Immigrant-crime link 
Immigrants are presumed to offend at a disproportionately higher rate than natives due to a 
range of social, economic and cultural factors (Lee & Martinez, 2009; Martinez & Lee, 2000; 
Thomas, 2011). Yet studies in the United States, find limited empirical support for these predictions. 
Here scholars typically find first generation immigrants display relatively low criminal propensities 
(Butcher & Piehl, 1998a; Butcher & Piehl, 1998b; Butcher & Piehl, 2007; Hagan & Palloni, 1999; 
Morenoff & Astor, 2006; Rumbaut et al., 2006; Sampson, 2008; Vaughn, Salas-Wright, DeLisi, & 
Maynard, 2014). Whilst generational disparities do exist, second generation immigrants are generally 
no more crime prone than their native born counterparts (Bersani, 2014a; Bersani, 2014b; Morenoff 
& Astor, 2006; Rumbaut et al., 2006). However, outside of the United States, the immigrant-crime 
link is less conclusive. In some settings, particularly in Europe, certain immigrant groups are 
overrepresented in official crime statistics (Albrecht, 1997; Lehti, 2015; Martens, 1997; Martens & 
Holmberg, 2005; Skardhamar et al., 2014). This divergence suggests context may matter in 
determining the significance and direction of the immigrant-crime relationship.  
Immigrant involvement in crime 
Immigrants are not thought to be inherently criminal but rather the challenges of life in their 
new host country can form a source of strain and frustration that in turn manifests into offending. In 
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the United States, certain immigrant groups (for example, Mexicans) are disproportionately young, 
male, and poorly educated – all characteristics associated with crime amongst natives (Terrazas, 
2010). As such, immigrants are generally considered a high-risk population for crime (Hagan & 
Palloni, 1999). Immigrants also face systemic discrimination in the workforce and encounter higher 
rates of unemployment and lower household incomes (De Jong & Madamba, 2001; Rumbaut et al., 
2006; Schnepf, 2008). According to strain theories, these circumstances make immigrants more 
vulnerable to crime (Thomas, 2011). While many migrate with the intention to better their and their 
children’s lives, immigrants can face constant barriers to achieving upward social mobility.   
Other theories, like the migration selection effects thesis, predict immigrants will offend at a 
lower rate than natives. This is because immigrants are a self-selected group who decide to migrate 
as opposed to a random cross section of the sending population (Tonry, 1997). According to 
Sampson (2008, p. 30) immigrants “selectively migrate on characteristics that predispose them to 
low crime, such as motivation to work, ambition and a desire not to be deported.” Due to the high 
stakes immigrants have in conformity, it is likely that they will assume the role of law-abiding 
citizens following settlement. Thus the process of migration itself actually selects individuals who 
are particularly responsive to deterrent mechanisms and possess fewer criminogenic tendencies 
(Butcher & Piehl, 2007).  
Most empirical evaluations of the immigrant-crime link focus on the growing Latino 
population in the United States. Here, immigrants are consistently found to be less involved in crime 
compared to the native born population (Butcher & Piehl, 1998; Butcher & Piehl, 2007; Hagan & 
Palloni, 1999; Sampson, 2008). In fact, evidence from the Project on Human Development in 
Chicago neighbourhoods suggests first generation immigrants are 45% less likely to act violently 
than their third generation counterparts (Sampson, 2008). Once accounting for age, gender and 
differential treatment in the criminal justice system, Hagan and Palloni (1999) found the rate of 
imprisonment for Hispanic immigrants in El Paso and San Diego was significantly lower than 
natives (Hagan & Palloni, 1999). Other studies uncover similar findings. Even without controlling 
for demographic differences, Butcher and Piehl (1998a) found that foreign born youth were less 
likely than native youth to be involved in crime.  
These trends are consistent over time. In analysing data from the 2010 American Community 
Survey, Ewing and colleagues (2015) found lower rates of incarceration amongst the immigrant male 
population (1.6%) compared to the native male population (3.3%). Drawing on census data from 
1980, 1990 and 2000, the authors argue this disparity is relatively stable over time with the 
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incarceration rate of natives two to five times greater than the incarceration rate of immigrants 
(Ewing, Martinez & Rumbaut, 2015). Immigrant-crime scholarship is thus remarkably unanimous in 
the United States. Despite the challenges immigrants face, most studies draw the same conclusion - 
immigrants do not pose a distinct criminal threat to society (Almeida, Johnson, McNamara & Gupta, 
2011; Bersani, 2014a; Morenoff & Astor, 2006; Rumbaut et al., 2006; Sampson, 2008; Vaughn et 
al., 2014).   
Internationally, the immigrant-crime link is less clear. In the United Kingdom, Papadopoulos 
(2010) found no significant relationship between immigrant status and self-reported involvement in 
either property or violent crime. Similarly, Jaitman and Machin (2013) found that while immigrants 
were arrested at a significantly higher rate than natives (3.5 arrests per 1,000 population compared to 
2.8 arrests per 1,000 population) - this higher arrest rate disappears once controlling for age. Yet, 
scholarship across several European countries reveals a different picture. In Europe, immigrants are 
generally overrepresented in official crime statistics as evidenced by a growing body of research in 
Germany (Albrecht, 1997), Sweden (Van Hofer, Sarnecki & Tham, 1997; Martens & Holmberg, 
2005; Martens, 1997), Switzerland (Killias, 2009), Denmark (Van Noije & Kessels, 2011), Norway 
(Skardhamar et al., 2014) and Finland (Lehti, 2015).  
After analysing official police and court data in Germany, Albrecht (1997) concluded that 
immigrants are more involved in crime than natives with this association remaining even after 
adjusting for socio-economic conditions and demographic differences. Drawing on official statistics, 
victimisation data and self-reports, Killias (2009) found immigrants offend at a disproportionately 
higher rate than natives in Switzerland. In Sweden, Martens (1997) found the proportion of 
immigrants suspected for crimes was higher than anticipated given their population structure. When 
holding other factors equal, these group differences remained, although the effect size was reduced 
(Martens, 1997).  
Considering a broader range of family and neighbourhood factors, Hallsten and colleagues 
(2013) accounted for a relatively large proportion of the gap in offending between immigrants and 
natives in Sweden. Following the offending trajectories of individuals who completed schooling 
between 1990 and 1993 until their thirties (N=63,462), they found that between 50% to 80% of the 
offending gap between immigrant males and their native born counterparts could be explained by 
differences in family resources and neighbourhood segregation. In addition, the authors tested 
cultural explanations for crime by pairing individuals who share the same country of origin. Here 
they found only a small correlation between individuals from similar origins and their level of 
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criminal involvement. The authors thus concluded that cultural factors (related to country of origin) 
are unlikely to be a primary driver of crime amongst immigrants. 
Studies that disaggregate the foreign born population by ethnicity find considerable 
heterogeneity in offending rates across groups. In the Netherlands, just 1% of Dutch citizens were 
officially registered as a suspect of a crime committed in 2009 compared to 3.8% of non-Western 
immigrants (Van Noije & Kessels, 2011). However, this gap is even greater when focusing on non-
Western immigrants by country of origin with 6.0% of immigrants of Antillean origin registered as a 
crime suspect followed by 5.3% of immigrants of Moroccan origin and 4.1% of immigrants of 
Surinamese origin (Van Noije & Kessels, 2011). Though it should be noted that these statistics fail to 
account for the demographic differences between these immigrant groups and natives.  
Group differences in offending rates are also found in Norway and Finland. In comparing 
violent crime and property crime rates in Norway and Finland for 25 immigrant groups, Skardhamar 
and colleagues (2014) uncovered considerable differences between groups. In many cases, 
immigrant groups exhibited a low rate of offending relative to the native born population, especially 
in Norway. Yet for other groups - particularly those where immigrants are migrating for 
humanitarian purposes (for example immigrants from Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and 
Iran), the rate of offending exceeded the native born population. Further still, these differences were 
independent of age and gender. However, it is important to recognise that the authors did not control 
for other key determinants of crime which may explain the overrepresentation of humanitarian 
immigrants in offending rates, namely socio-economic status and racial bias in policing practices. 
The inconsistencies in the international literature are likely attributable to contextual factors 
such as differences in immigration policy and the ability of some nations to integrate their foreign 
born population more effectively than others (Simon & Lynch, 1999). In their cross-cultural 
investigation, Simon and Lynch (1999) considered the crime rates of foreigners in immigrant 
countries (Australia, Canada and the United States), non-immigrant countries (Japan and Germany) 
and countries with both immigrant and non-immigrant features (Great Britain and France). Here they 
found a general pattern whereby nations with more liberal immigration policies exhibited lower 
incarceration rates of foreigners in comparison to nations with more restrictive immigration policies. 
This rule applied to all observed nations with the exception of France where foreigner involvement 
in crime was considerably higher than non-immigrant nations (Simon & Lynch, 1999).  
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In addition to receptivity, differences in the push/pull factors which determine motivations 
for migration may explain some of the differences across contexts. For some immigrant groups, like 
Latinos in the United States, immigrants are pulled to the host country in pursuit of a better 
livelihood for themselves and their family with the hope of achieving upward social mobility (Pew 
Research Center, 2009). While in Europe (particularly in Germany and Sweden), a large proportion 
of immigrants are pushed from their country of origin as a consequence of conflict/humanitarian 
crisis (Connor, 2016). Such groups tend to lack both social and economic resources upon arrival, 
face high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and often experience posttraumatic stress. Due to these 
circumstances, immigrants who are forced to migrate may be particularly vulnerable to crime and 
strain whereas migrants who are ‘pulled’ may be especially responsive to deterrent mechanisms due 
to their high stake in conformity.  
Second generation immigrants  
While first generation immigrants in the United States are not engaged in more crime than 
natives, there is evidence to suggest criminal involvement increases in successive generations 
(Bersani, 2014a; Bersani, 2014b; Morenoff & Astor, 2006; Rumbaut et al., 2006). To account for the 
offending gap between first and second generation immigrants, scholars proffer two, somewhat 
competing theoretical arguments, namely segmented assimilation theory and socialisation processes 
(also referred to as Americanisation).  
Developed by Portes and Zhou (1993), segmented assimilation theory recognises that 
immigrants arrive at their new host country with vastly different skills and resources. For some, they 
will follow a path of upward mobility, improving their circumstances post migration. For others, they 
may stay in the same social class or, experience downward mobility (Portes & Zhou, 1993). Mobility 
is determined by two key factors: (1) social and financial capital and; (2) patterns of residence 
(Portes, Fernandez-Kelly & Haller, 2009). Not surprisingly, first and second generation immigrants 
with fewer resources are at a higher risk of experiencing downward mobility, and as a result, are in 
greater danger of turning to crime. The effect of low socio-economic status is believed to be 
particularly strong for second generation immigrants as they did not self-select (Portes & Zhou, 
1993; Zimring, 2010). 
Alternatively the higher rate of criminal involvement amongst the second generation may be 
a product of socialisation processes, or as referred to in the United States - a consequence of 
Americanisation. Unlike their parents, the second generation is born and socialised in their 
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destination country. Thus, their higher engagement in crime compared to the first generation may 
merely represent a pattern of convergence with their native born peers. If this is the case, their 
criminal activity will be linked to the same factors that explain crime amongst natives (Bersani, 
2014a). Evidence supporting this perspective does not necessarily disprove claims that some second 
generation immigrants are worse off than their parents, but it does call into question whether the 
experiences of the second generation are in fact unique from natives and require separate exploration 
to the rest of the population.  
Common to both perspectives is the idea that the generational disparity in offending patterns 
may be due (at least in part) to different frames of reference (Bersani, 2014a). For first generation 
immigrants, their country of birth forms the frame of reference for standards of living. Despite the 
challenges they now face in their new home country, they are well aware that their current situation 
is an improvement on their past (Tonry, 1997). The second generation however is essentially ‘torn 
between two worlds’ (Tonry, 1997). Their frame of reference is their host country therefore they are 
unable to find solace in the idea that they are better off now. Rather, they compare their situation to 
those with non-immigrant histories (Bersani, 2014a; Tonry, 1997). Although second generation 
immigrants may offend at a higher rate than the first, it does not necessarily follow that they possess 
greater criminogenic tendencies than non-immigrants in similar circumstances (Zimring, 2010). 
Empirical evidence supports the notion that generational status and time of arrival are related 
to immigrant criminality. Morenoff and Astor (2006) found a strong significant association between 
age of arrival and self-reported violence amongst immigrant youth in their analysis of PHDCN data. 
Specifically, immigrants who were under the age of six at time of migration were more likely to act 
violently during adolescence compared to those who migrated at an older age. Further, they found a 
significant (although weaker) relationship between linguistic acculturation and self-reported 
violence. This suggests youth from fully acculturated households are more likely to be violent than 
those from partially acculturated or non-acculturated households (Morenoff & Astor, 2006).  
Almeida and colleagues (2010) uncover similar findings. Using data from the Boston Youth 
Survey, they tested the effect of generational differences and time of arrival on peer violence. The 
participants (n=1,878) were categorised as recent arrivals (less than four years in the United States), 
non-recent arrivals (more than four years in the United States), second generation (one or both 
parents born overseas) and third generation (both parents born in the United States). In line with 
previous research, they found that recently arrived immigrants were less likely to partake in peer 
violence than their native born counterparts while the second generation’s rate of violence reflected 
23 
 
their native born peers. Interestingly, they found that the protective effect of nativity was negated 
amongst non-recent immigrants. They therefore concluded that negative assimilation takes place 
within the first generation, not just in successive generations.  
Employing several waves of data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, Bersani 
(2014a) questioned whether the rate of offending for first and second generation immigrants (n=532 
and n=988 respectively) differed from native born youth (n=6418). Here she found the rate of 
participation as well as the frequency of offending was lowest amongst first generation immigrants 
but similar amongst the second generation and natives. These patterns persisted even when 
disaggregating by nationality and crime type (Bersani, 2014a). In a later study, Bersani (2014b) 
considered whether second generation youth and native born youth share similar pathways into 
offending. Here she found that predictors of crime amongst the second generation were, for the most 
part, consistent with predictors of crime amongst natives. These findings provide some support for 
theoretical arguments centred on socialisation processes and subsequently question the utility of 
considering the second generation as a distinct crime problem.  
Again, studies outside of the United States interested in the offending rates of the second 
generation uncover divergent findings. In Italy, Melossi, De Giorgi and Massa (2009) found nativity 
had little explanatory power in regards to self-reported deviancy. Further, they found no evidence 
that second generation youth were involved in crime at a greater frequency or seriousness than 
natives. In Switzerland, Vazsonyi and Killias (2001) found that second generation youth report the 
highest level of deviant behaviour. Yet, these differences between groups were for less serious types 
of deviance such as vandalism and school misconduct rather than more serious crimes like theft and 
assault. Further, the magnitude of these differences was only small. While in Sweden, Kardell and 
Martens (2013) found the overall offending rate for the first generation was higher than both the rate 
for the second generation and the rate for natives. Their findings suggest immigrants become less 
rather than more crime prone following processes of socialisation and assimilation. Together, this 
literature points to the importance of context in shaping the immigrant-crime link – both for first and 
second generation immigrants.   
2.3 Immigration-crime link 
Regardless of whether or not immigrants offend at a higher rate than natives, immigration 
changes the demographic, economic and social structures of cities and neighbourhoods in ways that 
may impact crime rates (Reid et al., 2005). Whether these changes will have a positive or negative 
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effect on crime is the source of much debate. For example, some argue that an increased number of 
immigrants may heighten crime by adding to the share of the population with a high-risk crime 
profile (for instance, increasing the number of young males) (Ousey & Kubrin, 2009). In the United 
States, Ousey and Kubrin (2009) found that a greater proportion of recent immigrants were male 
(51.4% compared to 48.9%) and fell into the 15-34 age category (53.7% compared to 26.8%). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that if immigration increases the proportion of the population 
that is young and male, increased crime may follow. Also, in some contexts, immigrants face higher 
rates of victimisation than natives (Bell, Fasani & Machin, 2013). Thus, higher crime in immigrant 
areas may merely reflect an increase in the share of the population that is vulnerable to victimisation.  
As first generation immigrants are underrepresented in crime statistics (at least in the United 
States) (Butcher & Piehl, 1998a; Butcher & Piehl, 2007; Hagan & Palloni, 1999; Morenoff & Astor, 
2006; Rumbaut et al., 2006; Sampson, 2008), others argue that increased immigration should lead to 
an overall reduction in the crime rate by increasing the share of the population unlikely to offend 
(Sampson 2008). As discussed earlier in this chapter, the migration selection effects thesis predicts 
immigrants to be selected from the “low end of the criminal propensity distribution” (Ousey & 
Kubrin, 2009, p. 451). On a larger scale, Sampson (2008, p. 30) argues that this selection bias 
“favours the argument that immigration may be causally linked to lower crime.”    
Although immigration is ultimately a macro social process, it has a considerable impact on 
neighbourhood contexts. Immigrants are not randomly distributed across cities (ABS 2014a; 
McDonald et al., 2013). Due to limited social and economic capital, immigrants often settle in 
disadvantaged areas (Stowell, 2007). Any bivariate relationship uncovered between immigration and 
crime may therefore be spurious (Stowell, 2007). Two theoretical frameworks are mainly used by 
scholars to explain the negative or positive impact of immigration on neighbourhood crime: social 
disorganisation theory and the immigration revitalisation thesis. On the one hand, social 
disorganisation theorists argue that immigration is likely to disrupt the development of key social 
networks important for the informal social control of crime. On the other hand, the immigration 
revitalisation thesis suggests that immigration can bring economic and social opportunities that 
reduce neighbourhood crime (Martinez et al., 2004; Martinez et al., 2010; Stowell, 2007). I discuss 
each in turn below.  
Social disorganisation theory  
In their landmark study, Shaw and McKay (1942) posited that certain structural features, 
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namely poverty, ethnic diversity and residential instability were linked to higher rates of juvenile 
delinquency in Chicago neighbourhoods. In poor, ethnically diverse and residentially unstable 
neighbourhoods, developing strong social ties is particularly difficult (Stowell, 2007). Subsequently 
these structural features erode the social networks necessary to prevent crime thereby limiting a 
community’s regulatory capacity (Sampson & Groves, 1989). Thus unlike other scholars at the time, 
Shaw and McKay (1942) did not believe immigrants were inherently criminal or that their cultural 
traditions promoted more crime. Instead, crime was a result of disrupted social structures (Martinez 
et al., 2010; Stowell, 2007).  
Social disorganisation theory assumes an indirect relationship between immigration and 
crime. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, increased immigration alters levels of poverty, residential 
instability and ethnic diversity in neighbourhoods which in turn affects crime (Martinez et al., 2010; 
Stowell, 2007). Key to this theory is the idea that immigrants typically arrive at their new host 
country with limited resources. As a result, immigrants move into resource poor neighbourhoods 
further exacerbating levels of economic deprivation in a given area (Stowell, 2007). Immigration 
also contributes to a neighbourhood’s level of ethnic diversity. The language and cultural differences 
associated with immigration create barriers between residents undermining their ability to build 
social ties and collectively solve community problems like crime. From this perspective, diverse 
immigrant populations are particularly detrimental to a community’s regulatory capacity. In addition 
to increasing diversity and disadvantage, influxes of new immigrants add to the share of the 
population who are new to the area. In residentially unstable areas, residents are unable to develop 
friendships and form strong ties to local organisations (Stark, 1987).  These weak social ties lead to 
higher crime as residents lack a willingness to exercise informal social control in their 
neighbourhood. For these reasons, social disorganisation theorists view immigration as “an 
inherently destabilising or disorganising urban process” (Stowell, 2007, p. 2). 
It is important to note that the theory does not explicitly identify immigration as a direct 
cause of disorganisation. Rather due to its damaging impact on neighbourhood social structures, 
social disorganisation theorists predict an indirect relationship between immigration and crime. 
Specifically, social disorganisation theory assumes higher crime rates in neighbourhoods where 
larger proportions of immigrants (particularly recent arrivals) reside (Stowell, 2007). Yet this 
perspective fails to recognise that immigrants do not represent a monolithic group but rather arrive 
under different circumstances with varied resources. Thus it is likely various immigrant groups 
(whether classified by race/ethnicity or purpose for migration) will differentially impact 
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neighbourhood social structures (Stowell, 2007).  
Figure 2.1 Indirect relationship between immigration and crime  
(Stowell, 2007) 
Contemporary theoretical perspectives like social capital theory and collective efficacy 
theory similarly predict that the increased ethnic diversity associated with immigration will 
negatively impact the regulatory processes necessary to prevent crime. This is because residents 
living in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods report less confidence in the government, vote less, have 
fewer friends in their neighbourhood, have less contact with their neighbours and are less involved in 
charity/volunteer work (Putnam, 2007; Wickes et al., 2013b). Ethnically diverse neighbourhoods 
also suffer from lower levels of social cohesion and collective efficacy (Lancee & Dronkers, 2011; 
Putnam, 2007; Walker & Hewstone, 2008; Wickes et al., 2013b). Yet limited research has explicitly 
considered whether the lower levels of social cohesion and reduced neighbourly interactions 
associated with ethnic diversity and immigrant concentration are actually linked to increased crime 
(see for exception Burchfield & Silver; 2013; Feldmeyer et al., 2017; Kubrin & Desmond, 2015). 
Immigration revitalisation  
The immigration revitalisation thesis was developed by Martinez and colleagues in order to 
explain the unexpected findings in the empirical literature (Lee & Martinez, 2002; Lee & Martinez, 
2009; Martinez & Lee, 2000; Martinez et al., 2004; Martinez et al., 2010; Nielsen, Lee & Martinez, 
2005). Central to this theory is the role ethnic enclaves play in providing a sense of home to 
immigrants suffering feelings of disorientation and displacement (Desmond & Kubrin, 2009). Rather 
than increasing crime, it is argued that increased immigration in ethnic enclaves can revitalise an 
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area by encouraging opportunities to build social ties with culturally similar individuals (Breton, 
1964; Desmond & Kubrin, 2009). These connections provide vital social and economic resources for 
immigrants.  
Immigrant neighbourhoods often boast thriving ethnic economies with specialised 
businesses, restaurants, cafes and open-air markets that meet the needs of the immigrant population. 
These services provide employment opportunities and stimulate economic growth (Velez, 2009). 
Further, in immigrant neighbourhoods, residents are typically active in local organisations like 
schools and faith-based institutions (Foner & Alba, 2008; Portes and Rumbaut, 2006). This 
involvement allows for the additional development of social networks and helps to generate informal 
social control. It is argued that these strong social ties may mediate the effect of social isolation and 
deprivation on crime. Studies find this revitalising effect is strongest in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods (MacDonald et al., 2013; Velez, 2009). In fact, neighbourhoods that had previously 
experienced a population decline and were “destined to become crime ridden enclaves,” have 
actually become thriving social hubs following increased immigration (Martinez et al., 2010, p. 822). 
Yet the process of revitalisation may depend on the degree of homogeneity in the immigrant 
population. For revitalisation to occur, it is likely the immigrant population needs to share similar 
ethnic origins in order to produce strong social networks.  
Empirical evaluations of the immigration-crime link  
In one of the first empirical examinations of the immigration-crime link, Alaniz and 
colleagues (1998) investigated the spatial distribution of violent crime committed by or against youth 
aged 15-24 years. From their analysis of census blocks in three Northern Californian communities, 
they found that the proportion of foreign born residents in an area did not predict youth violence 
when controlling for neighbourhood factors. Desmond and Kubrin (2009) further confirmed these 
findings drawing on self-report data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health. In 
their study, youth living in areas with a greater immigrant presence reported fewer violent offenses 
with this protective effect particularly strong amongst Asian youth. There is also evidence to suggest 
that immigrant concentration is linked to lower levels of reoffending amongst juvenile delinquents. 
Examining the rate of recidivism by 105,573 youth nested within 3,547 neighbourhoods in Florida, 
Wolff and colleagues (2015) found that delinquents living in immigrant neighbourhoods were 
significantly less likely to reoffend - although the effect size was modest.  
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These consistent null and negative effects of immigrant concentration on crime extend 
beyond youth offenses. For example, Martinez and colleagues (2008) found heterogeneity (a 
combined measure which included percent recent arrivals, percent Latino and percent linguistically 
isolated) was significantly and negatively linked to aggravated assault, robbery and drug activity in 
their study of Miami neighbourhoods. Similarly, Akins and colleagues (2009) found no link between 
the number of homicides in a census tract and the proportion of recent arrivals in Austin, Texas.  
Similar patterns are uncovered at larger geographies. Drawing on a stratified random sample 
of 150 metropolitan areas, Reid and colleagues (2005) assessed the relationship between several 
immigration measures (namely, percent recent arrivals, percent Asian foreign born, percent Hispanic 
foreign born and percent non-English proficient) and four crime types (homicide, robbery, burglary 
and larceny). They found that in no instance was any immigration measure positively related to 
crime. In fact, recent immigration was significantly linked to fewer homicides while Asian 
immigration was significantly associated with less theft. In another study, Kubrin and Ousey (2009) 
examined the relationship between immigrant concentration and various types of homicide across 
206 cities in the United States. Controlling for a range of socio-demographic predictors, they found 
that immigrant concentration was associated with lower homicide rates overall, as well as lower rates 
of altercation, felony and drug-related homicide (Kubrin & Ousey, 2009).   
However, there is evidence to suggest that the effect of immigration on crime varies when 
crime rates are disaggregated by offender ethnic/racial group. Studying black and Latino homicide in 
three border cities, Lee, Martinez and Rosenfeld (2001) found that the presence of new immigrants 
significantly reduced Latino homicide in El Paso and Black homicide in Miami. However in San 
Diego, the concentration of new immigrants significantly increased homicide perpetrated by black 
residents. Utilising homicide arrest counts, Feldmeyer and Steffensmeier (2009) similarly considered 
whether immigration had a violence-generating, violence-reducing or a null effect on black, white 
and Latino offending across 328 census tracts in California. Like Lee and colleagues (2001), the 
authors found differences between groups. In this case, immigration had no effect on Latino 
offending but slightly reduced both white and black homicide.  
Recognising that immigration is a social process that unfolds over time, more recent 
scholarship has moved towards examining how changes in immigration impact changes in crime 
(Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Martinez et al., 2010; Stowell et al., 2009; Wadsworth, 2010). This is an 
important step forward as cross sectional studies interested in the impact of immigrant concentration 
on crime are limited by an inability to examine temporal ordering. Martinez and colleagues (2010, 
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p.817) argue that longitudinal evaluations are “the key to understanding the dynamic forces driving 
processes of urban disorganisation and revitalisation.” With this in mind, Martinez and colleagues 
(2010) utilised neighbourhood-level data over three decennial census years (1980, 1990 and 2000) to 
examine how changes in immigration influenced changes in homicide over time in San Diego 
neighbourhoods. To determine how changes in the social structural features of a neighbourhood are 
linked to changes in homicide, they employed fixed effects negative binomial models with the 
logged population included as the exposure variable. Their results revealed a negative relationship 
between immigration and homicide over time. In other words, increases in the size of the foreign 
born population over time were linked to decreases in the number of homicides.  
To test whether increased immigration produces differential outcomes for various 
racial/ethnic groups, Martinez and colleagues (2010) again estimated the models with 
racially/ethnically disaggregated homicide data. In doing so, they found increases in the foreign born 
population were linked to fewer white and Latino homicide victims yet found no significant effect 
for blacks. Martinez and colleagues (2010, p. 821) claim that overall these results provide support for 
the revitalisation thesis and suggest that “immigration halts (and might reverse) some of the 
disorganisation–crime–disorganisation spiral that unfolds throughout long periods of time and is 
thought to play a central role in the creation of permanently high-crime neighbourhoods.”  
Other longitudinal studies have examined this relationship across cities. For example, Ousey 
and Kubrin (2009) investigated the effect of changes in immigration1 on changes in violent crime 
across 159 cities in the United States from 1980 to 2000. Estimating fixed effects linear regression 
models, they considered whether changes in immigration (as well as changes in other 
demographic/socio-structural factors), influenced changes in violent crime over time. The models 
were stepped out in six stages. The initial model focused solely on immigration and crime. Without 
controlling for other predictors of crime, they found a significant and negative relationship between 
immigration and violent crime. Specifically, a one unit increase over time in the immigration index 
was related to a decrease of 253 violent crimes per 100,000 persons. The following models 
introduced additional measures known to be associated with violent crime. After including these 
variables, they found demographic transitions, labour market structure, economic deprivation, 
changes in drug markets and formal social control capacity did not affect the magnitude of the 
association between immigration and crime. Only one measure - the family instability index - was 
                                               
1 Immigration was measured by the creation of an immigration index- (summed the z scores of % Latino, % foreign born 
and % who speak English not well or not at all). 
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found to have both a positive relationship with violent crime and mediate the effect of immigration 
on violent crime. In fact, following the inclusion of the family instability index, the direct effect of 
immigration on crime was no longer statistically significant. Ousey and Kubrin (2009) therefore 
concluded that immigration strengthens family stability by increasing the presence of two parent 
households. These improved family structures flow on to produce lower levels of crime. The 
relationship between immigration and crime is thus indirect once family structures are considered.  
Building on their previous work, Ousey and Kubrin (2014), more recently assessed whether 
immigration patterns are associated with changes in overall homicide rates and circumstance specific 
homicide rates (including argument homicides, felony homicides, drug-related homicides and gang-
related homicides). To explore the temporal changes in 156 large cities in the United States between 
1980 and 2010, they estimated fixed effects negative binomial regression models and two stage least 
squares instrumental variable regression models. They found that changes in the overall homicide 
and drug-related homicide rate were negatively associated with changes in immigration. In other 
words, as immigration increased, homicide rates declined. Importantly, they found that for many of 
the homicide subtypes, the effect of immigration was “contingent and varied, not general” (Ousey & 
Kubrin, 2014, p. 453). Further, they found increases in immigration were most effective at reducing 
crime in cities that had relatively high immigration levels in the 1970s.  
Stowell and colleagues (2009) uncovered similar results to Ousey and Kubrin (2014) at the 
metropolitan area level. Here they assessed the effect of changes in immigration on changes in 
overall violent crime as well as changes in criminal homicide, robbery, forcible rape and aggravated 
assault between 1994 and 2004. They included an exhaustive list of co-variates in the models such 
as: population size, racial composition, education attainment, employment status, family formation, 
divorce rate, poverty, mean household income, adult/child ratio, residential instability, regional 
effects, police size and firearm availability. Overall they found violent crime rates typically fell in 
metropolitan areas following increases in immigrant concentration. When disaggregating by violent 
crime type, the same relationship was found for both robbery and aggravated assault. These findings, 
according to Stowell and colleagues (2009), provide evidence for Sampson’s claims that increased 
immigration may be partly responsible for the violent crime drop.  
Most recently, Adelman and colleagues (2017) explored the relationship between the size of 
the foreign born population and a broad range of criminal offenses at the metropolitan level between 
1970 and 2010. Employing fixed effects models, they found that as the size of the foreign born 
population increases over time, rates of violent crime, murder and robbery decrease. In fact, for 
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every 1% increase in the foreign born population, the overall violent crime rate per 100,000 
population drops by 4.9 crimes. When disaggregating by crime type, similar significant effects were 
found for robbery (4.3 crimes) and homicide (0.11 crimes) but not for aggravated assaults (although 
the direction was negative). Increases in the foreign born population also impacted the overall 
property crime rate (dropping by 99 offenses for every 1% increase) as well as the rate of burglary 
(45 crimes) and larceny (54 crimes).  
A recent systematic review and meta-analysis of United States based immigration-crime 
research further confirmed that immigration is not linked to greater crime (Ousey and Kubrin, 2017). 
Reviewing the results from over 50 studies, Ousey and Kubrin (2017) found that overall immigration 
was negatively related to crime although the association was fairly weak. Thus while empirical 
examinations of the immigration-crime link in the United States have examined this question at 
multiple scales of geography and utilised a range of different data sources, the results from the cross 
sectional and longitudinal literature are fairly consistent. Taken together, these studies suggest that 
regardless of the size of the geographic unit employed, the measure of immigration used or the crime 
type examined, the conclusion remains the same - immigration is not an inherently disorganising 
urban process. 
Empirical evidence beyond the United States  
Similar to the immigrant-crime link, the relationship between immigration and crime is far 
less conclusive outside of the United States. As a general rule, studies find a negative or null 
relationship between immigrant concentration and crime in the United Kingdom (Bell et al., 2013; 
Bell & Machin, 2013: Jaitman & Machin, 2013; Stansfield, 2014). For example, once controlling for 
socio-economic conditions, Bell and Machin (2013) found crime was lower in neighbourhoods with 
higher proportions of immigrants. Homogeneity however was the most important protective factor 
with the benefits of immigration strongest in areas where immigrants belong to the same ethnic 
group.  
In response to public concern surrounding A82  immigration, Bell, Fasani and Machin (2013) 
examined the effect of two contrasting waves of immigration (namely, the asylum seeker wave and 
the A8 wave) on violent and property crime in England and Wales. Drawing on crime data from 371 
local authorities between 2002 and 2009, they found neither wave significantly impacted violent 
crime rates. However, they uncovered considerable differences between the two immigrant groups 
                                               
2 The A8 are a group of eight of the 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004. These countries include: Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.  
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when considering rates of property crime. Specifically, they found a significant and positive link 
between the asylum seeker wave and property crime rates. Further, this relationship remained once 
other neighbourhood features were included in the model. Alternatively, the relationship between A8 
immigrants and property crime was significant and negative (although the effect size was modest). 
The authors concluded that these group differences may be explained by differences in labour market 
opportunities with A8 immigrants better positioned to secure work than asylum seekers.  
In their study, Jaitman and Machin (2013) also found no evidence that A8 concentration is 
linked to higher crime. Yet Stansfield’s (2014) analysis shows varying effects across crime types. 
Responding to claims that Eastern European nationals (i.e. the A8 cohort) are responsible for a 
quarter of the crimes perpetrated in London, Stansfield (2014) tested the link between recent Eastern 
European immigration and multiple crime types across 348 local authorities in England and Wales. 
He found that while the concentration of Eastern European immigrants was not associated with 
higher rates of homicide, robbery or sex offenses; their presence was significantly and positively 
related to drug offenses. Further still, this relationship was independent of other predictors of crime. 
To better understand potential motivations for crime, Stansfield (2014) also assessed the effect of 
changes in employment-related migration, study-related migration and other-related migration on 
crime. Here he found interesting differences between groups. Specifically, growth in employment 
migration was significantly linked to greater drug-related offenses whereas growth in other-related 
migration was significantly associated with more robberies. An increase in study-related migration 
had no effect on crime. While there are perhaps more exceptions to the rule, the relatively limited 
research in the United Kingdom largely mirrors the findings of the United States literature. The 
similarities between these two contexts are likely due to the fact that the two largest incoming 
immigrant groups (A8 immigrants in the United Kingdom and Latinos in the United States) are 
migrating for similar purposes (i.e. work opportunities).   
Similar conclusions are drawn in Canada (Andersen, 2011; Zhang, 2014). Grouping 
immigrants by their time of arrival (new, recent and established), Zhang (2014) found that while new 
immigrants have no influence on the level of property crime in a neighbourhood, more long standing 
immigrants do. Specifically, Zhang (2014) found that a 10% increase in the recent or established 
immigrant share was related to a 2-3% drop in the property crime rate. Investigating crime across 
Canadian provinces, Andersen (2012) found no direct effect of immigration on crime. Rather the 
relationship between immigration and crime was indirect, and a result of changes to the demographic 
composition of neighbourhoods, namely, increases in the most criminogenic subpopulation—young 
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males (Andersen, 2012). 
European studies uncover mixed results. For example, Aoki and Todo (2009) linked the 
presence of immigrants to higher crime across police districts in France. However, the authors found 
that unemployment levels largely determined this relationship. In areas where there was greater 
unemployment (particularly more unemployed immigrants), crime was higher (Aoki & Todo 2009). 
In Belgium, Bircan and Hooghe (2011) found no effect of total immigration on either property or 
violent crime across 589 municipalities. However, they found important differences between 
immigrant groups. Specifically, they found that the concentration of non-EU nationals was positively 
and significantly associated with property crime while the concentration of African nationals was 
positively and significantly linked to both property and violent crime3 (Bircan & Hooghe, 2011). In 
Italy, Bianchi, Buonanno and Pinotti (2012), tested the relationship between immigration and crime 
across 95 provinces between 1990 and 2003. In this study, the size of the immigrant population was 
positively linked to property crime and overall crime. Once endogeneity was considered, the size of 
the immigrant population only impacted the rate of robberies. The authors concluded that as 
robberies are relatively rare events, the effect of immigration on the overall crime rate is negligible. 
Taken together these findings indicate that in certain contexts, under certain conditions, increased 
immigration can reduce crime while in others, increased immigration can heighten it.  
2.4 New directions in immigration-crime research  
Receptivity of contexts  
Exceptions to the immigration reduces crime rule occur because “local conditions eclipse 
broad theoretical predictions” (Martinez et al., 2004, p. 152). Acknowledging this, scholars have 
recently moved towards understanding how outcomes vary across different local contexts. Results 
from this emerging body of research suggest the receptivity of contexts can moderate the effect of 
immigration on crime at both the neighbourhood and city level (Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013; Light, 
2017; Martinez et al., 2004; Painter-Davis, 2015; Ramey, 2013).  
Cities with long standing immigration histories, often referred to as “gateway” or 
“established” cities, are generally receptive contexts (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006; Singer, 2004). In 
such settings, the established co-ethnic community helps facilitate the integration of new arrivals by 
providing access to opportunities, resources and social support (Painter-Davis, 2015). Additionally, 
                                               
3 The authors noted that this group is largely concentrated in one particularly crime prone area. 
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established cities generally have more receptive governmental policies towards immigrants as well 
as institutional resources that can assist with navigating settlement processes (Velez & Lyons, 2012). 
Attitudes towards immigrants are also more favourable in established cities which in turn improves 
job and housing prospects for immigrants (Painter-Davis, 2015). The potential crime-generating 
effects of immigration are thus offset as the government, labour market and residents are well 
equipped to integrate new arrivals both socially and economically.  
Similar arguments are pitched at the neighbourhood level. Harris and Feldmeyer (2013) claim 
increased immigration into established immigrant enclaves can strengthen social ties and networks 
amongst immigrant residents, generate informal social control, and reinforce attachments to social 
institutions like church, work and family. In these communities, co-ethnics are well-situated to link 
new arrivals to essential resources and social support systems. With this in mind, Harris and 
Feldmeyer (2013, p. 205) argue that increased immigration into ethnic enclaves “is likely to offer 
protective effects that bolster community resources and institutions and shelter residents from social 
problems.”   
In contrast, new destination cities are typically less receptive contexts. Without a sizeable 
(and established) co-ethnic presence, local governments and native residents struggle to integrate 
immigrants. Here immigrants lack access to social and economic resources, face oppositional 
governmental policies and experience social exclusion and discrimination (Ramey, 2013). Against 
this backdrop, integration is much more challenging for new immigrant populations. Again, similar 
arguments are echoed at the neighbourhood level. In neighbourhoods with few immigrant residents, 
new arrivals lack access to the vital social support networks found in established areas which not 
only provide access to employment, childcare, financial assistance and housing but also help new 
arrivals overcome language barriers and adjust to a new culture (Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013; 
Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010). Without these resources, increased immigration may disrupt 
neighbourhood structures in ways that increase violence (Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013).  
A growing body of empirical literature (again concentrated on the United States context) 
finds support for these claims (Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013; Light, 2017; Martinez et al., 2004; 
Painter-Davis, 2015; Ramey, 2013). For example, Martinez and his colleagues (2004) compared the 
differences in crime outcomes for Miami and San Diego neighbourhoods- two cities with differing 
immigration histories. Miami is largely a receptive context, particularly for Cuban and Central 
American immigrants. Immigrants here are provided opportunities for low skilled labour and offered 
access to economic and social support (Martinez et al., 2004). Alternatively, while San Diego has an 
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established Mexican population, the city experienced considerable growth in immigration from 
Southeast Asia in more recent years. In contrast to Miami, minority groups are less concentrated in 
San Diego and there are also limited opportunities for low skilled labour. Therefore it is possible that 
San Diego may lack the structures and networks necessary for successful immigrant settlement. 
 In their comparative study of these two cities, Martinez and colleagues (2004) examined 
whether levels of receptivity influence spatial variations in crime across neighbourhoods. In Miami 
they found that drug-related homicides were not higher in areas with more Cuban or Central 
American residents. Yet in San Diego, the association between the concentration of Southeast Asian 
immigrants and drug-related homicide was significant and positive. As expected, the proportion of 
Mexican residents (the long standing migratory group) in San Diego was not related to drug-related 
homicide. These findings suggest some immigrant gateway cities may only possess the necessary 
structures and networks for the successful integration of certain immigrant groups. The arrival of 
new immigrant groups may increase crime in the short term until these resources and networks are 
established.  
Ramey (2013) also examined the importance of receptive contexts across 8,628 census tracts 
nested within 84 new and established destination cities across the United States. Here he predicted 
that new, emerging immigrant destinations may be less receptive to immigration and subsequently 
would experience more crime. The study’s findings support this argument. In new immigrant 
destination cities, immigration concentration was associated with higher levels of violent crime in 
largely white and black neighbourhoods. In addition, immigrant growth was linked to higher 
violence in black and integrated neighbourhoods. Yet in Latino neighbourhoods, immigration 
concentration was associated with lower levels of violence. In contrast, violent crime was lower in 
neighbourhoods in established destination cities with high concentrations of immigrants. This 
relationship was consistent across white, black, Latino and integrated neighbourhoods. This led 
Ramey (2013, p. 26) to argue that revitalisation “is a contingent process”, that relies upon the 
receptive context of the city and the contours of the neighbourhood.  
Several studies since have uncovered differences between established and emerging contexts 
(Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013; Light, 2017; Painter-Davis, 2015). Drawing on race specific arrest data 
for 326 census places in New York and Texas, Harris and Feldmeyer (2013) found that while recent 
Latino immigration was linked to a reduction in violence in traditional destinations, it was associated 
with a slight increase in violence in new destinations. Painter-Davis (2015) reached similar 
conclusions after exploring the effects of immigration on race-specific violent offending in 
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established and emerging census places (N=592). Specifically he found that the effect of Latino 
immigration on black and Latino violence varies by destination type. In established destinations, 
immigration exerts a violence-reducing effect on blacks and Latinos whereas in new destinations, the 
effect of immigration is either neutral or violence-generating.  
However, not all studies find support for the receptivity argument. In a longitudinal 
examination spanning 1990 to 2010, Light (2017) assessed the effect of Latino immigration on race-
specific victimisation rates across 132 metropolitan areas. The results indicated that the negative 
association between immigration and crime was not limited to established destinations (although this 
relationship was not always statistically significant). While Ferraro (2016) found new destinations 
actually experienced the largest reduction in property crime. Drawing on census, crime and 
American Community Survey data for 1,252 census places, Ferraro (2016) found that increases in 
the foreign born population were associated with 228 fewer property crimes per 100,000. Changes in 
the foreign born population had no statistically significant effect on violent crime or overall crime in 
new destinations. It is important to note that any differences across these studies may be attributable 
to the different crime types considered, the varied measures of immigration utilised and inconsistent 
definitions of what constitutes a ‘new’ versus established context.  
Immigrant ethnicity, diversity and crime  
Despite the plethora of research interested in the immigration-crime link, very few studies 
closely examine the particularities of immigrant ethnicity or the effect of ethnic diversity. Most 
research to date relies on a single measure of immigrant concentration – most commonly the percent 
foreign born/ recently arrived in an area (Feldmeyer and Steffensmeir, 2009; Lee et al., 2001; 
Martinez et al., 2008; Martinez et al., 2010; Wadsworth, 2010) or the percent Latino (Feldmeyer, 
2009; Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013; Light, 2017). Alternatively, some studies construct an immigration 
index by combining several measures into one (for example, percent foreign born, percent Latino 
and percent linguistically isolated) (Ousey and Kubrin, 2009). Problematically, this approach fails to 
recognise the potential heterogeneity within the immigrant population and may wash out important 
differences between groups. Further, the focus thus far has been on measures of concentration rather 
than diversity. Only a handful of immigration-crime studies consider how the mixture of ethnic 
groups within a given community impacts crime (see for exception Feldmeyer et al., 2016; Graif & 
Sampson, 2006). 
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Group specific effects  
There are a number of reasons to believe that the immigration-crime relationship may not 
generalise to all immigrant groups. Firstly, motivations for immigration vary - some migrate with the 
hope to secure better opportunities and achieve upward social mobility, while others are forced to 
migrate as a consequence of conflict/humanitarian crises. At the aggregate level, immigrants arriving 
under these different circumstances may differentially impact neighbourhood structures in ways that 
either promote or inhibit crime (Sampson, 2008). Secondly, differences in cultural traditions may 
impact how new immigrants interact and form social ties with established co-ethnics in their 
neighbourhood (Kubrin, Hipp & Kim, 2016). The quality of these social ties may determine the 
strength of informal social control mechanisms. Thirdly, immigrants speak a variety of different 
languages. For some groups (such as Spanish speakers in the United States), they are able to 
effectively communicate with other immigrants from a number of different countries. For others, 
language may create a communication barrier between natives and other immigrant residents which 
in turn impacts social interaction and weakens a community’s regulatory capacity (Kubrin, Hipp & 
Kim, 2016).  
In one of the most comprehensive studies to date, Kubrin, Hipp and Kim (2016) tested 
whether the protective effects of immigration on crime apply to all immigrant groups. In their 
analysis of property and violent crime across census tracts in Southern California, the authors took 
four different approaches to measuring immigration. These included: (1) a total immigrant 
concentration measure (percent foreign born); (2) disaggregated measures of the immigrant 
population by race/ethnicity; (3) disaggregated measures of the immigrant population by region of 
origin and; (4) cluster measures of spatially co-located immigrant groups. In the initial stages of 
modelling, they found that while their total immigrant concentration measure was not significantly 
associated with violent crime, it was related to lower levels of property crime.  
However, they found considerable variability in these relationships once the total immigrant 
concentration measure was disaggregated. For example, when considering ethnic/racial 
categorisations, they found that neighbourhoods with 10% more Latinos experienced 7.1% more 
violent crime while neighbourhoods with 1% more black immigrants encountered 4.7% less violent 
crime. Although the presence of Asian immigrants did not statistically impact violent crime, it did 
effect property crime. Neighbourhoods with 10% more Asian immigrants reported 7.4% less 
property crime. Similar variability was found when disaggregating the immigrant population by 
region of birth. Of the 18 regions tested, they found four groups (West Africans, North Americans, 
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North Africans and South Asians) were negatively associated with violent crime while three groups 
(Western Europeans, Eastern Europeans and Central Americans) were positively linked to violent 
crime. In terms of property crime, they found negative associations for three groups (West Africans, 
East Asians and Southeast Asians) but positive relationships for two groups (Southern Europeans 
and immigrants from the Caribbean). They again uncovered important group differences for the 
cluster variables. While neighbourhoods with more immigrants from the Chinese group encountered 
less violent crime, neighbourhoods with more immigrants from three other group clusters (Mexico, 
Jewish and Central American asylum seekers) recorded more violence. Moreover neighbourhoods 
with more immigrants from the Chinese or Central American asylum seeker group reported fewer 
property crimes whereas neighbourhoods with more immigrants belonging to the New World4 group 
faced higher property crime. Together, these divergent findings highlight the importance of 
considering the group specific effects of immigrant concentration on crime.   
Diversity  
One of the key arguments underpinning the social disorganisation perspective of the 
immigration-crime link is that the increasing ethnic heterogeneity caused by immigration makes it 
difficult for residents to come together to collectively solve community problems like crime. Within 
this framework it can be assumed that language diversity is particularly detrimental to a 
community’s regulatory capacity. If residents are unable to communicate with one another in a 
common language, they are less likely to interact with other residents which in turn weakens social 
ties and informal social control. As a result, crime flourishes. As Feldmeyer and colleagues (2016, p. 
271) explain heterogeneity “may contribute to a sense of social isolation among residents and a 
tendency for people to “hunker down” in their figurative “shells” in ways that decouple linguistically 
diverse communities from the social capital and normative constraints that reduce crime and 
violence.” Yet despite reasons to believe immigrant concentration and diversity may differentially 
impact the neighbourhood social processes important for the regulation of crime, few immigration-
crime studies compare these two effects (see for exception Feldmeyer et al., 2016; Graif & Sampson, 
2006).  
In their analysis of 2,858 census places across the United States, Feldmeyer and colleagues 
(2016) assessed the effects of language heterogeneity and Spanish language concentration on 
violence. Here they found, in line with previous research, that Spanish-language concentration was 
                                               
4 Comprised of immigrants from Cuba, Ecuador and Italy. 
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negatively associated with homicide, robbery and index violence (the sum of homicide, rape, 
robbery, and aggravated assaults). Therefore, places with more Spanish speakers encountered fewer 
violent crimes, net of other place-based characteristics. These findings support the revitalisation 
perspective. However, they found the opposite effect in linguistically diverse census places. In more 
linguistically diverse census places, rates of homicide and robbery were higher - even after 
accounting for other macro-level factors associated with crime. Index violence did not reach 
statistical significance. These findings provide support for the social disorganisation perspective. 
Assessing whether these relationships vary by socio-economic context, they found that the protective 
effect of Spanish language concentration on crime was particularly strong in disadvantaged areas 
(consistent with the revitalisation perspective). While in contrast, the crime-generating effect of 
language diversity was most pronounced in disadvantaged areas (aligning with social disorganisation 
theory). This research therefore highlights the need to consider both concentration and diversity 
effects in immigration-crime research as well as the potential for the broader neighbourhood context 
to shape this relationship.  
Spatial considerations 
As it stands, most studies interested in untangling the immigration-crime nexus have 
examined whether immigrant concentration or growth in the immigrant population is linked to crime 
at the neighbourhood or city level (Chavez & Griffiths, 2009; Desmond & Kubrin, 2009; Feldmeyer, 
2009; Feldmeyer & Steffensmeier, 2009; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Kubrin & Ousey, 2009; 
Martinez et al., 2010; Ramey, 2013; Stowell, 2007; Wadsworth, 2010). By comparison, we know 
very little about the association between the segregation of immigrant groups and crime. 
Theoretically, there are reasons to believe that immigrant segregation impacts neighbourhood 
structures in ways that either generate or inhibit crime. On the one hand, segregation is thought to 
reduce social controls and weaken a community’s regulatory capacity through mechanisms 
associated with social inequality and social isolation (Peterson, Krivo & Browning, 2009). As a 
result, segregation is argued to heighten crime, particularly in disadvantaged cities and 
neighbourhoods. On the other hand, there is extensive evidence to suggest that immigrant enclaves 
offer a “protective shell” or “umbrella of social control” which can actually insulate communities 
from crime (Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013, p. 203). In other words, the strong social networks found in 
immigrant enclaves can potentially mediate the effect of isolation and deprivation on crime.  
Only a handful of empirical studies to date have actually tested the link between immigrant 
segregation and crime (see for example, Barranco, 2013; Feldmeyer et al., 2015). In his study, 
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Barranco (2013) considered the effect of immigrant segregation on homicide rates across 776 
counties in the United States. Recognising the multi-dimensional nature of segregation, Barranco 
(2013) included several different segregation indices in the models (namely, the dissimilarity index, 
immigrant-native interaction and Latino isolation). Here he found that in both new and established 
destinations Latino segregation exerted a violence-reducing effect. In fact, for every one standard 
deviation increase in Latino isolation in new destinations, he found a 37% decrease in homicide. 
Similar effects were uncovered in traditional settlement zones (although the size of the reduction was 
less at 13%). The Latino-Native interaction variable had a comparable impact on homicide 
victimisation with every one standard deviation increase associated with a 62.7% drop in homicide in 
new destinations and a 37% reduction in traditional destinations. Rather than promoting crime, these 
findings suggest Latino segregation has a violence-reducing effect.  
Drawing on arrest and census data, Feldmeyer and colleagues (2015) assessed the impact of 
immigrant segregation on violent crime across 480 census places in California and New York. To do 
so, they employed two commonly used measures of segregation: (1) the dissimilarity index and (2) 
the isolation index. In their study, they found that while neither segregation measure was related to 
violent crime at the census place level, this relationship appeared contingent on the level of 
disadvantage. Specifically, they found that in more disadvantaged areas, immigrant segregation (both 
in terms of unevenness and isolation) was associated with more violent crime. In contrast, immigrant 
segregation was linked to less violence in   more affluent areas with greater resources. The authors 
concluded that “immigrant segregation and isolation can either be protective for urban locales or 
alternatively can make places more susceptible to violence depending on the socio-economic context 
in which it occurs” (Feldmeyer et al., 2015, p. 15).  
2.5 Chapter summary  
When Lee and Martinez wrote their chapter on immigration and crime in 2001, they noted an 
absence of macro level studies interested in examining the effect of immigration on crime. This is no 
longer the case, at least not in in the United States. Studies here present an overwhelmingly 
unanimous picture, immigrants are not more crime prone than natives and the places where 
immigrants live do not encounter more crime. However, these relationships do not necessarily hold 
in other settings. The key takeaway message of this chapter is that context matters when it comes to 
determining the significance and direction of the immigration-crime relationship. Divergent findings 
in the international literature suggest theories of immigration and crime are unlikely to be universal 
but rather highly nuanced and context specific. With this in mind, I examine, in detail, the Australian 
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context in the following chapter and explore a broad range of factors which might affect the 
relationship between immigration and crime in this setting. In particular, I consider Australia’s 
immigration history and current immigration policy as well as native attitudes towards immigrants 
and immigrant settlement patterns. Additionally, I review the limited immigration-crime literature 
available in the Australian context.  
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Chapter Three: Immigration in the Australian Context 
 
 
No motive power operated more universally on this continent…and certainly no motive power 
operated more powerfully in dissolving the technical and arbitrary political divisions which 
previously separated us than did the desire that we should be one people and remain one people 
without the admixture of other races. 
 – Deputy Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, 1901 
 
We must ensure that our citizenship program is conducted in our national interest. Membership of 
the Australian family is a privilege and should be granted to those who support our values, respect 
our laws and want to work hard by integrating and contributing to an even better Australia.  
- Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, 2017  
3.1 Introduction    
Considering immigrant composition varies significantly across contexts, inconsistencies in 
the international literature are not particularly surprising. The composition of a country’s immigrant 
population is shaped by a broad range of factors including but not limited to geography, immigration 
policy, histories of colonisation, shared languages, economic opportunities as well as proximity to 
conflict/ humanitarian crises. Understanding these macro level conditions is important as they are 
likely to determine the significance and direction of the immigration-crime connection at the 
neighbourhood level. In this chapter, I review Australia’s, at times tumultuous immigration history 
and outline the country’s current migration program. As receptivity determines the degree to which 
immigrants integrate and form social ties in their new host country, I consider public attitudes 
towards immigrants and immigration as well as the experiences of immigrants in Australia. I then 
focus on the impact of immigration on Australian neighbourhoods. Specifically, I describe 
immigrant settlement patterns and explore residents’ perceptions of community problems in the 
neighbourhoods where immigrants live. To conclude this chapter, I summarise what is currently 
known about the immigrant-crime link and the immigration-crime link in the Australian context.  
3.2 Australia’s immigration history  
The need to protect Australia’s Anglo-Celtic character from Asian immigration was a driving 
factor in the formation of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 (Jayasuiriya, 2012; Jupp, 2002; 
Neumann, 2015; Walsh, 2001). While colonial governments could limit the entry of certain 
migratory groups, these restrictions lacked uniformity. Forming a federal governing body was thus 
necessary in order to impose stricter controls over immigration flows (Walsh, 2001). At the turn of 
the twentieth century, Australia’s population was more ethnically homogenous than Britain’s with 
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the country’s three and a half million residents mostly of British or Irish decent (Neumann, 2015). 
Despite comprising less than 2% of the total population, Asians and Pacific Islanders were perceived 
to threaten Australia’s whiteness (Jupp, 2002; Neumann, 2015). Given the country’s geographic 
isolation from Europe and close proximity to the Asian region, fear of invasion was also high (Ang, 
2003).  
In response to these growing anxieties, the newly formed federal government quickly passed 
the Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901 which facilitated the deportation of approximately 7,500 
Melanesians, originally recruited as indentured labourers to work on Queensland’s sugarcane fields 
(Neumann, 2015). On the same day, the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 was officially enacted - 
marking the beginning of what is colloquially referred to as the White Australia policy (Jupp, 2002; 
Tavan, 2005). In essence, the act prevented the entry of non-whites through the use of a controversial 
dictation test. The test required prospective settlers to write out at dictation, fifty words in a 
European language chosen by an immigration official (Robertson, Hohmann & Stewart, 2005). 
Conducted in a language unfamiliar to the applicant, the test was designed for all “undesirable” 
migrants to fail (Jupp, 2002; Robertson et al., 2005).  
The act therefore imposed a racial barrier without specifically referring to race. Rather it was 
disguised (albeit poorly) for foreign policy purposes as an education test intended to exclude the 
“uneducated” from joining Australian society (Jupp, 1995; Robertson et al., 2005). As the legislation 
included penalties for the masters and owners of ships who brought prohibited migrants to Australia, 
shipping companies refused to issue tickets to non-whites (Jupp, 2002; Neumann, 2015). As such, 
the threat of the test operated as a strong deterrent - it was actually carried out less than 2,000 times 
(Neumann, 2015). In later years, further amendments to the act allowed immigration officials to 
administer the test to immigrants post arrival - providing the impetus for deportation (Dutton, 2002).                                                                                                                                                                                                 
At the time, a belief in racial purity and white superiority was deeply embedded in the 
Australian public conscience and thus the restricted entry of non-Europeans received widespread 
public support (Walsh, 2001). By 1947, non-European settlers represented just 0.21% of the total 
population (Tavan, 2005). Between 1901 and 1947, the Chinese population - the largest non-
European minority - shrank from 29,900 to just 6,400 (Neumann, 2015). Australia was deemed one 
of the “whitest” countries in the world (Jupp, 1995; 2002).  
In the aftermath of World War II, the Australian government launched its ‘populate or perish’ 
mandate with population growth considered key to ensuring both national security and economic 
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prosperity (Birrell, 2009; Jupp, 2002; Walsh, 2001). Receiving bipartisan support, this high 
migration policy saw Australia’s population almost double in size between 1945 and 1975 - 
increasing from seven and a half million to thirteen million (Walsh, 2001). As a result, the proportion 
of the population born overseas rose from 9.8% in 1947 to over 20% by 1971 (Markus et al., 2009).  
These new immigrants were largely recruited through a series of assisted immigration 
agreements with the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Greece and Italy (Burnley, 2001; 
Jupp, 2002). While British immigrants continued to represent the largest incoming group, 
immigrants from continental Europe accounted for half of all new arrivals during the post war period 
(Walsh, 2001). Several non-British populations thus experienced exponential growth. For example, 
the Netherlands-born population grew from just 2,000 in 1947 to 102,000 by 1961 (Jupp, 2002). 
While in the same time frame, the number of German immigrants dramatically increased from 
14,000 to 109,000 (Jupp, 2002). In 1947, 12,000 Greeks and 34,000 Italians were living in Australia, 
however by 1966, this figure grew to 140,000 and 267,000 respectively (Jupp, 2002). Notably, 
polling data at the time revealed overly negative attitudes towards Southern European immigrants 
with natives voicing concerns of ghetto formation and crime (Jupp, 2002).  
While the Migration Act 1958 saw the abolishment of the dictation test (Meaney, 1995), the last 
remnants of the White Australia Policy were not dismantled until the 1970s (Jupp, 1995). In 1973, 
the Whitlam Government introduced a Universal Migration Policy allowing for anyone - regardless 
of race, nationality or religion - to migrate to Australia (Walsh, 2001). At this time, the government 
began prioritising the entry of skilled migrants on a points based system (Meaney, 1995). Despite 
this significant policy shift, Australia’s population remained largely Anglo-Celtic until 1975 (Walsh, 
2001). Facing increasing international pressure to respond to the refugee crisis following the 
Vietnam War, the Fraser government welcomed 90,000 Indochinese refugees between 1975 and 
1984 (Meaney, 1995). Since the 1980s, at least one third of Australia’s immigrant population has 
come from the Asian region (Meaney, 1995; ABS, 2011).  
Despite increasing diversity, it wasn’t until 1989 that Australia officially embraced 
multiculturalism. Launching the ‘National Agenda for a Multicultural Society,’ the Hawke 
government promoted Australia as a tolerant and harmonious society enriched by the mixture of 
different cultures (Walsh, 2001). While multiculturalism was accepted without much opposition 
(Jupp, 2002), some, like historian Geoffrey Blainey voiced fears about Australia “becoming a nation 
of tribes” and “a giant rooming house for the world” (Birrell, 2009, p. 74). While the Asian 
population represented only a small proportion of the total population, concern around the 
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‘Asianisation’ of Australia grew during the 1980s and was revived during the mid to late 1990s by 
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party (Markus et al., 2009). At the height of their popularity, One 
Nation won 22.7% of the vote in the 1990 Queensland State Election and 8.4% of the vote in the 
1998 National Election (Markus et al., 2009). The relative success of One Nation reflects the 
growing discontent over racial and ethnic issues at the time.  
3.3 Recent trends in Australian immigration   
 Australia today is a nation of immigrants. With over a quarter of the population born 
overseas, Australia’s immigrant share surpasses other prominent destination countries like the United 
States (13.2%), Canada (19.9%), New Zealand (23.9%) and the United Kingdom (13.2%) (OECD, 
2016). In fact, almost one in every two Australian is a first or second generation immigrant (ABS, 
2012). Without immigration, Australia’s population would be in net decline; immigration is the 
leading contributor to population growth - exceeding natural births since 2006 (Markus, 2013). 
Table 3.1 Top 10 countries of birth for the foreign born population 
Country of Birth Number Percentage 
United Kingdom  1,101,100 20.8% 
New Zealand 483,400 9.1% 
China  319,000 6.0% 
India  295,400 5.6% 
Italy  185,400 3.5% 
Vietnam  185,000 3.5% 
Philippines  171,200  3.2% 
South Africa  145,700 2.8% 
Malaysia  116,200 2.2% 
Germany  108,000 2.0% 
Born elsewhere overseas  2,183,800 41.2% 
Total foreign born population  5,294,200 100% 
        (ABS, 2011) 
As an enduring effect of the White Australia era (Jupp, 2002), immigrants from the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand continue to represent the largest foreign born groups in Australia (ABS, 
2012). These typically white, English speaking immigrants comprise 20.8% and 9.1% of the foreign 
born population respectively (see Table 3.1). However, the last decade in particular has witnessed 
significant growth and diversification in Australia’s immigrant population - largely driven by the 
Asian region. Between 2001 and 2011, an additional 200,000 Indian and 176,000 Chinese 
immigrants were added to the residential population (ABS, 2012). Yet while Indian and Chinese 
natives now represent the third and fourth largest immigrant groups in Australia (and the most 
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sizeable ethnic minorities), their respective share of the foreign born population (around 6% each) is 
still relatively small (ABS, 2012)- especially when compared to key ethnic groups in other settings.  
Differences between the established and newly arrived population - particularly in terms of 
birthplace, language and religious affiliation5 - highlight the changing nature of Australian 
immigration. For example, one in four established immigrants were born in the United Kingdom 
with the top ten birthplaces including four Asian and four European countries (ABS, 2012). Yet for 
recent arrivals, India is the leading birthplace and only one European country - the United Kingdom - 
ranks within the top ten. For recent arrivals, Asian countries dominate, claiming eight of the top ten 
positions.  
Table 3.2 Top four languages other than English by time of arrival  
Established Population Recently Arrived 
Language Percentage  Language Percentage  
Mandarin  4.3% Mandarin  10.8% 
Cantonese  4.2% Punjabi 3.7% 
Italian  3.7% Hindi  3.3% 
Vietnamese  3.2% Arabic 3.0% 
         (ABS, 2011) 
Recent arrivals are also more likely to speak a language other than English at home (67% 
compared to 49%) and report lower levels of English proficiency (ABS, 2012). As illustrated in 
Table 3.2, recent waves of migration have seen a shift in the languages immigrants speak at home. 
Also notable are differences in religious affiliation between the two groups. In particular, recently 
arrived immigrants are more likely to be affiliated with non-Christian religions compared to 
established immigrants (see Figure 3.1). These trends reflect a growing presence of immigrants from 
non-European backgrounds in Australia.  
Recent arrivals represent a larger proportion of certain immigrant groups - a trend which 
reflects various waves of migration to Australia. For example, recent arrivals make up almost half of 
the Indian population (47%) and over a third of the Chinese population (35%). By comparison, 
recent arrivals comprise only 11% of the British population (ABS, 2012b). As a consequence of 
natural deaths, emigration and a general shift in migration patterns6, certain immigrant groups 
represent a smaller share of the immigrant population in 2011 than in 2001. In particular, the 
                                               
5 Recently arrived is defined by the ABS as arriving between census points, in this case any persons who arrived between 
2007 and census night 2011.   
6 It is important to recognize that a decline in the percentage share does not necessarily reflect a decline in the raw 
number or even a reduction in immigration.  
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proportion of immigrants born in a European country dropped from 52% in 2001 to 40% in 
2011(ABS, 2012).  
Figure 3.1 Religious affiliation by time of arrival  
                   (ABS, 2011) 
3.4 Immigration policy and Australia’s current migration program  
Historically, Australian immigration was characterised by a process of social engineering 
with the purpose to create a particular kind of society (Markus et al., 2009). To a lesser extent, this 
trend remains today with Australia’s immigration program designed to “cherry pick” high skilled 
immigrants, utilising a point-based system similar to Canada (Bertone 2009, p. 87). Each year, over 
120,000 skilled visas are allocated compared to around 60,000 family visas and 13,000 humanitarian 
visas (Spinks, 2016). Table 3.3 provides a breakdown of the number of visas granted to incoming 
permanent immigrants annually. In addition to these permanent migrants, Australia attracts a 
substantial number of temporary migrants each year for work and study. New Zealand immigrants 
are not counted in migration program statistics with the Trans-Tasman agreement allowing for 
relatively free movement between the two countries. I discuss these key aspects of the migration 
program in turn.  
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Table 3.3 Granted visas for permanent residency 
 2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16  
Migration Program         
Skill Stream 107,868 113,725 125,755 128,973 128,550 127,774 128,550  
Family Stream 60,254 54,543 58,604 60,185 61,112 61,085 57,400  
Special Eligibility  501 417 639 842 338 238 308  
Humanitarian Program         
Refugee  6,003 5,998 6,004 12,012 6,501 6,003 8,284 
Special Humanitarian  3,233 2,973 714 503 4,515 6,007 7,268  
Onshore  4,534 4,828 7,041 7,504 2,752 2,747 2,003  
(DIAC, 2010a; 2010b; 2011a; 2011b; 2012a; 2012b; 2013a; 2013b; DIPB, 2014a; 2014b; 2015a; 
2015b; 2016a; 2016b)  
 
Migration program  
Australia’s migration program is capped by the federal government at a set level each year 
and comprises two key streams: (1) the skilled stream and (2) the family stream. Within the skilled 
stream are four main subcategories: points based skilled migration; permanent employer 
sponsorship; the business innovation and investment program and distinguished talent (DIAC, 
2013a). The points based system comprises the largest group - around 56.7% (DIPB, 2016a). These 
potential immigrants are assessed on a number of selection criteria such as skills/qualifications, age, 
work experience and English proficiency (DIBP, 2016a).  
The family stream, as the name suggests, reunites close family members - mainly partners, 
fiancés and dependent children. Other family members including parents, orphan relatives, care 
givers, aged dependent relatives and remaining relatives can qualify for family visas (DIAC, 2013a). 
Unlike skilled stream immigrants, family stream applicants are not assessed on the basis of skills or 
English proficiency (DIAC, 2013a). Rather, their relationship with their sponsor in Australia forms 
the key selection criteria. However, family stream candidates are still examined against the same 
health and character requirements as skilled migrants (DIAC, 2013a). Figure 3.2 provides a 
breakdown of the key source countries for the migration program in the 2010-11 financial year. 
Here, seven of the top ten countries are in the Asian region, a consistent trend in recent years.  
Australia’s highly controlled strategy has resulted in a relatively well-educated and 
employable foreign born population. In fact, immigrants in Australia are more likely to be tertiary 
educated than natives (24.5% compared to 12.05%) (ABS, 2011). Despite public concerns that 
immigrants steal native jobs (Mayda, 2006; McLaren & Johnson, 2007; Sides & Citrin, 2007), 
limited empirical evidence supports these claims (Breunig, Deutscher & Tho, 2017). Rather, skilled 
migration in Australia fills critical skill shortages in certain industries – redressing the issue of an 
aging workforce while also stimulating economic growth (Markus et al., 2009).  
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 Figure 3.2 Top 10 source countries for the migration program 2010-2011 
               (DIAC, 2012a) 
Humanitarian program  
As a signatory of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol to 
provide asylum to refugees, Australia fulfils its international obligations through the Humanitarian 
Program (McMaster, 2001). The program comprises of two key components: the offshore 
resettlement component and the onshore protection/asylum component (DIAC, 2013). The offshore 
resettlement program resettles verified refugees - persons forced to flee their homeland due to fear of 
persecution because of their race, religion, nationality or political leaning (Refugee Council of 
Australia, 2014).  The humanitarian program additionally offers residency to persons for whom 
resettlement is deemed the best option - largely displaced persons who are unable to stay in their 
country due to conflict or humanitarian crises (DIAC, 2013). The onshore protection/asylum 
component of the program allows individuals to apply for protection after arriving in Australia. 
Ideally, the onshore program should offer protection to those who meet the United Nations criteria 
for refugee status however in practice, asylum seekers who arrive in Australia without a valid visa 
are not well received – particularly those who come by boat (Markus, 2016). 
The size and composition of Australia’s humanitarian program is capped each year with 
applications from certain regions prioritised (DIAC, 2013b). Due changing global conditions over 
time, the origins of humanitarian immigrants are varied (Markus et al., 2009; Walsh, 2001). While 
earlier waves were comprised largely of Eastern Europeans and later Vietnamese, refugees from the 
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Middle East and Africa account for a large number of places in recent intakes. As can be seen in 
Figure 3.3, Iraq, Afghanistan and Burma represented the largest incoming refugee groups in 2011-
12. In response to the current refugee crisis, the Australian government allocated an additional 
12,000 visas for displaced Syrians in 2015 (DIBP, 2017).    
Figure 3.3 Top 10 countries of birth for offshore humanitarian visas 2011-2012 
  
          (DIAC, 2012b) 
Temporary migration  
Temporary migration enables migrants to stay in Australia on a temporary basis for work, 
study or holiday (ABS, 2009). Unlike the permanent migration program, temporary migration is not 
capped (ABS, 2009). Rather, it is driven by employer demand and thus there is generally a higher 
intake during times of economic growth and low unemployment (Markus et al., 2009). Due to the 
Australian government’s strong preference for permanent migration, levels of temporary migration 
were relatively low until the mid-1990s (Markus et al., 2009). Yet in an increasingly globalised 
marketplace, the option for temporary migration has become a necessity, allowing the government to 
quickly respond to skill shortages in certain industries (DIAC, 2012c). Temporary migration also 
encourages companies to establish bases or branches in Australia with the knowledge that they can 
move employees with relative ease (Markus et al., 2009). Over one million temporary migrants were 
living in Australia in 2011. Table 3.4 provides a breakdown of the temporary migrant visa holders 
and the leading countries of origin.  
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Table 3.4 Temporary entrants in Australia on 31 December 2012 
Visa holder component  Number of Visas Leading Countries of Origin 
Visitor visa holder  368,050 United Kingdom; China; United 
States; India; Germany  
Student visa holder 254,700 China; India; Vietnam; South 
Korea; Nepal  
Working holiday maker visa 
holders  
134,840 United Kingdom; South Korea; 
Taiwan; Germany; Ireland  
Temporary skilled (subclass 
457) visa holders  
128,690 United Kingdom; India; Ireland; 
Philippines; United States 
Bridging visa holders  110,890 India; China; United Kingdom; 
Sri Lanka; Nepal  
Skilled graduate (subclass 485) 
visa holders  
21,910 India; China; Nepal; Sri Lanka; 
Malaysia  
Other temporary visa holders  25,040 United Kingdom; China; United 
States; South Korea; Japan  
                                                                                                                                 (DIAC, 2012c) 
 
Trans-Tasman agreement  
Under the Trans-Tasman agreement, New Zealand and Australian citizens are able to move 
freely between the two countries without restriction (Markus et al., 2009). Upon arrival, New 
Zealand residents can secure a special visa which permits residency for an indeterminate period of 
time (Markus et al., 2009). Thus New Zealanders - the second largest foreign born group in Australia 
- are not counted as part of the migration program (Markus et al., 2009). In 2012, over half a million 
New Zealand citizens (587,100) were living in Australia on this special category visa (DIAC, 
2012c). New Zealanders in Australia comprise a highly motivated group, exhibiting a greater labour 
force participation rate and lower unemployment rate than natives (DIBP, 2013). Interestingly, there 
is a large amount of return migration for New Zealand citizens. This contrasts typical global patterns 
of one way migration (Markus et al., 2009). 
“Illegal” immigration in Australia  
In Australia, the number of immigrants who fail to use these legitimate routes is limited. Due 
to the country’s geographic isolation, crossing its borders undetected is particularly difficult. In fact, 
persons who stay in the country after their visa expires constitute the only group of “illegal” 
immigrants (DIAC, 2013). In 2013, there was an estimated 62,000 visa over stayers living in 
Australia - equivalent to 0.3% of the total population (Whyte, 2014). Visa over stayers are comprised 
largely of persons from China (7,690), Malaysia (6,420), the United States (5,520) and Britain 
(3,780) (Whyte, 2014).  
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Nevertheless, references to illegal immigrants are not uncommon in the Australian context. In 
fact the majority of Australians perceive asylum seekers who arrive to Australia via boat as acting 
illegally (Markus, 2016). These perceptions are shaped by strong political rhetoric. Following the 
Tampa affair in 2001, the Howard government implemented the “Pacific Solution” to deter potential 
asylum seekers. Receiving bipartisan support at the time, the policy introduced the offshore 
processing of asylum seekers and a period mandatory detention (Francis, 2014). As a consequence, 
very few boats attempted to land in Australia between 2001 and 2007 (see Table 3.5).  
Table 3.5 Number of irregular maritime arrivals 
Year Number 
of Boats 
Number of 
Passengers 
1990 2 198 
1995 7 237 
2000 51 2,939 
2005 4 11 
2006 6 60 
2007 5 148 
2008 7 161 
2009 69 2,726 
2010 134 6,555 
2011 69 4,565 
2012 278 17,202 
2013 302 20,587  
         (Francis, 2014; Markus, 2017) 
 
Close to 50,000 asylum seekers arrived by boat between 2007 and 2013 following a change in 
government and a subsequent ‘softening’ of asylum seeker policy (Markus, 2016). Over this period, 
an estimated 1,200 drowned at sea (Kenny & Davis, 2015). Throughout the 2012 federal election, the 
leader of the opposition, Tony Abbott repeatedly referred to asylum seekers as “illegal arrivals” who 
“turn up illegally” on “illegal boats” (Rowe & O'Brien, 2014). Abbott’s campaign promise to tighten 
border control and stop the boats was key to his election success. In late 2016, the Coalition 
government (led by Malcolm Turnbull) celebrated 800 days without the landing of an asylum seeker 
boat (Markus, 2016). As it stands, Australia continues to be one of the only countries in the world 
where asylum seekers face an indefinite period of mandatory detention (Australian Human Rights 
Commission, 2014). 
3.5 Attitudes towards immigrants and immigration  
Public attitudes towards immigrants and immigration can determine the degree to which 
immigrants assimilate and form social ties in their new host country. On a global scale, there is 
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evidence to suggest Australia - along with Canada - is one of the most receptive countries to 
immigration in the world (Haller et al., 2009; Markus, 2016). A recent Gallup World Poll finds 
support for immigration at current or higher levels is at 70% in Australia and 67% in Canada 
(International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2015). In other settings, attitudes towards 
immigration are less favourable, particularly in Europe and the United Kingdom where support for 
continued or increased immigration sits at just 38% and 29% respectively (IOM, 2015).  However, 
studies find attitudes towards immigrants vary within Australia. In particular, residents in capital 
cities are more tolerant of ethnically diverse populations than residents in more rural or regional 
areas (Forrest & Dunn, 2006; Markus, 2016). There is also evidence to suggest that certain 
Australian cities are more welcoming than others. Indeed, Markus (2016) rates Melbourne and 
Canberra as the most receptive cities to immigration and cultural diversity, followed by Sydney and 
Adelaide. By comparison, residents in Brisbane and Perth are less receptive to immigration (Markus, 
2016). 
Attitudes towards immigrants and immigration vary across ethnic groups. In Australia, like 
elsewhere, there is a hierarchy of preference for immigrants based on ethnicity (Markus, 2013). 
Those from the United Kingdom and other English speaking countries are the most preferred 
immigrants followed by other Europeans. In fact, negative attitudes towards immigrants from 
England, New Zealand, Italy and Germany were less than 3% in 2013 (Markus, 2013). More visible 
minorities face greater anti-immigrant sentiment. Negative sentiment directed towards immigrants 
from the Pacific Islands (4.9%), China (12.8%), India (14.6%) and Ethiopia (16%) is much more 
apparent (Markus, 2013). Immigrants from the Middle East face the greatest level of negative 
sentiment in Australia. In fact in 2013, 22% of survey respondents indicated that they felt either 
‘very negative’ or ‘negative’ towards immigrants from Iraq. Similar negative attitudes are held 
against immigrants from Lebanon (27%) (Markus, 2013). Differences are also seen across religious 
groups. While Christian and Buddhist immigrants face relatively low levels of anti-immigrant 
sentiment (5%), attitudes towards Muslims are decidedly more negative7 (25%) (Markus, 2012).  
These negative attitudes towards Muslim immigrants are not well hidden. In fact, Muslim 
immigration is openly debated and often featured in the media. Findings from a poorly designed 
survey received considerable attention in 2016 with news outlets reporting that almost half of the 
Australian population supported a ban on Muslim immigration – even though more rigorous and 
                                               
7 It is likely that this survey data underrepresents the true level of negative sentiment in Australia due to social 
desirability bias. 
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representative studies find this figure to be much lower (Markus, 2016).  In the same year, television 
presenter Sonia Kruger created a stir by suggesting Muslim immigration should be “stopped 
now…because I would like to feel safe” (Markus, 2016). Throughout Pauline Hanson’s 2016 
election campaign, news networks frequently broadcasted her anti-Muslim, anti-immigration 
position. In her maiden speech to parliament, she claimed that the country is “in danger of being 
swamped by Muslims, who bear a culture and ideology that is incompatible with our own” 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, 2016, p. 939). Hanson went on to argue “if we do not make 
changes now, there will be no hope in the future. Have no doubt that we will be living under sharia 
law and treated as second-class citizens with second-class rights” (Commonwealth of Australia, 
Senate, 2016, p. 939). These incredibly alarmist and inflammatory views continue to be publicised 
by mainstream media outlets with Hanson regularly featuring on the news. Given her return to the 
political area, this rhetoric clearly resonates with a certain subsection of the Australian population.  
Attitudes towards refugees in Australia vary depending on the circumstances surrounding 
their arrival. Markus (2016) finds a high rate of approval for refugees who are verified overseas and 
enter via the Humanitarian program. Indeed 80% of survey respondents indicated support for the 
Humanitarian program. However, those who arrive by boat are less well received. In fact, maritime 
arrivals are widely perceived as “illegal” immigrants and “queue jumpers” with only 32% of survey 
respondents indicating approval (Markus, 2016). Turning back boats – while internationally 
controversial – is the most supported policy response to dealing with onshore asylum seekers by 
Australians. As a consequence of the Syrian refugee crisis, attitudes towards Muslims and refugees 
are becoming increasingly intertwined. Not surprisingly, just over a quarter of Australians feel 
Christian immigrants should be prioritised for resettlement over Muslim applicants.  
3.6 Experiences of immigrants in Australia  
Like elsewhere, immigrants in Australia face significant challenges which can impede 
integration processes. While most perceive Australia to be “a land of economic opportunity” where 
“hard work brings a better life”, reports of discrimination are high - particularly amongst visible 
minorities (Markus, 2015, p. 18). Results from the 2015 Scanlon survey suggest immigrants from 
European countries face relatively low levels of discrimination– with reports ranging between 11% 
and 15% (Markus, 2015). By comparison, newer and more socially distant groups report much 
higher levels. For example, 39% of Indian and Chinese respondents recall some experience with 
discrimination, so too do more than half of South Korean respondents (55%). However, reports of 
discrimination are most prevalent amongst immigrant groups who typically arrive via the 
55 
 
humanitarian stream. Indeed, 67% of Kenyans, 75% of Zimbabweans and 77% of South Sudanese 
report negative experiences in Australia (Markus, 2015). A similar cultural divide is evident when 
considering religious affiliation. Although discrimination is relatively low amongst Anglicans (8%) 
and Catholics (13%), Hindus and Muslims report much higher levels (26% and 31% respectively) 
(Markus, 2016).  
Field experiments provide further of evidence of racial discrimination in Australia. For 
example, Mujcic and Fritjers (2013) considered the treatment of research assistants with varied 
ethnic appearances on public buses. After informing the driver of a fault in their travel card and 
requesting a free ride, 71% of white participants and 72% of Asian participants were able to catch 
the bus. However, the success rate was markedly less amongst Indian and Black research assistants - 
just 51% and 36% respectively. These findings highlight clear differences in treatment based on 
ethnic appearance. To assess labour market discrimination, Booth and colleagues (2012) sent 
potential employers advertising positions matched CVs. In doing so, they examined whether 
applicants with either an Italian, Chinese, Middle Eastern or Indigenous sounding name were more 
or less likely to receive a call back compared to an applicant with an Anglo-Saxon sounding name. 
Again, the results provide evidence of racial discrimination - in this case - against Chinese and 
Middle Eastern applicants. To receive the same number of call-backs as Anglo-Saxon applicants, 
Chinese and Middle Eastern candidates needed to submit at least 50% more job applications.  
Using a similar matching technique, Nelson and colleagues (2015) considered differential 
treatment in the housing market (Nelson et al., 2015). The authors recruited and paired research 
assistants of either Anglo, Muslim Middle Eastern or Indian appearance and sent the pairs to open 
houses for rental properties. In comparing their experiences and interactions with real estate agents, 
the researchers found those of Muslim Middle Eastern appearance were significantly less likely to be 
encouraged to rent a property compared to an Anglo or Indian counterpart (Nelson et al., 2015). 
Problematically, this discrimination can manifest into unequal outcomes for immigrants in 
the housing and employment market. Research finds immigrants from non-English speaking 
backgrounds have poorer employment outcomes than the native born population (Colic-Peisker, 
2011), receive lower wages for the same work (Breunig, Hasan & Salehin, 2013) and are more likely 
to live in precarious housing situations (Forrest, Hermes, Johnston & Poulsen, 2012). Thus while 
attitudinal surveys suggest Australia is one of the most receptive immigrant destination countries in 
the world (Haller et al., 2009; Markus, 2016), certain immigrant groups may not share this view. In 
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fact, 17% of immigrants point to issues with racism and discrimination as their least favourite aspect 
of life in Australia (Markus, 2015). 
Compared to natives, immigrants are more fearful of crime and victimisation and feel less 
safe in their community (Johnson, 2005; Markus, 2015). However, studies consistently find 
immigrants are actually less likely to be a victim of crime in Australia– although under reporting and 
recording practices limit data quality (Johnson, 2005; Makkai & Taylor 2009). Australian Bureau of 
Statistics (ABS) data suggests the likelihood of violent victimisation is 50% lower amongst the 
foreign born population – even more so when considering just those from non-English speaking 
backgrounds (ABS, 2010). Nevertheless, cases of racially motivated crime frequently capture the 
media’s attention. Racist tirades against ethnic minorities on public transport are often filmed and 
broadcast on the news (McCosker & Johns, 2014). In 2009, reports of racially motivated attacks 
against Indian students dominated news headlines and led to a significant reduction in student visa 
applications from India (Mason, 2012). As immigrants are disproportionately targeted for ethnically 
and religiously motivated crimes coupled with the fact that these crimes are widely publicised, their 
fear of crime is not entirely unjustified.  
 3.7 Immigrant settlement patterns  
Immigrant settlement patterns are non-random and are shaped by a range of social and 
economic factors. Broadly speaking, immigrants tend to live in areas close to family members or 
near people with similar ethnic backgrounds (ABS, 2014a). Employment opportunities, income and 
visa conditions also affect where immigrants settle (ABS, 2014a). In Australia, most immigrants are 
drawn to major urban areas. In fact, 85% of the foreign born population chose to live in urban areas 
compared to just 64% of the native born population (ABS, 2014a). Neighbourhoods located in and 
around the central business district are popular settlement zones, as are areas nearby universities 
(ABS, 2014a). Neighbourhoods with a long-standing immigration history continue to appeal to large 
numbers of new arrivals (ABS, 2014a). While newly developed master planned estates attract skilled 
migrants with economic capital (ABS, 2014a). Australian studies find relatively low levels of 
residential segregation and suggest immigrant neighbourhoods are multicultural rather than 
dominated by a single birthplace (Markus et al., 2009). In their comparative analysis, Johnston and 
colleagues (2007) found cities in Australia and New Zealand exhibited less segregation than those in 
Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
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Few empirical studies explore the distribution of the foreign born population across 
Australian neighbourhoods. In one large-scale investigation, Markus and colleagues (2009) assessed 
immigrant concentration across Statistical Local Areas8 (SLAs). SLAs with an immigrant population 
who comprise over 44 per cent of the total population were considered highly concentrated. 
Comparing levels of concentration across Australian capital cities, they found that 43% of Sydney 
SLAs met the highly concentrated criteria (27/63 SLAs). The proportion of highly concentrated 
SLAs was much lower in other Australian cities - 22% of Perth SLAs (8/36), 19% of Melbourne 
SLAs (15/78), 7% of Brisbane SLAs (5/214) and 4% of Adelaide SLAs (2/54). Just one SLA in 
Hobart, Darwin and Canberra reached a high level of concentration.  
Outside of these metropolitan areas, immigrant concentration is less common. Markus and 
colleagues (2009) thus defined a high concentration for non-metropolitan areas as SLAs with above 
20% of the population foreign born. In Western Australia - where a booming mining industry attracts 
a large number of foreign workers - 45% of non-metropolitan SLAs exceeded the 20% threshold. In 
Queensland, 40% of non-metropolitan SLAs were classified as highly concentrated. In fact, all Gold 
Coast SLAs and all but one Sunshine Coast SLA reached at least 20 per cent foreign born 
concentration. However, only 8% of non-metropolitan SLAs in NSW and 6% of non-metropolitan 
SLAs in Victoria met the high concentration criteria. While only a few non-metropolitan SLAs in 
South Australia (4 SLAs), Hobart (2 SLAs) and Tasmania (2 SLAs) were deemed highly 
concentrated. 
Markus and colleagues (2009) also examined whether immigrants who share the same 
birthplace settle together. Here they found that relatively invisible migratory groups in Australia are 
generally dispersed across the country with a few exceptions. For example, British residents 
comprise 24% of the population in Joondalup, Perth - representing the largest foreign born 
concentration in Australia. Despite their overall dispersion, British immigrants make up over 10% of 
the total population in 61 SLAs across Australia. New Zealanders are also relatively dispersed across 
the country apart from two SLAs in Queensland - Pacific Pines on the Gold Coast and Tanah Merah 
in South Brisbane - where they comprise 10% of the total population. Immigrants from South Africa, 
Canada, Ireland, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland are all highly dispersed. These groups tend 
have a relatively long standing presence in Australia and/or share cultural similarities with the native 
population.  
                                               
8 ABS defined boundaries described by the ABS as a ‘general purpose spatial unit’ (ABS, 2001). 
58 
 
In contrast, immigrants from China, Hong Kong and Korea are much more concentrated. 
Typically, these groups tend to settle in suburban middle class areas in the three largest Australian 
cities: Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. Due to high levels of concentration, they make up sizeable 
proportions of the total population in several neighbourhoods. While spread across the country, the 
Vietnamese tend to cluster within cities and remain largely concentrated in areas where they first 
settled as refugees in the 1970s and 1980s. In fact two SLAs -Fairfield and Liverpool (both located 
in Sydney) - are home to 18% of all Vietnamese immigrants. The Vietnamese account for over 10% 
of the total population in eight SLAs across Australia.  
Sydney is home to 73% of the Lebanese population, with a further 20% residing in 
Melbourne. Within both of these cities, Lebanese immigrants are concentrated in a small number of 
areas with 55% living in Rockdale, Canterbury, Bankstown, Auburn, Parramatta, Holroyd, Fairfield 
and Liverpool. Yet despite this high level of concentration, the Lebanese represent less than 5% of 
the total population in these areas. The Turkish born are also highly concentrated in Sydney and 
Melbourne and typically live in similar SLAs to Lebanese immigrants. Even more concentrated is 
the Iraqi population with 62% residing in Sydney and two thirds of this group living in two SLAs: 
Fairfield and Liverpool. Indeed, Iraqis constitute around 6% of the total population in Fairfield. 
Sydney is also a popular settlement city for Fijian migrants (56% live in Sydney) and half of this 
population is concentrated in three SLAs: Liverpool, Campbelltown and Blacktown.  
The degree immigrant groups are dispersed is a function of their cultural distance to the 
native born population (Markus et al., 2009). Specifically, culturally distant migratory groups are 
generally geographically clustered while more culturally proximate groups are relatively dispersed. 
Yet the settlement patterns of some groups go against expectations of cultural distance. For example, 
the Indian born population is widely dispersed across the country with the exception of one SLA - 
Parramatta-Holroyd in Sydney where 7.4% of all Indians in Australia live. Indonesians and 
Malaysians are also not concentrated - apart from around universities. Further those from the 
Philippines are not concentrated with the exception of Blacktown where 13% live.  
3.8 Resident perceptions in immigrant neighbourhoods  
Regardless of whether or not immigrant concentration is associated with actual increases in 
crime, extensive scholarship suggests residents living in immigrant neighbourhoods view their 
community less favourably (Benier & Wickes, 2016; Markus, 2012; Wickes et al., 2013a; Wickes et 
al., 2013b). Research indicates that residents living in immigrant neighbourhoods report higher rates 
of crime and disorder (Wickes et al., 2013a). Studying nearly 10,000 residents living across 300 
59 
 
neighbourhoods in two Australian cities, Wickes and colleagues (2013) found residents perceived 
more crime and disorder in neighbourhoods with higher proportions of residents born overseas, 
speaking a language other than English or practicing a religion other than Christianity (Wickes et al., 
2013). These findings suggest that foreign born residents are either consciously or subconsciously 
associated with crime, violence and disorder and as such, their mere presence in a neighbourhood is 
enough to trigger implicit biases amongst residents. These biases severely distort perceptions of 
neighbourhood crime and disorder. 
Studies also find residents in immigrant neighbourhoods tend to report lower levels of social 
cohesion and participation (Benier & Wickes, 2016; Leigh, 2006; Markus, 2012; Wickes et al., 
2013b). Examining the link between trust and diversity, Leigh (2006) demonstrated that language 
diversity is particularly detrimental to localised trust. In other words, in more linguistically diverse 
neighbourhoods, residents are far less trusting of fellow residents. In fact, a one standard deviation 
increase in language diversity was associated with a 5% decrease in localised trust. Conducting a 
multilevel analysis of over 4000 residents living across 148 neighbourhoods in Brisbane, Wickes and 
colleagues (2013b) found residents in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods perceived lower levels of 
social cohesion and less frequently interacted with their neighbours (Wickes et al., 2013b). Similarly, 
Benier and Wickes (2016) found collective efficacy was attenuated in linguistically diverse 
neighbourhoods and in neighbourhoods with a greater concentration of residents from non-English 
speaking backgrounds. Together, these studies provide support for Putnam’s “constrict theory” in the 
Australian setting with increasing ethnic diversity - largely a product of increasing immigration - 
leading to social withdrawal amongst residents (Putnam, 2007). This process of ‘hunkering’ may 
have important consequences for informal social control mechanisms and neighbourhood crime.  
3.9 Immigrants, immigration and crime in Australia  
While Australia is a nation of immigrants, the relationship between immigration and crime 
remains largely understudied in this context. Much of what we do know (see for example Dovey 
1952; 1955; 1957; Francis, 1972; 1981; Hazelhurst, 1987; Mukherjee, 1999) no longer reflects the 
increasingly diverse origins of Australia’s foreign born population. Only a handful of Australian 
studies have explored the immigration-crime relationship within the last decade (see for exception 
Sinning & Vorell, 2011). To date, these studies have largely overlooked neighbourhood effects (see 
for exception Francis et al., 2006; Sinning & Vorell, 2011). I discuss the limited research that 
explores the immigrant-crime link and the immigration-crime link in turn below.  
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Immigrants and crime  
With the significant influx of migrants following World War II came growing public concern 
about the criminal propensity of the increasingly diverse foreign born population. In response to 
these anxieties, the Immigration Advisory Council established a committee to determine whether 
migrants were involved in a disproportionately higher rate of crime than the general population. The 
series of reports commissioned by the council - known as The Dovey Reports - marked the first 
empirical investigation into migrant crime in Australia. Released in 1952, the first report found that 
the incidence of serious crime amongst migrants was considerably lower than the general population 
despite the notable overrepresentation of young males in the migrant group (Dovey, 1952). Published 
in 1955, the follow up report found no evidence of changes in the migrant crime rate over time even 
though crime amongst the general population increased (Dovey, 1955). The final report (1957) 
further reaffirmed these findings - migrants were no more crime prone than the native population 
(Dovey, 1957). The committee concluded that while migrants were exposed to substantial hardships 
(which in turn place them at a higher risk of offending), they posed no distinct criminal threat to the 
wider population. Fear of the criminal immigrant was thus unfounded.  
The end of white Australia saw renewed scholarly interest in migrant crime during the 1970s 
and 1980s (Francis, 1972; 1981; Hazelhurst, 1987). Francis (1972) calculated the imprisonment rates 
of several key immigrant groups for each census year from Federation to 1966. Overall, he found 
that while rates varied over time, imprisonment was highest amongst New Zealanders and Canadians 
and lowest amongst those from Asia or Africa. These differences between groups remained even 
after controlling for marital status and age (Francis, 1972). While this appears to reflect a divide 
between visible and invisible migratory groups, those from the United Kingdom were also involved 
in a relatively low rate of crime. In a later study, Francis (1981) examined police, court and prison 
data that included information on an offender’s country of birth. Here he found patterns consistent 
with earlier evaluations - migrants as a whole were underrepresented in crime. However, this finding 
was not consistent across all groups. In particular Francis (1981) found that New Zealand born and 
Yugoslav born migrants were overrepresented in the criminal justice system. Yet Francis (1981, p. 
164) warned against labelling these birthplaces as producing crime prone migrants and argued the 
social conditions to which these groups were exposed were likely to explain their higher rate of 
criminal involvement. Collating data from a range of sources, Hazlehurst (1987) similarly concluded 
that migrants tend to commit fewer offenses and are less likely to be imprisoned than the native born 
population.    
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In the late 1990s, Mukherjee (1999) compared offending rates of key immigrant groups in 
Victoria. Nine of the 26 countries examined had an arrest rate higher than the arrest rate of the 
Australian born population. In particular, high arrest rates were found for those born in Romania, 
Former Yugoslavia, Soviet Republic, Lebanon, Turkey, Fiji, Vietnam and Cambodia. Mukherjee 
(1999) explained that these immigrant groups also faced poorer socio-economic circumstances. By 
comparison, the arrest rates of those born in Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the United 
States were lower than the native rate. Despite variation between groups, Mukherjee (1999) found 
that the overall offending rate of the foreign born was significantly lower than the native rate. 
Mukherjee’s (1999) work thus further supports previous studies - the foreign born population is not 
involved in more crime than the native born population (although exceptions to this rule do exist).  
Immigration and crime  
Immigration-crime research at the more macro level is limited in Australia. In fact, just three 
studies have examined the effect of immigrant concentration on crime across aggregate units (see 
Francis et al., 2006; Tran, 2005; Sinning & Vorrell, 2011). Studies that consider the temporal and 
spatial dimensions of the immigration-crime association are virtually non-existent in this setting. 
Analysing state and territory level crime rates between 1981 and 2004, Tran (2005) examined the 
link between Asian immigration to Australia and crime. Specifically, he questioned whether crimes 
against persons and crimes against property are related to either the size of the Asian population or 
the annual influx of Asians. Here he found that the size of the Asian population was significantly and 
positively associated with crimes against persons yet had no statistically significant effect on crimes 
against property. An influx of Asians was not significantly associated with either crime type. 
Additional analyses indicated that neither the size of the non-Asian immigrant population nor an 
influx of non-Asian immigrants was linked to rates of violent or property crime at the state level.  
Focusing on Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Victoria, Francis, Armstrong and Totikidis 
(2006) tested the relationship between multiple indicators of ethnicity and immigration (such as 
birthplace, English proficiency, time of arrival and citizenship status) and various types of crime 
(including crimes against the person, crimes against property, drug offenses, other crime and total 
crime). Here, Francis and colleagues (2006) found that LGAs with a greater presence of recent 
arrivals encountered more crime. Similar effects were found for other immigration/ethnicity 
measures (namely the concentration of Oceanic immigrants, immigrants from non-English speaking 
backgrounds, immigrants from English speaking backgrounds and immigrants with low levels of 
English proficiency). Interestingly, they uncovered a significant and negative relationship between 
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Australian citizenship and crime across LGAs. Yet problematically, the authors failed to account for 
the structural conditions of the LGAs under examination. As immigrant settlement patterns (as 
outlined in section 3.7) are non-random, our understanding of the immigration-crime relationship is 
limited without accounting for context.  
Sinning and Vorell (2011) similarly examined the link between immigration and crime - 
although tested this association at the SLA level. In doing so, they drew on crime data from each 
state and territory government and census data from the ABS. Unlike Francis and colleagues (2006), 
they found no statistically significant relationship between immigrant concentration and the log 
transformed total crime rate across Australian SLAs. Taken together, the handful of studies 
interested in the immigration-crime link present a mixed picture of this association in the Australian 
context. Further, these studies employ relatively large geographic units to examine the effect of 
immigration on crime and thus potentially mask its effects. Thus while Australia is an immigrant 
nation, we know very little about the effect of immigration on neighbourhood crime.    
3.10 Chapter summary  
This chapter illustrated clear differences between the Australian and American immigration 
experience. While both countries enjoy incredibly diverse immigrant populations, they vary 
significantly in terms of ethnic group size and immigration policy in addition to the settlement 
patterns of immigrants. These differences have important implications for the ecological theories 
outlined in Chapter 2. To date, few empirical studies in the United States find support for social 
disorganisation theory’s explanation of the immigration-crime link. This is not particularly 
surprising. Immigrants in the United States tend to settle with co-ethnics - sharing both a common 
language (e.g. Spanish) and a common religion (e.g. Catholicism). Immigrant communities in this 
setting should thus be able to effectively communicate with one another and find common ground to 
come together to collectively solve local problems. Due to this tendency to settle near culturally 
similar individuals, changes in immigration are less likely to impact levels of ethnic diversity in a 
given neighbourhood in the United States.  
On the other hand, single birthplace concentration is rare in Australia. Rather, immigrant 
neighbourhoods tend to be multicultural and increases in immigration may further add to both the 
number of groups present as well as the size of the groups (two key indicators of ethnic diversity). 
Thus in Australian neighbourhoods, the language and cultural barriers created by immigration may 
reduce a community’s regulatory capacity and lead to higher crime as predicted by social 
disorganisation theory. Alternatively, ethnic group concentration may not reach the threshold 
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necessary for neighbourhood revitalisation. Further, as new immigrants settling in Australia typically 
possess access to human and economic capital - a consequence of Australia’s skilled migration 
program - it is unlikely their presence will exacerbate poverty levels as predicted by social 
disorganisation theory. In other words, increased immigration in Australian neighbourhoods may 
heighten diversity without worsening levels of disadvantage. Given these contextual differences, the 
overarching aim of this thesis is to determine whether United States focused theories of immigration 
and crime can readily translate to the Australian context. In Chapter 4, I outline the methodology for 
the three empirical studies designed to investigate this aim.   
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The overarching aim of this thesis is to determine whether theories of immigration and crime 
derived from the United States experience translate well to the Australian setting. Specifically I ask, 
in a country with limited ethnic segregation, high levels of ethnic diversity and a largely skilled 
immigrant population, do similar relationships unfold? To address this aim, this thesis is comprised 
of three quantitative studies designed to better understand how immigrant growth, concentration, 
diversity and segregation affect crime rates across neighbourhoods located in two Australian cities: 
Sydney - an established immigrant gateway and Brisbane - a relatively new immigrant destination 
(Singer, 2004).   
Setting a baseline for Australian research and providing a point of comparison to 
international scholarship, Study 1 utilises an innovative hybrid modelling approach to examine 
whether immigrant concentration influences changes in violent crime within neighbourhoods over 
time and/or variations in violent crime between neighbourhoods. Recognising that this broad 
measure of immigrant concentration may over-simplify the immigration-crime link, Study 2 
disaggregates the immigrant population by language and religion in order to tease apart any group 
specific effects. By assessing both concentration and diversity effects, key theories of immigration 
and crime, namely social disorganisation theory and the immigration revitalisation thesis, are 
robustly tested. In Study 3, the spatial patterns of immigrant settlement are considered. To date, most 
immigration-crime research has employed measures of immigrant growth or concentration (see for 
exception Barranco, 2013; Feldmeyer et al., 2015). Study 3 advances the current literature by 
examining how the spatial segregation of immigrant groups at the local level influences 
neighbourhood crime outcomes.  
Data for this thesis are drawn from three separate sources and aggregated to the state suburb - 
a common unit of analysis for neighbourhood effects research in the Australian context (Benier & 
Wickes, 2016; Colic-Peisker & Robertson, 2015; Foster, Giles-Corti & Knuiman, 2010; Sargeant, 
Wickes & Mazerolle, 2013; Wickes et al., 2013a; Wickes et al., 2013b; Zahnow et al., 2013). Crime 
incident data were sourced from the Queensland Police Service (QPS) and the New South Wales 
Bureau of Crime Statistics (BOSCAR). Information on the socio-demographic conditions and 
environmental features of neighbourhoods was drawn from the Australian Census of Population and 
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Housing. This chapter provides an in-depth overview of the two research sites; describes the data 
sources employed; and outlines the analytic approach utilised in each of the three studies. 
4.2 Research sites  
Scholars find that the receptivity of city contexts can play an important role in moderating the 
effect of immigration on crime (Martinez et al., 2004; Ramey, 2013). Cities with longstanding 
immigration histories, often referred to as ‘gateway cities’ are generally receptive contexts. In 
gateway cities, access to social institutions and ethnic economies is readily available for new 
immigrants upon arrival (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006; Singer, 2004). Moreover, established co-ethnics 
provide a valuable source of social capital and facilitate integration by helping recent arrivals 
navigate their new environment (Velez & Lyons, 2012). By contrast, less receptive city contexts 
typically exhibit limited co-ethnic presence and local governments and native residents often 
struggle to assimilate new immigrants. In such settings, immigrant residents tend to lack access to 
social and economic resources, face oppositional government policies and experience high levels of 
social exclusion and discrimination (Ramey, 2013). Some studies find the effect of immigration on 
crime varies between new and established cities with newer destinations experiencing poorer crime 
outcomes following increased immigration (Martinez et al., 2004; Ramey, 2013; Shihadeh & 
Barranco, 2010). As the social organisation of the city has important implications for crime at the 
neighbourhood level, two Australian cities with differing immigration histories are included as 
research sites in this thesis.  
Sydney Statistical Division (SSD) 
Sydney is the state capital of New South Wales and is the largest city in Australia. Almost 
one fifth of the country’s total population lives in Sydney with the residential population exceeding 4 
million persons (ABS, 2011). Often referred to as an immigrant gateway city (Price & Benton-Short, 
2008), Sydney has served as a key entry point for new immigrants entering Australia since the 1940s 
(ABS, 2014a). Immigrants have enjoyed a long-standing and sizeable presence in Sydney for over 
half century and today represent the country’s largest foreign born population (see Figure 4.1) (ABS 
2014a; Ley & Murphy, 2001). Of Australia’s six million immigrants, approximately 1.5 million 
reside in Sydney with over one third of the city’s total population born overseas (ABS, 2014a). 
While Sydney is the preeminent destination for permanent immigrants, it also attracts many 
temporary workers and international students. Due to its strong ties to the global economy, half of 
the immigrants who enter Australia on temporary business visas choose to live in Sydney (Price & 
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Benton-Short, 2008). Additionally, New South Wales hosts Australia’s largest international student 
population with over one third of all enrolments (ABS, 2011).  
Historically, immigrants from the United Kingdom have comprised the largest incoming and 
established group in Sydney. Collins (2006) describes these foreigners as a largely ‘invisible’ 
migratory group due to the similarities they share with natives in terms of language, religion and skin 
colour. Since World War II, Sydney’s immigrant population has significantly diversified. The first 
wave of non-British immigrants arrived in the late 1940s and early 1950s comprising largely Eastern 
European refugees with a wave of Dutch and German immigrants settling shortly after (Benton-Short 
& Price, 2008). From the mid to late 1950s, large numbers of Italian, Greek, Yugoslav and Lebanese 
immigrants landed in Sydney (Price & Benton-Short, 2008). The 1980s and 1990s saw an upsurge in 
immigrants arriving from the Asian region. In 1981, no Asian country was listed in Sydney’s largest 
foreign born groups. Yet by 2001, China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Hong Kong and India were all 
ranked within the top 10 (Price & Benton-Short, 2008).  
Figure 4.1 Sydney’s population over time (1961-2011)
                         (ABS, 1961; 1971; 1981; 1991; 2001; 2011)  
These successive waves of immigration since World War II have shaped the city into what it 
is today - a mosaic of people from diverse ethnic backgrounds with 96 birthplaces exceeding 
numbers of over 1,000 persons (ABS, 2011). A significant proportion of Sydney’s immigrant 
population (67%) speak a language other than English at home with many affiliated with non-
Christian religions (25%) (ABS, 2011). Sydney is a popular settlement zone for certain ethnic 
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groups. In fact, 73% of Australia’s Lebanese population reside in Sydney, so too does 56% of the 
Fijian population, 62% of the Iraqi population and 61% of the Korean population (Markus et al., 
2009). Between 2001 and 2011, Sydney experienced a considerable change in key migratory groups. 
Figure 4.2 shows that while immigrants from the United Kingdom continue to represent the largest 
foreign born group in Sydney, Indian and Chinese migration grew substantially over the period of 
study.  
Figure 4.2 Changes in key migratory groups in Sydney (2001-2011)  
                         (ABS, 2001; 2011) 
Immigration has played an important role in developing the economic, social and cultural 
landscape of Sydney (Collins, 2006). Collins (2006, p. 146) describes Sydney’s ethnic economy as a 
“defining aspect of Sydney as a cosmopolitan global city.” Shortly after their arrival, Italian and 
Greek entrepreneurs set up small businesses in Sydney. In Leichardt alone, 175 Italian business were 
established by 1976 including (but not limited to) delicatessens, fruit stores, pastry shops and fashion 
retailers (Collins, 2006). Vietnamese immigrants have similarly contributed to Sydney’s vibrant 
ethnic economy. Following the Vietnam War, Vietnamese refugees moved into affordable Sydney 
suburbs like Cabramatta and opened small businesses. Today, the neighbourhood boasts over 820 
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ethnic businesses with Collins and Poynting (2000, p. 39) describing a visit to Cabramatta as like a 
“visit to an Asian city, with the smells of food and produce jostling with the sounds of many 
languages.” 
The established ethnic economy which operates across several Sydney neighbourhoods 
initially shaped the settlement patterns of many migratory groups. Today, these ethnic businesses not 
only help facilitate the economic incorporation of the immigrant population (Velez & Lyons, 2012) 
but also create a sense of home for immigrants suffering from feelings of disorientation and 
displacement. These places effectively encourage opportunities to build social ties with culturally 
similar individuals (Breton, 1964; Desmond & Kubrin, 2009) which in turn, helps strengthen 
neighbourhood networks and informal social control.  
Due to Sydney’s well-established immigration history and strong immigrant presence, 
immigrants living in Sydney have easy access to a variety of resources and social organisations. For 
example, immigrants are able to practice their religion at a number of non-Christian institutions with 
20 mosques, 18 Hindu temples, 16 Buddhist temples and 15 synagogues located within the city9.  
Parents are also able to send their children to non-Christian schools with six Jewish and 12 Islamic 
schools on offer. Further, immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds can attend one of the 
21 language institutions situated throughout Sydney. Legal aid is also relatively accessible with a 
range of migration lawyers operating citywide.   
Figure 4.3 Sydney violent crime rate per 100,000 persons (2000-2012)
             
                                               
9 All religious institutions and schools located by searching the yellow pages online directory and google maps. Counts 
reflect listed businesses in March 2017.  
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With a well-established immigration history, a thriving ethnic economy, strong ties to the 
global economy and a variety of resources available for immigrants, Sydney is in a strong position to 
effectively integrate new arrivals. The size of Sydney’s immigrant population rivals other global 
immigrant cities like New York, Toronto, Los Angeles, London, Miami and Vancouver (Benton-
Short, Price & Friedman, 2005). Yet most notable about the Sydney context is that while foreign 
born concentration is high across many neighbourhoods, these concentrations are rarely dominated 
by a single birthplace (Price & Benton-Short, 2008). Further still, the violent crime rate in Sydney 
has steadily declined in recent years (see Figure 4.3). As such, Sydney provides an interesting 
research site for the investigation of the immigration-crime link in a non-United States setting.  
Brisbane Statistical Division (BSD) 
Brisbane is the state capital of Queensland and recorded a residential population of 2 million 
persons in 2011 (ABS, 2011). In contrast to Sydney, Brisbane is a relatively new immigrant 
destination city (Singer, 2004). At last census, over a quarter of Brisbane’s immigrant population had 
arrived within the last five years (ABS, 2011). Up until the 1990s, there were comparatively few 
immigrants living in Brisbane (see Figure 4.4). While immigrants have long comprised a sizeable 
proportion of Sydney’s total population (25% in 1971), Brisbane’s immigrant share has lagged 
behind (see Figure 4.5). Over the period of the current study, Brisbane experienced an unprecedented 
growth in immigration with the foreign born share increasing from 22% in 2001 to 27% in 2011. 
While Sydney also saw a continued increase on previous years, this upward trend was much more 
pronounced in Brisbane.  
It is perhaps not surprising then that Brisbane’s immigration history differs significantly from 
Sydney’s experience. Unlike other Australian states, Queensland did not experience a gold rush 
during the 19th century making it a less attractive site for immigrants (Burnley, 2001). Due to 
concerns voiced by an overly conservative electorate, the Queensland Government did not promote 
diversity in immigration post World War II. As a consequence, Brisbane recorded the lowest intake 
of non-British immigrants compared to other capital cities at the time (Burnley, 2001). During the 
1970s, the largest non-British groups living in Brisbane consisted of the Italians (7,800), the Greeks 
(3,000) and the Polish (2,800) (Burnley, 2001). Up until the late 1980s, Queensland’s intake of Asian 
migrants was lower than any other state with the exception of South Australia (Burnley, 2001). The 
1990s saw an increased presence of immigrants arriving from Asian countries like China, Hong 
Kong, Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines with some of these populations doubling or tripling in 
size in the space of a decade (ABS, 1986; 1996). Many of these migrants settled in middle ring or 
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outer ring suburbs such as Stretton, Sunnybank and Macgregor with these formerly Anglo-Celtic 
neighbourhoods rapidly transformed into culturally diverse communities within a matter of years. 
Despite the growing presence of non-English speaking immigrants during the 1990s, immigrants 
from New Zealand and the United Kingdom overwhelmingly represented the largest incoming and 
established foreign born groups at the time (Burnley, 2001).   
Figure 4.4 Brisbane’s population over time (1961-2011) 
               (ABS, 1961; 1971; 1981; 1991; 2001; 2011) 
Figure 4.5 Brisbane and Sydney’s foreign born share compared (1961-2011) 
           (ABS, 1961; 1971; 1981; 1991; 2001; 2011)  
More recent statistics show that Brisbane’s immigrant population continues to be dominated 
by immigrants from English speaking backgrounds (ABS, 2007; Forrest & Dunn; 2006). Compared 
to Sydney, Brisbane’s immigrant population is much less linguistically diverse (41% speak a 
language other than English) and fewer practice non-Christian religions (14%) (ABS, 2011). 
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Brisbane is rarely the entry point for immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds. Rather 
many first settle in other cities before moving to Brisbane (Forrest & Dunn, 2011). Like Sydney, 
Brisbane experienced a considerable shift in key migratory groups over the period of study. Most 
significant is the sharp increase in the Chinese and Indian population which grew by 212% and 
350% between 2001 and 2011 respectively (see Figure 4.6). 
Figure 4.6 Changes in key migratory groups in Brisbane (2001-2011) 
         (ABS, 2001; 2011) 
Immigrants in Brisbane have made similar attempts as those in Sydney to establish an ethnic 
economy. In 1981, half of the Greek male population were involved in small business (Burnley, 
2001). Yet many early ethnic businesses struggled to succeed in Brisbane with small migrant 
numbers unable to support the local ethnic economy (Burnley, 2001). Following the influx of Asian 
migrants during the 1990s, a small ethnic economy was established on Brisbane’s south side with 
bakeries, video stores, butchers, grocers and florists opened predominantly in neighbourhoods like 
Sunnybank, Darra and Inala (Burnley, 2001). While a number of ethnic businesses are now 
established across the city to service the growing immigrant community, Brisbane’s ethnic economy 
continues to operate on a much smaller scale than what is seen in Sydney.  
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Figure 4.7 Brisbane violent crime rate per 100 000 persons (2000-2012) 
With non-Anglo-Celtic immigration a relatively recent phenomenon in Brisbane, fewer 
ethnic institutions and resources are available throughout the city. For example, there are only three 
synagogues, eight Buddhist temples, seven Hindu temples and ten mosques.10 Non-Christian school 
options are also limited with only one Jewish school and one Islamic school on offer. While there are 
12 businesses set up to teach English as a second language, all are located in the city centre making 
access more difficult for immigrants who live further away. Therefore it is expected that the limited 
networks and resources present in Brisbane will reduce capacity for bonds and weaken informal 
social control. Thus compared to Sydney, it is likely that Brisbane will struggle to “absorb” influxes 
of new immigrants which in turn may lead to higher neighbourhood crime in locations where 
immigrants settle. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in Figure 4.7, Brisbane (like Sydney) experienced 
an overall reduction in the crime rate between 2001 and 2011. 
4.3 Unit of analysis  
Empirical examinations of the immigration-crime link have addressed this question at 
varying levels of spatial granularity utilising a wide range of de jure units. In the United States, 
studies have employed everything from micro places like census block groups (Alaniz et al., 1998), 
to meso-level constructs like census tracts (Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Martinez et al., 2010; Martinez 
et al., 2008; Nielsen et al., 2005; Nielsen & Martinez, 2009) through to macro level places such as 
metropolitan areas (Reid et al., 2005), census places11 (Feldmeyer, 2009; Feldmeyer & 
                                               
10 All religious institutions and schools located by searching the yellow pages online directory and google maps. Counts 
reflect listed businesses in March 2017. 
11 Census places are non-overlapping geographic units delineated by the United States Census Bureau. Census places 
range in size—from small towns up to midsize and large cities (US Census Bureau, 2012).  
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Steffensmeier, 2009), counties (Shihadeh & Barranco, 2010) and cities (Ferraro, 2016; Kubrin & 
Ousey, 2009; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009). Some have even examined multiple spatial scales within a 
single study. For example, Ramey (2013) explored the immigration-crime relationship across 8,628 
census tracts nested within 84 cities.  
The limited international scholarship shows similar variability in the unit of analysis 
employed. Andersen (2012) considered the relationship between immigrant concentration and 
homicide across Canadian provinces - an equivalently sized geographic unit to states in the United 
States and Australia. In Belgium, Bircan and Hooghe (2011) examined the effect of immigrant 
concentration on crime across 589 municipalities–areas with an average population of 17,900 
inhabitants. Others have utilised much smaller units of analysis. Interested in neighbourhood effects, 
Bell and Machin’s (2013) study in the United Kingdom concentrated on immigration and crime 
patterns across Lower Layer Super Output Areas with an average residential population of 1,513 
persons.   
As this study is primarily interested in the meso level processes that shape the immigration-
crime link, I focus on the neighbourhood as the primary unit of analysis. Like elsewhere, immigrant 
settlement patterns and crime in Australia are non-random. Immigrants are not evenly distributed 
across city landscapes but rather favour certain types of neighbourhoods (ABS, 2014a). In particular, 
immigrants are overrepresented in neighbourhoods located in and around the city centre comprising 
over half of the total population in Sydney and Brisbane’s central business districts (ABS, 2014a). 
Neighbourhoods located around universities are also popular settlement zones, home to many young 
international students (ABS, 2014a). For immigrants arriving through the skilled stream, newly 
developed or redeveloped suburbs are particularly appealing (ABS, 2014a). Not surprisingly, areas 
with a long-standing immigrant presence and an established ethnic economy continue to attract new 
arrivals (ABS, 2014).   
Crime is also spatially clustered in particular types of neighbourhoods. A long history of 
ecological research in the United States suggests that certain neighbourhoods create a social 
environment conducive to crime (Shaw & McKay, 1942; Sampson et al., 1997). In particular, poor, 
ethnically diverse, and residentially unstable communities tend to experience higher rates of crime. 
Empirical research in Australia has uncovered similar patterns (Mazerolle, Wickes & McBroom, 
2010).  
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Yet problematically, there is no universal definition for what constitutes a neighbourhood 
(Taylor, 2015). Neighbourhood boundaries vary considerably in both areal and population size not 
only across countries, but also within (Oberwittler & Wikstrom, 2009). In the United States, census 
tracts are often used to reflect neighbourhoods and usually contain between 1,200 and 8,000 
residents (United States Census Bureau, 2012). Delineated based on population, the spatial size of 
census tracts depends largely on the level of population density. In Britain, scholars tend to employ 
either Lower Layer Super Output Areas (with an average population of 1,500 residents) or Middle 
Layer Super Output Areas (with an average population of 7,500 residents) (Office for National 
Statistics, 2017).  
The issues associated with determining appropriately sized neighbourhoods is described by 
Oberwittler and Wikstrom (2009, p. 40) as an “awkwardly inescapable” aspect of neighbourhood 
based research. While the purpose of geographic analysis is to determine how two (or more) spatial 
phenomenon are related to one another, the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) suggests that 
effects may vary depending on the unit of analysis (Oberwittler & Wikstrom, 2009; Openshaw & 
Taylor, 1979; Rengert & Lockwood, 2009). MAUP comprises two key components - the scale effect 
and the zonation effect. The scale effect (also known as aggregation bias) refers to variance in the 
results at different geographic scales (Wong, 2004). In criminological research, if the unit of analysis 
is too large, the crime rates of several heterogeneous neighbourhoods are aggregated into one - 
potentially distorting empirical relationships (Hipp, 2007). Although smaller units are generally more 
homogenous in terms of their environmental conditions, focusing on small units can also present 
methodological challenges. In particular, when modelling rare events like crime, small units can 
produce excessive zero cell counts of the dependent variable and thereby reduce the accuracy of the 
analysis (Oberwittler & Wikstrom, 2009; Rengert & Lockwood, 2009).  
The second component of MAUP - the zonation effect - concerns variability in the results 
when comparing different unit boundaries at the same spatial scale (Wong, 2004). As administrative 
boundaries are demarcated for non-research purposes, these boundaries may not represent 
meaningful neighbourhoods or reflect the spatial patterning of the social phenomena under 
examination (Rengert & Lockwood, 2009). This can be problematic because if administrative 
boundaries artificially divide an ethnic enclave into multiple neighbourhoods, segregation indices 
will underestimate the level of segregation (Oberwittler & Wikstrom, 2009). Thus MAUP can 
introduce a source of error into the model that can affect the validity of the results. Despite the 
challenges associated with MAUP, Sampson (2006, p. 35) argues that “the place stratification of 
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local communities by factors such as social class, race and family status is a robust phenomenon that 
emerges at multiple levels of geography.” Similar arguments can be made for the association 
between immigrant concentration and crime with consistent patterns uncovered regardless of the unit 
of analysis operationalised.   
Rengert and Lockwood (2009) suggest two important considerations for determining the 
appropriate unit of analysis. The first depends on the theoretical propositions under examination. The 
second is more pragmatic - at what unit is data available? Consistent with previous Australian 
neighbourhood studies (Benier & Wickes, 2016; Foster et al., 2010; Sargeant et al., 2013; Wickes et 
al., 2013a; Wickes et al., 2013b; Zahnow et al., 2013), the unit of analysis employed in this thesis is 
the state suburb. State suburbs are an ABS approximation of localities gazetted by the Geographical 
Place Name authority in each State and Territory (ABS, 2011). State suburbs are a similarly sized 
unit to census tracts in the United States and Middle Layer Super Output Areas in the United 
Kingdom. The state suburb is synonymous with the neighbourhood in the Australian context. 
Research suggests residents recognise their state suburb as their local neighbourhood with most able 
to name the suburb in which they live (Mazerolle et al., 2007). Further studies find certain suburbs 
are stigmatised by high rates of crime and disorder – a trend which is not seen for other 
administrative units such as local government areas or postcodes (Palmer, Ziersch, Arthuson & 
Baum, 2005). Indeed immigrant suburbs like Cabramatta are often perceived to be associated with 
social problems like drug-related crime (Collins, 2006). In addition to being theoretically relevant, 
crime and census data for both sites are available at the state suburb level for all time points 
examined. With this in mind, the state suburb is the most suitable unit of analysis to answer the 
research questions outlined in this thesis.  
In 2011, there were 824 state suburbs located within the Sydney Statistical Division (SSD) 
and 429 state suburbs within the Brisbane Statistical Division (BSD). As this study is primarily 
interested in how changes in the residential population influence violence over time, some 
neighbourhoods were considered inappropriate for inclusion. Neighbourhoods were selected based 
on two criteria: (1) the area had over 300 residents at all three time points; and (2) over 25% of the 
land use was classified as residential in 2011. In addition, four well-known entertainment precincts 
were excluded from the analysis as the high density of licensed premises located within these 
neighbourhoods largely explains the high prevalence of violent crime (Livingston, 2008; Grubesic, 
Pridemore, Williams & Philip-Tabb, 2013). Using these criteria ensured that outlier areas such as 
parklands, agricultural land, entertainment precincts and newly developed areas were not included in 
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the analysis. For Study 1 and 2, this process resulted in a total neighbourhood sample of N=580 
(Sydney) and N=302 (Brisbane). As Study 3 is cross-sectional and focuses solely on 2011, some 
additional neighbourhoods met the population based criteria. The analytic sample for Study 3 is 
therefore N=598 (Sydney) and N=313 (Brisbane). The total persons residing within these 
neighbourhoods ranged from 307 to 43,373 persons with an average population of 6,089 residents.  
Dealing with census boundary changes 
There are additional challenges associated with longitudinal neighbourhood based research. 
Specifically, administrative boundaries tend to change over time as a result of population growth and 
urban sprawl. Changing classification systems also present issues for comparison over time. In this 
study, the state suburb boundaries shifted to varying degrees between 2001 and 2011. To deal with 
these changes, the ABS provides correspondence files which help create comparable units over time. 
Using a proportional approach, data from the 2001 and 2006 census were matched to the 2011 state 
suburb boundaries. To reduce the amount of error associated with concordance, data were extracted 
at the Collection District (CD) level - the smallest available unit for residential data comprising on 
average 225 dwellings (ABS, 2006). 
The process of concording data is relatively simple. In the correspondence files, each CD is 
assigned a proportion based on how much of the unit’s area falls within the 2011 suburb boundaries. 
Data cells for each variable were multiplied by the allocated proportion. For example, if a CD 
recorded 100 foreign born residents in 2006 and the proportional score was listed as 0.75, the 
adjusted score for this variable would be 75. The adjusted counts for the CDs were then collapsed 
and aggregated to the state suburb level. Each neighbourhood was assigned a rating based on the 
quality of the concordance by the ABS (poor, acceptable or good). Based on this assessment, the data 
concorded for 79.30% of the suburbs included in the longitudinal analyses is of a “good” quality, 
while 15.50% is “acceptable.”  
4.4 Data sources  
This thesis draws on three administrative data sources to examine the immigration-crime 
relationship over time. In Australia, each state is responsible for the distribution of crime statistics. 
Crime data was therefore extracted from two separate sources. BOSCAR provided data on crime in 
Sydney and the QPS allowed access to crime data for Brisbane. Information on the socio-
demographic and environmental features of neighbourhoods was drawn from the ABS Census of 
Population and Housing. Each data source is described in detail below.  
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Queensland Police Service (QPS) 
In raw form, the QPS crime incident data listed the x y co-ordinates for all offenses which 
occurred in Queensland from January 2000 to December 2012. These data were transferred to 
ArcGIS for geocoding with each incident that fell within the 2011 BSD boundaries assigned to a 
suburb. Next, the crime incident data were cleaned in Stata and aggregated to the neighbourhood 
level. Daily counts were collapsed to represent annual counts of crime based on the calendar year. 
QPS offenses were combined to create a violent crime category. Offenses classified as violent crime 
in Brisbane include homicide, manslaughter, attempted homicide, conspiracy to murder, assault 
(grievous, serious and common) and robbery (armed and unarmed).  
New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOSCAR) 
BOSCAR provided monthly counts of all crime incidents within New South Wales suburbs 
from January 2000 to December 2012. The state suburb is the smallest unit of analysis that this data 
is provided and thus the preassigned suburbs listed in the dataset were used. The crime incident data 
were cleaned in Stata with incidents falling outside of the SSD dropped from the dataset. From here, 
monthly counts were aggregated to represent annual counts of crime based on the calendar year. 
Recognising that collection agencies record crime differently and definitions of crimes vary across 
state boundaries, offense subcategories were further examined to ensure similar offenses were 
captured in New South Wales crime statistics. BOSCAR offenses included in the violent crime 
measure consist of murder, attempted murder, murder accessory/conspiracy, manslaughter, assault 
(domestic violence related, police, non-domestic violence related) and robbery (with firearm, with 
non-firearm weapon and without weapon). While differences exist in how subcategories are defined 
in the two sites (for example assault categories), once aggregated both violent crime measures 
capture similar violent crime incidents: homicide, other homicide, assaults and robberies.  
Australian Census of Population and Housing  
 The Australian Census of Population and Housing is conducted every five years under the 
auspices of the ABS. With participation mandatory, the census aims to provide an accurate 
representation of the number of people and dwellings in Australia on census night. Additionally, the 
census collects information on a number of individual and household indicators including: age, 
gender, income, occupation, dwelling type and occupancy, year of arrival, ancestry, languages 
spoken, and religion. This study utilises three waves of ABS census data (2001, 2006 and 2011) 
based on place of usual residence to provide information on the socio-demographic and 
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environmental features of neighbourhoods. Data from the 2011 and 2006 census were extracted 
using TableBuilder Pro - an online product made available by the ABS. TableBuilder Pro allows 
users to create large tables with census data and supports a variety of cross classified tables (for 
example, year of arrival by religious affiliation). Tables created in TableBuilder Pro were exported to 
excel and later cleaned in Stata. As 2001 census data is not available online, it was purchased 
directly from the ABS. All variables of interest were cross-checked to ensure consistency in the 
questions and response categories across census years.   
4.5 Violent crime counts as the outcome variable  
Immigration-crime scholarship in the United States and elsewhere has tended to focus on the 
effect of immigration on violent crime (see for example, Martinez et al., 2004; Martinez et al., 2010; 
Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Ousey & Kubrin, 2014; Stowell & Martinez, 2009; Velez, 2009; Wadsworth, 
2010). To provide a point of comparison to international research, violent crime is employed as the 
dependent variable across all three quantitative studies in this thesis. Offenses classified as violent 
crime include homicide, other homicide, assault and robbery. While Andresen and Linning (2012) 
cite issues with combining offenses into broad crime categories, this aggregation is necessary in the 
Australian context with violent crime a particularly rare event.   
In modelling crime across place, scholars usually use one of two strategies. The traditional 
approach is to create a crime rate by dividing crime counts by a population base (for example, the 
residential population) and then converting this figure to a rate to per 100,000 persons. This crime 
rate (or the log transformation) is then modelled using linear regression. While this approach is 
suitable when considering crime across large units of analysis (such as cities), Osgood (2000) argues 
that it is problematic when examining crime across smaller units (like census tracts) where the 
population is smaller and crime events are fewer. This is because crime incidents are discrete events 
and thus the crime rate for any given population relates to integer counts of crime (Osgood, 2000). In 
places with a small population, a single violent crime incident might equate to a high crime rate. 
Osgood (2000) therefore warns that using crime rates at this geographic unit violates the assumption 
of homogeneity of error variance. Specifically, crime rates will produce larger error terms when 
based on small populations compared to large populations (Osgood, 2000). As the population size of 
neighbourhoods included in this thesis varies from 300 persons up to 40,000 persons, Osgood’s 
(2000) warning is worthy of consideration. Additionally, violent crimes are rare events distributed 
across neighbourhoods in a highly skewed manner. As such, OLS regression is not suitable as the 
normal distribution of error terms cannot be assumed when crime counts are small. Osgood (2000, p. 
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23) explains: “As populations decrease, an offense rate of zero will be observed for a larger and 
larger proportion of cases. Thus, there is an effective censoring at zero that is dependent on sample 
size, which has considerable potential for biasing the resulting regression coefficients.”  
To deal with these methodological challenges, many scholars have opted to use count models 
such as Poisson or negative binomial regression. These models generally include an exposure term 
that effectively standardises counts by population size. I take this approach in this thesis and employ 
negative binomial regression to assess crime within and between neighbourhoods. The violent crime 
count for each time point is calculated based on a three year moving average centred around each 
census year (for example in 2001, the crime count represents the average for 2000, 2001 and 2002). 
This helps create a more stable estimate of crime and prevents an uncharacteristically high crime 
year from biasing the results (Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Ousey & Kubrin, 2014).  
Table 4.1 Number of zero violent crime count suburbs  
 
 SYDNEY 
(N=598) 
BRISBANE 
(N=302) 
2001  2 (0.003%) 13 (4.30%) 
2006 2 (0.003%) 11 (3.64%) 
2011  0 (0.00%) 10 (3.31%) 
 
Figure 4.8 and 4.9 show the distribution of violent crime across the three time points for both 
research sites. Here we can see that violent crime counts are consistently higher across Sydney 
neighbourhoods compared to Brisbane neighbourhoods, reflecting the greater population size and 
density in Sydney neighbourhoods. While violent crime counts are quite rare events in the Australian 
context, only a few suburbs reported zero violent crimes (see Table 4.1). Areas that reported zero 
violent crimes tended to have relatively small residential populations with low population density 
and were located on the outskirts of the city. The following sections outline the analytic strategy of 
each of the three quantitative studies that comprise this thesis.  
4.6 Study 1: Immigrant growth, concentration and crime    
Study 1 aims to determine whether theories of immigration and crime developed in the 
United States context generalise to multi-ethnic settings like Australia where recent immigrant waves 
have focused on the admittance of skilled immigrants and where neighbourhoods are rarely 
dominated by a single birthplace. Apart from setting a baseline for Australian research, Study 1 also 
advances the current literature by employing an innovative hybrid modelling approach. Previous  
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Figure 4.8 Distribution of violent crime counts across Sydney neighbourhoods  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Distribution of violent crime counts across Brisbane neighbourhoods 
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immigration-crime studies consider either how changes in immigrant concentration over time impact 
crime within a unit (see for example Martinez et al. 2010; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009) or how static 
levels of immigrant concentration are associated with more or less crime between units (i.e. cross-
sectional research, see for example Stowell & Martinez, 2009; Velez, 2009). Yet experiencing an 
influx of immigrants into an area is inherently different to exhibiting a generally high level of 
immigrant concentration and as such, each process may differentially influence crime. This study 
considers both and is guided by three research questions. First, how do changes in immigrant 
concentration impact changes in violent crime within neighbourhoods over time? Second, do 
neighbourhoods with a higher concentration of immigrants encounter more or less violent crime than 
those with a lower concentration? And finally, do neighbourhood factors (such as the size of the 
immigrant population or the level of disadvantage) moderate the effect of changes in immigrant 
concentration on violent crime across neighbourhoods? 
Variable information  
In Australia, like elsewhere, immigrant settlement patterns and crime are non-random and 
both are heavily shaped by dynamic neighbourhood contexts (ABS, 2014a; McDonald et al, 2013). 
Due to lower rents and costs of living, many immigrants settle in disorganised communities (Stowell, 
2007) where violent crime is much more pronounced (Krivo & Peterson, 1996; Shaw & McKay, 
1942). In Australia, newly arrived immigrants often settle in and around the central business district 
(CBD) (ABS 2014a) however, such areas present greater opportunities for crime due to high 
population density and a greater mixed land use (Livingston, 2008; Nielsen & Martinez, 2003; 
Grubesic et al., 2013). The relationship between immigration and crime may therefore be spurious 
and a result of the types of places immigrants chose to settle. To control for aspects of the 
neighbourhood that might correlate with crime and immigration, a number of theoretically and 
empirically derived socio-demographic and environmental variables are included in the analysis 
(Bell & Machin, 2013; Martinez et al., 2010; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Ousey & Kubrin, 2014). This 
section provides information on the key independent variable of interest for Study 1 as well as an 
overview of the neighbourhood variables included. Descriptive statistics for these variables are 
included in Table 4.2 and 4.3. As can be seen in the correlation matrices provided in Table 4.4, none 
of these variables exceed correlations of 0.70.    
Immigrant Concentration: the key variable of interest for Study 1 is total immigrant concentration. 
This variable effectively captures the share of the total population who is foreign born across each 
neighbourhood at each time point. Several studies in the United States have used a comparable 
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measure to tap into the presence of immigrants (see for example Feldmeyer and Steffensmeir, 2009; 
Lee et al., 2001;  Martinez et al., 2008; Martinez et al., 2010; Wadsworth, 2010) - although percent 
Latino is also common (Feldmeyer, 2009; Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013; Light, 2017). On average, 
levels of immigrant concentration are considerably higher across Sydney neighbourhoods compared 
to Brisbane neighbourhoods at all time points. However, both cities saw an increase in the 
neighbourhood level of immigrant concentration between 2001 and 2011 (Sydney: 28.74% in 2001 
and 30.75% in 2011; Brisbane 20.19% in 2001 and 23.81% in 2011).  
Disadvantage: Social disorganisation theory predicts disadvantaged neighbourhoods will encounter 
higher rates of crime. Extensive studies reveal that socio-economic disadvantage is a consistent and 
strong predictor of neighbourhood violence (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Krivo & Peterson, 1996; Lee 
et al., 2001; Sampson, Morenoff & Raudenbush, 2005). Scholars argue this is because disadvantaged 
communities generally exhibit weaker ties between neighbours, higher levels of unemployment, 
limited supervision of children and teenagers and residents lack a willingness to intervene in local 
problems (Browning, Dietz & Feinberg, 2004). As a result, residents living in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods often fail to engage in the informal social control actions required to reduce crime 
(for example arranging neighbourhood watches or contacting the police) (Velez, 2009). Due to 
limited social and economic capital, certain immigrant groups (such as humanitarian immigrants) 
often settle in disadvantaged areas on arrival and thus any relationship uncovered between 
immigration and crime may be due to selection bias (Stowell, 2007).  
To control for the effect of disadvantage on violent crime, a disadvantage factor was 
generated in Stata using the factor command with the principal-component factor (pcf) option. The 
disadvantage factor is based on three measures: percent unemployed and seeking work, percent one 
parent families and percent low-income persons.12 These variables loaded strongly on one factor in 
both cities at each time point. All variables had loadings of 1.9 or higher. Higher scores of the 
disadvantage factor reflect higher degrees of neighbourhood disadvantage.  
Residential Instability: In addition to disadvantage, social disorganisation theorists also contend that 
higher levels of residential instability are associated with more neighbourhood crime. In residentially 
unstable areas, residents are unable to build social networks and form strong ties to local 
organisations (Stark, 1987). These weak social ties can reduce a community’s regulatory capacity 
and as a consequence, crime flourishes. As immigration is a strong driver of residential instability, it 
                                               
12 Low income measure captures persons who reported earning less than $399 a week. This figure was adjusted in 2001 
and 2006 according the Consumer Price Index based on September each census year (ABS, 2015). 
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is important to control for its unique effect on violent crime and thus two measures of residential 
instability (percent households renting and percent households at a different address five years ago) 
are included in the models (the correlation between the two variables is below 0.62 at each time 
point).  
Young Males: In the broader criminological literature, young males are found to be 
disproportionality involved in crime (Boyd, 2000; Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983). Evidence from the 
2011 Australian Census suggests that while a similar proportion of recently arrived immigrants are 
male compared to the native population, nationally, a higher number of recent immigrants fall within 
the 15 to 24 age bracket (22.40% compared to 14.53%) (ABS, 2011). If increased immigration shifts 
the socio-demographic composition of neighbourhoods by increasing the proportion of young males, 
crime rates are likely to rise. Indeed, Andersen (2012) found that increased immigration indirectly 
affected crime by increasing the number of young males in the population. To control for this, 
percent males aged 15-24 years is included in the models. 
Indigenous Presence: Indigenous Australians are overrepresented in the criminal justice system both 
as victims and as perpetrators of violent crime (Wundersitz, 2010). Despite comprising only 3% of 
the total population (ABS, 2011), recent figures show Indigenous offenders make up 40% of the 
prisoner population incarcerated for assault (Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC), 2015). 
Further Indigenous Australians are 2-3 times more likely to be a victim of crime (AIC, 2015). Their 
disproportionate contact with the system can be attributed to the high levels of social disadvantage 
which plagues Indigenous communities (Altman, Biddle & Hunter, 2008) and the systematic 
discrimination they face. As research shows Indigenous Australians are more likely to be charged by 
police than their non-Indigenous counterparts (Wundersitz, 2010), this may have important 
consequences for official crime data. Studies have linked Indigenous presence to greater recorded 
crime at the aggregate level (McCausaland & Vivian 2010). To control for the effect of Indigenous 
presence on crime, percent Indigenous is included in the models. In 2011, neighbourhoods in 
Brisbane had on average a greater number of Indigenous residents (2.15%) compared to Sydney 
(1.43%).  
Population Density: Population density affects neighbourhood environments in ways that can either 
promote or prevent violent crime. By presenting more opportunities for violence (due to increased 
contact with or access to potential victims), some contend higher population density is intrinsically 
linked to higher rates of neighbourhood crime. Alternatively, it is also argued more densely 
populated neighbourhoods should experience less violent crime. By having more ‘eyes on the street,’ 
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population density can provide a source of natural surveillance that inhibits potential offenders from 
engaging in violence (Harries, 2006). To control for the effect of population density on violent 
crime, a measure of population density was also included in the models. This measure was calculated 
by dividing the total population of a neighbourhood by the area of the neighbourhood (in square 
kilometres). This variable was then rescaled (divided by 100) for interpretation purposes. As shown 
in Table 4.2 and 4.3, neighbourhoods in Sydney are on average much more densely populated than 
neighbourhoods in Brisbane (29.15 and 14.27 in 2011 respectively).  
Residential Land Use:  Extensive evidence suggests crime is clustered around certain non-residential 
land uses particularly bars, schools, transport stations and shopping centres (Grubesic et al., 2013; 
Ihlanfeldt, 2003; Livingston, 2008; Murray & Swatt, 2010; Nielsen & Martinez, 2003).  
Environmental criminologists contend these non-residential land uses either attract or generate 
opportunities for crime and thus neighbourhoods with these features present tend to experience 
higher rates of crime (McCord & Ratcliffe, 2009). Land use is less considered in empirical tests of 
social disorganisation. However, from this perspective it is argued that mixed or non-residential land 
use can limit the capacity of residents to maintain social control. Specifically, residents’ ability to 
differentiate between locals and outsiders is reduced in areas with greater non-residential land use 
due to the large number of strangers in the area (Stucky and Ottensmann, 2009). Previous 
immigration-crime scholarship has largely ignored the effect of land use on crime (see for exception 
Alaniz et al., 1998; Nielsen and Martinez, 2003). Yet failing to account for land use may present a 
misleading picture of the immigration-crime association, particularly if immigrants are unevenly 
distributed in areas with more crime-generators or attractors present. This study therefore accounts 
for the influence of non-residential land use on violent crime.  
To control for the effect of non-residential land use on violent crime, the land use categories 
assigned to meshblocks13 in the 2011 census were used to construct a percent residential land use 
variable. Meshblocks are the smallest unit of analysis provided by the census and include 
information on their physical size as well as a categorisation of their primary land use into one of 
seven classes: residential, parkland, commercial, industrial, water, education or transport. To create 
the residential land use measure, meshblocks were spatially joined to state suburbs in ArcGIS. The 
total area of residential meshblocks within each suburb was summed and then divided by the total 
suburb area. This figure was then multiplied by 100 to provide a percentage score. While it is 
acknowledged that not all non-residential land uses are equal in their ability to attract or generate 
                                               
13 No residential data is provided at this level.  
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crime, this blunt measure controls for the potential of non-residential activities driving higher rates of 
crime across neighbourhoods. Unfortunately due to data availability, the land use measure is only 
taken at one time point (2011).  
Distance to the CBD:  Early neighbourhood theories of crime predicted a negative correlation 
between a neighbourhood’s distance to the CBD and the occurrence of crime (Burgess, 1928). 
Notable in Australian capital cities is the tendency for immigrants to settle in and around the CBD 
(as discussed in Chapter 3) (ABS, 2014). In fact, in both Sydney and Brisbane over 60% of the 
residential population living in the city centre is foreign born (ABS, 2014). With this in mind, the 
distance between the centroid of each neighbourhood and the centroid of the CBD was estimated to 
create a distance to CBD measure. To create this measure, ArcGIS and Stata were both employed to 
compute the Euclidean distance (in km) between the geometric centres of each neighbourhood to the 
CBD (see Figure 4.10). On average, the Sydney neighbourhoods included in the sample were located 
25.88 km from the city centre (min=0.89km and max=88.33km) while Brisbane neighbourhoods 
were on average located 19.18km crime the city centre (min= 1.04km and max=61.67km).  
Figure 4.10 Distance to CBD calculation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nearby violent crime: As neighbourhoods are not independent entities, scholars contend that the 
activities in adjacent areas may affect crime in the focal neighbourhood. Morenoff and colleagues 
(2001) found that the spatial proximity to violent crime neighbourhoods was associated with 
homicide rates in the focal area. Acknowledging the potential for spillover effects, a spatially lagged 
violent crime variable was generated to account for violence in surrounding areas based on the 
average crime rate for 2010, 2011 and 2012. This variable was created in Stata using a spatial 
weights matrix which employed the rook contiguity matrix. The crime rate measure was then log 
transformed. In the longitudinal models, this measure is not used to look at changes in neighbouring 
areas but rather represents the average level of violent crime in neighbouring areas.  
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Table 4.2 Descriptive statistics for Study 1 Sydney (N=580) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 2001 2006 2011 
 Mean (S.D) Min Max Mean (S.D) Min Max Mean (S.D) Min Max 
Violent Crime Counts  67.64 (101.70) 0.00 773.33 64.96 (97.70) 0.00 817.67 58.91 (87.21) 0.33 869.33 
% Immigrant  28.74 (11.73) 8.45 67.53 28.97 (11.92) 8.33 64.90 30.75 (12.98) 9.33 70.43 
Disadvantage  -0.06 (1.02) -2.23 5.04 0.13 (1.15) -2.12 6.28 0.11 (1.06) -1.90 5.35 
Population Density  25.68 (19.33) 0.63 186.41 26.85 (20.02) 0.63 192.48 29.15 (21.76) 0.51 201.69 
% Renting  24.07 (13.43) 1.66 84.30 24.39 (12.81) 1.13 77.91 24.47 (12.64) 0.83 83.29 
% Different Address 5 Years 38.84 (10.07) 21.58 86.00 30.04 (8.18) 15.78 61.22 33.57 (9.45) 17.02 80.25 
% Indigenous   1.10 (1.41) 0.00 11.55 1.18 (1.57) 0.00 12.99 1.43 (1.78) 0.00 15.15 
% Young Males  6.89 (1.64) 3.26 16.96 6.79 (1.65) 2.74 14.22 6.56 (1.64) 2.32 16.01 
% Residential Land Use  - - - - - - 66.62 (18.99) 25.17 100.00 
% Distance to CBD (km) - - - - - - 25.83 (19.24) 0.89 88.33 
Nearby Violent Crime - - - - - - 6.42 (0.71) 0.00 8.60 
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Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics for Study 1 Brisbane (N=302) 
Variables 2001 2006 2011 
 Mean (S.D) Min Max Mean (S.D) Min Max Mean (S.D) Min Max 
Violent Crime Counts  22.51(26.07) 0.00 165.33 21.67 (24.54) 0.00 163.67 21.47 (25.42) 0.00 195.33 
% Immigrant  20.19 (7.10) 6.80 50.54 20.76 (7.41) 6.52 54.67 23.81 (8.75) 6.65 56.61 
Disadvantage  0.42 (0.91) -1.53 3.31 0.03 (0.80) -2.00 2.35 0.11 (0.82) -1.85 2.62 
Population Density  12.01 (9.03) 0.14 47.48 13.13 (9.94) 0.14 55.64 14.27 (10.61) 0.13 65.20 
% Renting  25.43 (11.97) 2.80 57.97 25.00 (11.55) 2.82 52.01 26.90 (12.00) 2.55 54.48 
% Different Address 5 Years 44.32 (8.83) 13.28 79.16 38.11 (7.60) 11.19 68.86 40.59 (8.93) 7.68 68.66 
% Indigenous   1.79 (2.09) 0.00 29.32 1.90 (2.55) 0.00 37.61 2.15 (2.74) 0.00 40.29 
% Young Males  7.41 (2.02) 1.79 22.37 7.35 (2.03) 2.42 22.43 7.25 (2.02) 1.16 22.58 
% Residential Land Use  - - - - - - 66.12 (18.17) 25.57 100.00 
Distance to City Centre (km) - - - - - - 19.18 (11.93) 1.04 61.67 
Nearby Violent Crime - - - - - - 5.40 (1.03) 0.00 7.35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
 
Table 4.4 Correlation matrices for Study 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 SYDNEY (N=580) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
2
0
0
1
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00           
2. % Immigrant 0.33 1.00          
3. Population Density  0.30 0.43 1.00         
4. % Indigenous   0.17 -0.17  -0.11 1.00        
5. Disadvantage  0.37 0.19 0.00 0.59  1.00       
6. Young Males  0.11 0.17 -0.09  0.15 0.09  1.00      
7. % Renting  0.46 0.40 0.54 0.37 0.56 0.03 1.00     
8. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.11 0.14 0.30  -0.12 -0.14 -0.11 0.34 1.00    
9. Distance to CBD -0.08 -0.54 -0.54 0.35 0.34 -0.03 -0.25 -0.04 1.00   
10. % Residential Land Use -0.04 0.15 0.40 -0.11 -0.07 -0.10 -0.01 -0.00 -0.24 1.00  
11. Nearby Violent Crime  -0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02  0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.05 1.00 
2
0
0
6
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00           
2. % Immigrant 0.28  1.00          
3. Population Density  0.28 0.40  1.00         
4. % Indigenous   0.18  -0.26 -0.16 1.00        
5. Disadvantage  0.30 0.17 -0.20  0.63 1.00       
6. Young Males  0.13 0.18 -0.14 0.13 0.24  1.00      
7. % Renting  0.44 0.34 0.56 0.34 0.33 -0.03  1.00     
8. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.20  0.22 0.48 -0.15 -0.29  -0.14 0.54 1.00    
9. Distance to CBD -0.04 -0.53 -0.56 0.45 0.44 0.07 -0.21 -0.18 1.00   
10. % Residential Land Use -0.05 -0.14 0.37  -0.12 -0.06 -0.18  0.01 -0.01 -0.24 1.00  
11. Nearby Violent Crime  0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.00 0.00  0.00  -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 1.00 
2
0
1
1
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00           
2. % Immigrant 0.32 1.00          
3. Population Density  0.23 0.46 1.00         
4. % Indigenous   0.16 -0.35 -0.21 1.00        
5. Disadvantage  0.32 0.16 -0.18  0.62 1.00       
6. Young Males  0.10 0.12 -0.25 0.18 0.38 1.00      
7. % Renting  0.46 0.42 0.57 0.31 0.37 -0.07 1.00     
8. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.18 0.26 0.53 -0.17 -0.30 -0.27 0.53 1.00    
9. Distance to CBD  -0.02 -0.55 -0.55 0.53 0.42 0.17 -0.21 -0.22 1.00   
10. % Residential Land Use -0.05 0.13 0.37 -0.13 -0.03 -0.12 0.03 -0.02 -0.24 1.00  
11. Nearby Violent Crime  0.01 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 1.00 
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 BRISBANE (N=302) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
2
0
0
1
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00           
2. % Immigrant 0.19  1.00           
3. Population Density  0.32 0.23 1.00         
4. % Indigenous   0.24 -0.17 -0.09 1.00        
5. Disadvantage  0.52 0.13 0.20 0.42 1.00       
6. Young Males  0.19 0.31  0.29 -0.04 0.05 1.00      
7. % Renting  0.54 0.19  0.63 0.30 0.59  0.32 1.00     
8. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.02 0.29 0.37 -0.23 -0.09 0.13 0.40  1.00    
9. Distance to CBD -0.10 -0.27 -0.63 0.25 0.18 -0.33 -0.37 -0.29 1.00   
10. % Residential Land Use -0.09 0.04 0.33 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.11 1.00  
11. Nearby Violent Crime  0.08  0.04 0.12 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.07 0.10 -0.10 0.01 1.00 
2
0
0
6
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00           
2. % Immigrant 0.17  1.00           
3. Population Density  0.22 0.25 1.00         
4. % Indigenous   0.22 -0.20  -0.14 1.00        
5. Disadvantage  0.45 0.12 -0.10 0.39  1.00       
6. Young Males  0.18 0.33 0.24 -0.03 0.01 1.00      
7. % Renting  0.50 0.14 0.62 0.21 0.36 0.28 1.00     
8. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.06 0.28 0.34 -0.17  -0.10 0.10 0.40 1.00    
9. Distance to CBD -0.02  -0.31 -0.63 0.27 0.38 -0.28  -0.38  -0.15 1.00   
10. % Residential Land Use -0.10  0.03 0.34 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.11 1.00  
11. Nearby Violent Crime  0.09  0.04 0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.10 0.01 1.00 
2
0
1
1
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00           
2. % Immigrant 0.18 1.00           
3. Population Density  0.19  0.32 1.00         
4. % Indigenous   0.20 -0.24 -0.18  1.00        
5. Disadvantage  0.47 0.14 -0.12 0.43 1.00       
6. Young Males  0.16 0.31 0.16 -0.02 0.09 1.00      
7. % Renting  0.49 0.22 0.61 0.20 0.34 0.27  1.00     
8. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.13 0.32 0.47 -0.18 -0.03 0.13 0.62 1.00    
9. Distance to CBD 0.03 -0.38 -0.63 0.33 0.39 -0.26 -0.36 -0.29 1.00   
10. % Residential Land Use -0.10  -0.00 0.33 -0.07 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.11 1.00  
11. Nearby Violent Crime  0.07 0.08 0.13 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.12 -0.10 0.01 1.00 
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Analytic Strategy 
As immigration is a social process which unfolds over time, its study requires longitudinal 
analysis. There are two main approaches to longitudinal analysis: fixed effects and random effects. 
While fixed effects models control for unobservable factors reducing potential bias, they concentrate 
solely on within-unit variation and time variant variables (Allison, 2009). In contrast, random effects 
models exploit both within group and between group variation producing more precise estimates 
(Allison, 2009). Yet the assumptions of the random effects model can lead to omitted variable bias 
and potentially misrepresent the association. Longitudinal examinations of immigration and crime 
have preferred the fixed effects estimation (Martinez et al., 2010; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009; Ousey & 
Kubrin, 2014; Wadsworth, 2010) and are thus unable to examine between unit variation as well as 
the effect of time invariant variables.  
Hybrid models allow for more precise estimates than what is offered by fixed effects models 
while dealing with the potential bias which undermines the random effects approach. This study 
utilises Allison’s hybrid model which allows for the examination of both within neighbourhood and 
between neighbourhood effects (Allison, 2009). The first step for calculating a hybrid model is to 
create the two types of variables: community specific mean-centred variables (for the between 
effects) and mean-deviated variables (for the within effects). The mean-centred variables are the 
predictor variables used to compare between neighbourhoods. The mean-centred variables are 
created as follows:   
Mean-Centred Variable= (Time 1 + Time 2 + Time 3)/3 
The mean-deviated variables compare changes within a neighbourhood overtime. This variable is 
calculated for each time point as follows:  
Mean-Deviated Variable= (Mean – Time t) 
After creating these variables, the next step is to run a regression model with the mean-
deviated variables and the mean-centred variables included as predictors. Hybrid models therefore 
comprise two distinct components: (1) the within effects and; (2) the between effects. The within 
effects component of the model assesses how changes in the predicator variables in Neighbourhood 
A influence changes in Neighbourhood A’s level of violent crime over time. Of particular interest to 
this study is how changes in immigrant concentration impact violent crime within a neighbourhood. 
The between effects component allows for comparison across neighbourhoods - Neighbourhood A’s 
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average score over the three time points is thus compared to Neighbourhood B’s. This allows us to 
consider whether areas with a higher average level of immigrant concentration encounter higher 
levels of crime. Taken together, this approach enables us to disentangle how change influences 
violent crime within a neighbourhood over time as well as compare across neighbourhoods. 
  As violent crimes represent relatively rare neighbourhood events, the distribution is strongly 
skewed to the right with many places exhibiting low counts. As such, hybrid estimates for negative 
binomial regression models are calculated as they are less affected by overdispersion (Alison, 2009). 
As demonstrated in section 4.5, zero crime counts are infrequent and represent only a small 
proportion of suburbs. Zero inflated models were thus not required. The models are run using the 
xtnbreg command in Stata with the total resident persons included as the exposure variable. This 
estimates the outcome as a crime rate. In order to get correct standard errors, Alison (2009) suggests 
that it is important to use an estimation technique that accounts for dependence among the multiple 
observations for each neighbourhood. Allison (2009) recommends random effects. The formula for 
the random effects negative binomial hybrid model is:  
𝑦𝑡𝑗 = 𝑎 + 𝐵1𝑗𝑋𝑡 + 𝐵2𝑗𝑍 + 𝐵3𝑗𝐼 +  𝑢𝑗 +  𝐸𝑡𝑗  
 
Where 𝑦 is the number of violent crimes incidents in neighbourhood 𝑗 in year 𝑡, 𝑎 is the intercept, 𝑋 
is a matrix of the mean-deviated neighbourhood predicators and 𝑍 is a matrix of mean-centred 
neighbourhood predicators, 𝐼 is a matrix of the time invariant neighbourhood predictors, 𝑢𝑗  is the 
random effect and 𝐸𝑡𝑗 is the standard error term.  
4.7 Study 2: Immigration, ethnicity and crime   
Study 2 expands on Study 1 by disaggregating immigrant concentration by two indicators of 
ethnicity: language and religion, to tease apart group specific effects. By tapping into the presence of 
culturally similar immigrants, these disaggregated concentration measures are more suitable for 
testing the immigration revitalisation thesis than the total immigrant concentration measure 
employed in Study 1. To simultaneously test the central tenets of social disorganisation theory, 
corresponding diversity measures are also included in the models. By considering both concentration 
and diversity effects and by accounting for the dynamic features of the neighbourhood, the central 
tenets of social disorganisation theory and the immigration revitalisation thesis are rigorously tested. 
Three similar questions to Study 1 guide Study 2. First, I ask how do changes in immigrant group 
concentration and diversity impact changes in violent crime over time within a neighbourhood. 
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Second, I question whether neighbourhoods with a higher concentration of certain immigrant groups 
or higher levels of ethnic diversity report more or less violent crime. And finally, I ask whether the 
effect of changes in immigrant concentration and ethnic diversity varies across different 
neighbourhood contexts (namely, in areas with high versus low levels of immigrant concentration 
and in more versus less disadvantaged neighbourhoods). 
Variable information  
This section outlines the measures of immigrant group concentration and ethnic diversity 
included in the Study 2 models. Descriptive statistics for these additional variables are provided in 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7. The neighbourhood variables included in the Study 1 analysis are retained for 
Study 2. As shown in the correlation matrices (see Table 4.8 and 4.9), these variables are not too 
highly correlated with one another to prohibit them from being included in the same model.  
Group specific concentration measures  
As ethnicity is a multi-dimensional construct, the total immigrant concentration measure is 
disaggregated by both language and religion to determine the group specific effects of immigration 
on violent crime over time and across neighbourhoods. These group categories were developed using 
the ABS broad group classification14 (see Table 4.5, for further detail on composition of broad 
language categories see Chapter 6). By capturing the presence of co-ethnics, these disaggregated 
measures allow for a more meaningful test of the immigration revitalisation thesis in Australia. 
Table 4.5 Ethnic group categories 
Language Religious Affiliation  
% Northern European  
% Southern European  
% Eastern European  
% Southern Asian 
% Southeast Asian  
% Southwest and Central Asian 
% Eastern Asian 
% English Only 
% ‘Other’ 
% Islam  
% Buddhism  
% Hinduism 
% Christianity  
% ‘Other’ Religion (incl. Judaism) 
% No Religion   
 
 
                                               
14 Due to relatively small overall numbers, the Judaism category was included under the ‘Other’ Religion category.  
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Diversity  
Social disorganisation theory predicts the negative effect of immigration on crime is 
particularly pronounced in ethnically diverse areas (Stowell 2007). To measure this, diversity indices 
are included in the Study 2 analysis and are calculated using the Blau formula (Blau, 1977): 
1 - Σ𝑝𝑖
2 
where p is the proportion of the total group who are members of a given category i. A completely 
homogenous community would receive a score of 0 and the score for an entirely heterogeneous 
community would approach 1. The language diversity index is comprised of the nine broad language 
groups listed in Table 4.5. Similarly, the religion diversity index was calculated using the six broad 
religious groups outlined in Table 4.5. For ease of interpretation, the index is multiplied by 100.  
Analytic strategy  
Consistent with Study 1, Study 2 utilises a hybrid modelling approach. By including mean-
centred variables and mean-deviated variables this approach allows for the examination of both 
within-neighbourhood and between-neighbourhood effects. Similar to Study 1, the first stage of 
analysis involves creating the two types of variables. Next, the variables are entered into a regression 
model. Again, violent crime counts are modelled using negative binomial estimates with the total 
resident population included as the exposure variable. In line with Allison’s recommendation, 
random effects are estimated in order to get correct standard errors as it allows for dependence 
amongst multiple observations for each neighbourhood. For further information on this modelling 
strategy refer to Section 4.7.   
Similar to Study 1, the models are stepped out in three stages. In stage 1, only the group 
specific measures and corresponding diversity indices are included in the model. In stage 2, the 
socio-demographic and environmental features of neighbourhoods are added. In stage 3, the 
interaction terms are considered. This process allows us to see how broader neighbourhood contexts 
shape the immigration-crime relationship. The two conceptualisations of ethnicity (language and 
religion) are modelled separately due to issues with multi-collinearity.  
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Table 4.6 Descriptive statistics for Study 2 Sydney (N=580) 
 2001 2006 2011 
 Mean  (S.D) Min Max Mean  (S.D) Min Max Mean  (S.D) Min Max 
Language Concentration           
% Northern European  0.51 (0.36) 0.00 2.88 0.58 (0.50) 0.00 2.94 0.60 (0.48) 0.00 2.43 
% Southern European  3.53 (2.26) 0.00 20.97 3.27 (3.14) 0.00 18.58 3.13 (2.71) 0.00 16.34 
% Eastern European  2.04 (1.93) 0.00 18.38 1.67 (1.63) 0.00 15.78 1.59 (1.42) 0.00 12.60 
% Southwest and Central Asian  2.26 (3.22) 0.00 21.24 2.57 (3.66) 0.00 24.08 2.74 (3.97) 0.00 27.85 
% Southern Asian  1.37 (2.16) 0.00 22.21 1.81 (3.02) 0.00 30.14 2.65 (4.53) 0.00 42.39 
% Southeast Asian  2.46 (3.98) 0.00 33.19 2.54 (4.07) 0.00 32.56 2.84 (4.29 0.00 36.00 
% Eastern Asian  3.92 (4.73) 0.00 29.29 4.39 (5.59) 0.00 36.65 4.92 (6.54) 0.00 42.37 
% ‘Other’ Languages  1.07 (1.60) 0.00 18.82 0.59 (1.21) 0.00 12.04 0.65 (1.12) 0.00 10.09 
% English Only  11.70 (4.52) 2.31 29.42 11.30(4.49) 2.79 28.47 11.40 (5.02) 2.83 29.85 
Religion Concentration           
% Buddhist  2.12 (3.44) 0.00 36.96 2.26 (3.53) 0.00 35.30 2.44 (3.55) 0.00 35.58 
% Christian   17.65 (6.09) 5.56 42.17 17.07 (5.82) 6.69 39.21 16.82 (5.67) 6.72 39.97 
% Hindu  0.84 (1.42) 0.00 18.49 1.12 (2.05) 0.00 22.35 1.60 (3.11) 0.00 33.27 
% Muslim   1.54 (2.34) 0.00 21.72 1.68 (2.79) 0.00 27.58 1.98 (3.29) 0.00 33.72 
% ‘Other’ Religion (Judaism) 0.77 (1.78) 0.00 22.62 0.81 (1.98) 0.00 25.95 0.93 (4.31) 0.00 25.32 
% No Religion  3.86 (2.60) 0.35 14.95 4.62 (3.29) 0.00 23.51 5.81 (4.31) 0.00 28.11 
Diversity Indices           
Language Diversity  44.41 (22.00) 7.84 97.13 46.62 (22.31) 8.55 95.34 47.20 (22.27) 9.76 92.58 
Religion Diversity  48.44 (11.99) 17.41 97.05 51.90 (12.12) 21.27 94.16 53.65 (11.47) 22.31 88.77 
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Table 4.7 Descriptive statistics for Study 2 Brisbane (N=302) 
 2001 2006 2011 
 Mean  (S.D) Min Max Mean  (S.D) Min Max Mean  (S.D) Min Max 
Language Concentration           
% Northern European  0.63 (0.37) 0.00 2.17 0.73 (0.56) 0.00 4.24 0.84 (0.53) 0.00 3.03 
% Southern European  1.08 (1.01) 0.00 7.85 1.01 (0.98) 0.00 7.77 1.08 (0.93) 0.00 6.82 
% Eastern European  0.90 (0.86) 0.00 4.47 0.76 (0.76) 0.00 4.84 0.75 (0.63) 0.00 3.35 
% Southwest and Central Asian  0.22 (0.30) 0.00 1.85 0.31 (0.48) 0.00 3.42 0.49 (0.68) 0.00 4.95 
% Southern Asian  0.50 (0.61) 0.00 4.50 0.70 (0.84) 0.00 4.60 1.49 (1.56) 0.00 8.14 
% Southeast Asian  1.10 (2.19) 0.00 20.47 1.23 (2.13) 0.00 16.20 1.57 (2.21) 0.00 18.13 
% Eastern Asian  1.46 (3.17) 0.0 28.91 1.80 (3.66) 0.00 30.65 2.29 (4.41) 0.00 31.29 
% ‘Other’ Languages  0.97 (1.44) 0.00 9.87 0.63 (1.16) 0.00 8.81 0.85 (1.40) 0.00 9.19 
% English Only  13.43 (3.49) 4.66 25.47 8.33 (7.15) 0.00 38.63 12.13 (3.62) 3.55 25.28 
Religion Concentration           
% Buddhism 1.00 (1.71) 0.00 12.29 1.15 (1.78) 0.00 10.45 1.27 (1.69) 0.00 9.41 
% Christianity    12.03 (3.85) 4.46 25.99 12.76 (3.70) 3.96 23.53 12.76 (2.70) 3.96 23.53 
% Hinduism 0.29 (0.40) 0.00 2.58 0.44 (0.57) 0.00 3.45 0.44 (0.57) 0.00 3.49 
% Islam  0.38 (0.57) 0.00 4.58 0.50 (0.86) 0.00 8.66 0.79 (1.20) 0.00 12.98 
% ‘Other’ Religion (Judaism) 0.24 (0.23) 0.00 1.47 0.24 (0.30) 0.00 1.64 5.46 (2.61) 0.88 18.32 
% No Religion  3.37 (1.49) 0.67 11.62 4.21 (0.191) 0.00 14.26 0.48 (0.47) 0.00 2.93 
Diversity Indices           
Language Diversity  22.63 (13.12) 4.80 92.23 26.57 (14.33) 6.50 91.77 29.04 (15.74) 4.58 96.17 
Religion Diversity  48.07 (7.34) 34.50 93.79 53.28 (7.30) 37.05 94.58 54.39 (7.49) 37.16 97.14 
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Table 4.8 Correlation matrices (language concentration and diversity) 
 
 
 SYDNEY (N=580) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
2
0
0
1
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00                    
2. Northern European   -0.07 1.00                   
3. Eastern European  0.28 -0.08 1.00                  
4. Southern European  0.08 -0.29 0.40 1.00                 
5. Eastern Asian  0.19 -0.13 0.29 0.19 1.00                
6. Southern Asian  0.24 -0.29 0.21 0.13 0.38 1.00               
7. Southeast Asian  0.25 -0.25 0.45 0.29 0.28 0.31 1.00              
8. Southwest & Central Asian  0.26 -0.32 0.45 0.38 0.25 0.36 0.45 1.00             
9. ‘Other’ Languages  0.28 -0.31 0.16 0.15 0.06 0.29 0.33 0.38 1.00            
10. English Only  0.50 0.21 0.07 -0.05 0.15 0.08 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 1.00           
11. Language Diversity  0.32 -0.32 0.63 0.64 0.57 0.50 0.60 0.68 0.42 0.04 1.00          
12. Population Density  0.30 0.10 0.24 0.22 0.26 0.09 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.29 0.35 1.00         
13. % Indigenous   0.17 -0.23 -0.04 -0.11 -0.26 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.52 -0.16 0.00 -0.11 1.00        
14. Disadvantage  0.37 -0.36 0.23 -0.17 0.02 0.13 0.40 0.38 0.59 -0.12 0.29 0.00 0.59 1.00       
15. Young Males  0.11 -0.15 0.07 -0.36 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.02 0.21 -0.09 0.15 0.09 1.00      
16. % Renting  0.46 -0.09 0.23 0.11 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.46 0.17 0.39 0.54 0.37 0.56 0.03 1.00     
17. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.11 0.11 -0.05 -0.17 0.14 0.22 0.01 -0.15 -0.7 0.17 -0.01 0.30 -0.12 -0.14 -0.11 0.34 1.00    
18. Distance to CBD -0.08 -0.14 -0.29 -0.36 -0.45 -0.11 -0.08 -0.16 0.02 -0.23 -0.48 -0.54 0.35 0.34 -0.03 -0.25 -0.04 1.00   
19. % Residential Land Use -0.04 -0.06 0.10 -0.16 0.08 -0.04 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.40 -0.11 -0.07 -0.10 -0.01 -0.00 -0.24 1.00  
20. Nearby Violent Crime  -0.00 0.04 -0.03 -0.16 -0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.10 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.05 1.00 
2
0
0
6
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00                    
2. Northern European   -0.11 1.00                   
3. Eastern European  0.24 -0.13 1.00                  
4. Southern European  0.03 -0.26 0.42 1.00                 
5. Eastern Asian  0.14 -0.10 0.21 0.13 1.00                
6. Southern Asian  0.26 -0.24 0.14 0.05 0.34 1.00               
7. Southeast Asian  0.20 -0.25 0.43 0.22 0.20 0.27 1.00              
8. Southwest & Central Asian  0.22 -0.28 0.43 0.34 0.18 0.31 0.45 1.00             
9. ‘Other’ Languages  0.25 -0.26 0.11 0.06 -0.04 0.25 0.30 0.33 1.00            
10. English Only  0.49 0.21 0.06 -0.05 0.13 0.09 -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 1.00           
11. Language Diversity  0.30 -0.30 0.60 0.58 0.55 0.48 0.58 0.65 0.33 0.05 1.00          
12. Population Density  0.28 -0.03 0.24 0.19 0.27 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.26 0.40 1.00         
13. % Indigenous   0.18 -0.26 -0.11 -0.15 -0.30 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 0.57 -0.18 -0.11 -0.16 1.00        
14. Disadvantage  0.30 -0.45 0.19 0.10 -0.01 0.17 0.45 0.43 0.65 -0.18 0.25 -0.20 0.63 1.00       
15. Young Males  0.13 -0.22 0.11 -0.08 0.18 0.26 0.20 0.22 0.18 -0.05 0.21 -0.14 0.13 0.24 1.00      
16. % Renting  0.44 -0.18 0.15 0.06 0.21 0.22 0.15 0.16 0.36 0.16 0.38 0.56 0.34 0.33 -0.03 1.00     
17. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.20 0.11 -0.06 -0.18 0.28 0.27 -0.08 -0.14 -0.15 0.28 0.09 0.48 -0.15 -0.29 -0.14 0.54 1.00    
18. Distance to CBD -0.04 -0.18 -0.26 -0.35 -0.44 -0.09 -0.07 -0.16 0.09 -0.23 -0.51 -0.56 0.45 0.44 0.07 -0.21 -0.18 1.00   
19. % Residential Land Use -0.05 -0.04 0.10 0.19 0.09 -0.03 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.37 -0.12 -0.06 -0.18 0.01 -0.01 -0.24 1.00  
20. Nearby Violent Crime  0.00 0.07 -0.03 -0.14 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.09 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 1.00 
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 SYDNEY (N=580) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
2
0
1
1
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00                    
2. Northern European   -0.10 1.00                   
3. Eastern European  0.22 -0.18 1.00                  
4. Southern European  0.01 -0.26 0.45 1.00                 
5. Eastern Asian  0.12 -0.11 0.17 0.10 1.00                
6. Southern Asian  0.31 -0.25 0.10 0.02 0.30 1.00               
7. Southeast Asian  0.23 -0.30 0.43 0.19 0.17 0.24 1.00              
8. Southwest & Central Asian  0.25 -0.36 0.42 0.30 0.11 0.26 0.46 1.00             
9. ‘Other’ Languages  0.32 -0.36 0.11 0.02 -0.07 0.25 0.34 0.33 1.00            
10. English Only  0.46 0.35 0.05 -0.04 0.11 0.08 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 1.00           
11. Language Diversity  0.29 -0.37 0.59 0.56 0.53 0.50 0.58 0.64 0.36 0.04 1.00          
12. Population Density  0.23 0.18 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.15 0.13 0.08 0.00 0.28 0.04 1.00         
13. % Indigenous   0.16 -0.30 -0.17 -0.21 -0.33 -0.09 -0.05 -0.10 0.56 -0.18 -0.20 -0.21 1.00        
14. Disadvantage  0.32 -0.55 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.16 0.47 0.43 0.69 -0.22 0.29 -0.18 0.62 1.00       
15. Young Males  0.10 -0.34 0.03 -0.09 0.16 0.14 0.25 0.23 0.27 -0.12 0.19 -0.25 0.18 0.38 1.00      
16. % Renting  0.46 -0.09 0.17 0.09 0.23 0.26 0.20 0.19 0.43 0.18 0.40 0.57 0.31 0.37 -0.07 1.00     
17. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.18 0.28 -0.05 -0.11 0.28 0.23 -0.09 -0.17 -0.20 0.29 0.06 0.53 -0.17 -0.30 -0.27 0.53 1.00    
18. Distance to CBD -0.02 -0.25 -0.28 -0.39 -0.42 -0.10 -0.08 -0.14 0.11 -0.25 -0.50 -0.55 0.53 0.42 0.17 -0.21 -0.22 1.00   
19. % Residential Land Use -0.05 -0.06 0.13 0.19 0.09 -0.03 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.37 -0.13 -0.03 -0.12 0.03 -0.02 -0.24 1.00  
20. Nearby Violent Crime  0.01 0.08 -0.04 -0.15 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.10 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 1.00 
 BRISBANE (N=302) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
2
0
0
1
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00                    
2. Northern European   -0.04 1.00                   
3. Eastern European  0.30 0.01 1.00                  
4. Southern European  0.19 0.07 0.45 1.00                 
5. Eastern Asian  0.04 0.08 0.32 0.33 1.00                
6. Southern Asian  0.03 0.02 0.44 0.40 0.59 1.00               
7. Southeast Asian  0.19 0.06 0.40 0.37 0.15 0.35 1.00              
8. Southwest & Central Asian  0.23 -0.00 0.60 0.55 0.49 0.58 0.26 1.00             
9. ‘Other’ Languages  0.43 -0.04 0.42 0.18 0.01 0.16 0.54 0.14 1.00            
10. English Only  0.54 -0.05 0.26 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.02 0.18 0.14 1.00           
11. Language Diversity  0.34 0.11 0.62 0.64 0.58 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.47 0.11 1.00          
12. Population Density  0.32 -0.10 0.24 0.46 0.26 0.27 0.07 0.42 0.06 0.34 0.36 1.00         
13. % Indigenous   0.24 -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.18 -0.18 0.13 -0.11 0.33 -0.11 0.11 -0.09 1.00        
14. Disadvantage  0.53 -0.05 0.40 0.10 -0.03 -0.06 0.25 0.12 0.50 0.13 0.22 0.20 0.42 1.00       
15. Young Males  0.19 0.11 0.20 0.19 0.44 0.28 0.11 -0.24 0.10 0.14 0.46 0.29 -0.04 0.05 1.00      
16. % Renting  0.54 -0.09 0.33 0.40 0.07 0.11 0.20 0.31 0.37 0.20 0.45 0.63 0.30 0.59 0.32 1.00     
17. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.28 0.24 0.29 -0.04 0.25 -0.09 0.15 0.16 0.37 -0.23 -0.09 0.13 0.40 1.00    
18. Distance to CBD -0.10 0.11 -0.28 -0.51 -0.27 -0.38 -0.17 -0.41 -0.05 -0.15 -0.39 -0.63 0.25 0.18 -0.33 -0.37 -0.29 1.00   
19. % Residential Land Use -0.09 -0.05 0.00 0.09 0.11 0.05 -0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.06 -0.01 0.33 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.11 1.00  
20. Nearby Violent Crime  0.08 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.16 0.03 0.12 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.07 0.10 -0.10 0.01 1.00 
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 BRISBANE (N=302) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00                    
2. Northern European   -0.11 1.00                   
3. Eastern European  0.23 -0.05 1.00                  
4. Southern European  0.14 -0.06 0.36 1.00                 
5. Eastern Asian  0.08 -0.01 0.39 0.35 1.00                
6. Southern Asian  -0.02 0.03 0.49 0.38 0.67 1.00               
7. Southeast Asian  0.17 -0.05 0.38 0.35 0.21 0.40 1.00              
8. Southwest & Central Asian  0.16 -0.04 0.53 0.37 0.51 0.54 0.37 1.00             
9. ‘Other’ Languages  0.44 -0.13 0.40 0.05 -0.03 0.08 0.42 0.20 1.00            
10. English Only  0.51 -0.10 0.05 -0.10 -0.02 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02 0.21 1.00           
11. Language Diversity  0.31 -0.06 0.60 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.38 -0.04 1.00          
12. Population Density  0.22 -0.20 0.18 0.51 0.28 0.21 0.08 0.20 0.02 0.12 0.38 1.00         
13. % Indigenous   0.22 -0.11 -0.06 -0.13 -0.17 -0.19 0.06 -0.14 0.28 0.06 0.02 -0.14 1.00        
14. Disadvantage  0.45 -0.14 0.18 -0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.27 0.02 0.53 0.29 0.14 -0.10 0.39 1.00       
15. Young Males  0.18 -0.03 0.20 0.26 0.46 0.28 0.17 0.24 0.08 0.15 0.48 0.24 -0.03 0.01 1.00      
16. % Renting  0.50 -0.05 0.23 0.38 0.09 0.06 0.20 0.22 0.36 0.23 0.42 0.62 0.21 0.36 0.28 1.00     
17. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.19 0.17 0.21 -0.04 0.13 -0.10 0.06 0.10 0.34 -0.17 -0.10 0.10 0.40 1.00    
18. Distance to CBD -0.02 0.20 -0.25 -0.54 -0.29 -0.35 -0.18 -0.38 -0.01 0.15 -0.40 -0.63 0.27 0.38 -0.28 -0.38 -0.15 1.00   
19. % Residential Land Use -0.10 -0.08 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.10 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.34 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.11 1.00  
20. Nearby Violent Crime  0.09 -0.07 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.10 0.01 1.00 
2
0
1
1
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00                    
2. Northern European   -0.19 1.00                   
3. Eastern European  0.17 -0.02 1.00                  
4. Southern European  0.11 0.0 0.40 1.00                 
5. Eastern Asian  0.05 -0.02 0.46 0.34 1.00                
6. Southern Asian  0.10 -0.05 0.60 0.50 0.67 1.00               
7. Southeast Asian  0.23 -0.11 0.40 0.29 0.25 0.45 1.00              
8. Southwest & Central Asian  0.22 -0.04 0.55 0.45 0.49 0.69 0.53 1.00             
9. ‘Other’ Languages  0.46 -0.21 0.38 0.06 0.02 0.24 0.58 0.34 1.00            
10. English Only  0.48 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.02 0.09 0.14 1.00           
11. Language Diversity  0.32 -0.08 0.66 0.58 0.65 0.69 0.66 0.68 0.48 0.10 1.00          
12. Population Density  0.19 -0.08 0.23 0.63 0.27 0.38 0.12 0.36 0.01 0.26 0.39 1.00         
13. % Indigenous   0.20 -0.28 -0.13 -0.22 -0.18 -0.19 0.03 -0.12 0.24 -0.13 0.01 -0.18 1.00        
14. Disadvantage  0.47 -0.26 0.16 -0.14 0.10 0.02 0.34 0.14 0.55 0.06 0.23 -0.12 0.43 1.00       
15. Young Males  0.16 -0.11 0.16 0.26 0.40 0.28 0.20 0.30 0.30 0.03 0.45 0.16 -0.02 0.09 1.00      
16. % Renting  0.49 -0.31 0.20 0.47 0.11 0.31 0.28 0.36 0.39 0.15 0.46 0.61 0.20 0.34 0.27 1.00     
17. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.13 0.06 0.17 0.43 0.20 0.32 0.09 0.29 0.03 0.19 0.25 0.47 -0.18 -0.03 0.13 0.62 1.00    
18. Distance to CBD 0.03 -0.07 -0.27 -0.62 -0.29 -0.48 -0.21 -0.41 -0.01 -0.09 -0.42 -0.63 0.33 0.39 -0.26 -0.36 -0.29 1.00   
19. % Residential Land Use -0.10 -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.00 0.33 -0.07 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.11 1.00  
 20. Nearby Violent Crime  0.07 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.06 0.09 -0.00 0.01 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.13 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.12 -0.10 0.01 1.00 
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Table 4.9 Correlation matrices (religion concentration/diversity) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SYDNEY (N=580) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
2
0
0
1
 
1.  Violent Crime Counts  1.00                 
2. % Buddhist  0.23 1.00                
3. % Christian  0.23 0.45 1.00               
4. % Hindu  0.19 0.16 0.38 1.00              
5. % Muslim  0.30 0.29 0.47 0.34 1.00             
6. % ‘Other’ Religion  0.02 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 -0.05 1.00            
7. % No Religion  0.19 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.03 0.24 1.00           
8. Religion Diversity  0.31 0.40 0.19 0.22 0.33 0.38 0.67 1.00          
9. Population Density  0.30 0.20 0.25 0.05 0.18 0.24 0.57 0.55 1.00         
10. % Indigenous   0.17 -0.10 -0.12 -0.05 0.04 -0.13 -0.32 -0.01 -0.11 1.00        
11. Disadvantage  0.37 0.35 0.17 0.08 0.37 -0.15 -0.23 0.10 0.00 0.59 1.00       
12. Young Males  0.11 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.14 -0.06 -0.2 0.07 -0.09 0.15 0.09 1.00      
13. % Renting  0.46 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.31 0.09 0.39 0.58 0.54 0.37 0.56 0.03 1.00     
14. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.11 -0.00 -0.01 0.22 -0.04 0.11 0.41 0.34 0.30 -0.12 -0.14 -0.11 0.34 1.00    
15. Distance to CBD -0.08 -0.19 -0.41 -0.11 -0.17 -0.26 -0.60 -0.45 -0.54 0.35 0.34 -0.03 -0.25 -0.04 1.00   
16. % Residential Land Use -0.04 0.10 0.16 -0.04 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.40 -0.11 -0.07 -0.10 -0.01 -0.00 -0.24 1.00  
17. Nearby Violent Crime  -0.00 -0.01 -0.10 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.05 1.00 
2
0
0
6
 
1.  Violent Crime Counts  1.00                 
2. % Buddhist  0.16 1.00                
3. % Christian  0.17 0.43 1.00               
4. % Hindu  0.22 0.13 0.32 1.00              
5. % Muslim   0.28 0.27 0.39 0.21 1.00             
6. % ‘Other’ Religion  0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.08 -0.04 1.00            
7. % No Religion  0.13 0.20 0.13 0.16 -0.04 0.15 1.00           
8. Religion Diversity  0.32 0.40 0.14 0.28 0.34 0.34 0.65 1.00          
9. Population Density  0.28 0.20 0.19 0.08 0.10 0.21 0.53 0.60 1.00         
10. % Indigenous   0.18 -0.13 -0.17 -0.07 0.41 -0.15 -0.40 -0.09 -0.16 1.00        
11. Disadvantage  0.30 0.35 0.22 0.11 0.22 -0.23 -0.38 -0.03 -0.20 0.63 1.00       
12. Young Males  0.13 0.16 0.10 0.24 0.28 -0.04 -0.07 0.03 -0.14 0.13 0.24 1.00      
13. % Renting  0.44 0.17 0.12 0.21 -0.01 0.07 0.35 0.61 0.56 0.34 0.33 -0.03 1.00     
14. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.20 -0.02 -0.04 0.29 -0.01 0.16 0.55 0.51 0.48 -0.15 -0.29 -0.14 0.54 1.00    
15. Distance to CBD -0.04 -0.21 -0.40 -0.10 -0.13 -0.25 -0.59 -0.44 -0.56 0.45 0.44 0.07 -0.21 -0.18 1.00   
16. % Residential Land Use -0.05 0.11 0.16 -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.37 -0.12 -0.06 -0.18 0.01 -0.01 -0.24 1.00  
17. Nearby Violent Crime  0.00 -0.00 -0.11 -0.02 -0.00 -0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 1.00 
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 SYDNEY (N=580) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
2
0
1
1
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00                 
2. % Buddhist  0.18 1.00                
3. % Christian  0.18 0.42 1.00               
4. % Hindu  0.25 0.12 0.25 1.00              
5. % Muslim   0.32 0.24 0.33 0.27 1.00             
6. % ‘Other’ Religion  0.10 -0.02 0.07 0.19 0.02 1.00            
7. % No Religion  0.08 0.21 0.12 0.15 -0.10 0.16 1.00           
8. Religion Diversity  0.31 0.42 0.21 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.61 1.00          
9. Population Density  0.23 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.23 0.57 0.56 1.00         
10. % Indigenous   0.16 -0.19 -0.22 -0.11 -0.22 -0.16 -0.41 -0.17 -0.21 1.00        
11. Disadvantage  0.32 0.37 0.21 0.09 0.40 -0.19 -0.36 0.05 -0.18 0.62 1.00       
12. Young Males  0.10 0.20 0.11 0.09 0.22 -0.08 -0.15 -0.05 -0.25 0.18 0.38 1.00      
13. % Renting  0.46 0.22 0.17 0.24 0.29 0.14 0.35 0.61 0.57 0.31 0.37 -0.07 1.00     
14. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.18 -0.00 -0.07 0.26 -0.04 0.20 0.58 0.48 0.53 -0.17 -0.30 -0.27 0.53 1.00    
15. Distance to CBD -0.02 -0.21 -0.40 -0.12 -0.13 -0.25 -0.58 -0.43 -0.55 0.53 0.42 0.17 -0.21 -0.22 1.00   
16. % Residential Land Use -0.05 0.10 0.15 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.37 -0.13 -0.03 -0.12 0.03 -0.02 -0.24 1.00  
17. Nearby Violent Crime  0.01 -0.00 -0.11 -0.04 0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 1.00 
 BRISBANE (N=302) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
2
0
0
1
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00                 
2. % Buddhist  0.16 1.00                
3. % Christian  0.20 0.58 1.00               
4. % Hindu  0.02 0.48 0.43 1.00              
5. % Muslim   0.24 0.53 0.43 0.42 1.00             
6. % ‘Other’ Religion  -0.02 0.38 0.45 0.41 0.31 1.00            
7. % No Religion  0.05 0.49 0.51 0.48 0.45 0.44 1.00           
8. Religion Diversity  0.28 0.42 0.22 0.20 0.39 0.23 0.55 1.00          
9. Population Density  0.32 0.21 0.12 0.32 0.33 0.10 0.34 0.20 1.00         
10. % Indigenous   0.24 -0.01 -0.15 -0.19 0.33 -0.21 -0.31 0.11 -0.09 1.00        
11. Disadvantage  0.53 0.16 0.16 -0.11 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 0.22 0.20 0.42 1.00       
12. Young Males  0.19 0.32 0.11 0.29 0.17 0.24 0.38 0.45 0.29 -0.04 0.05 1.00      
13. % Renting  0.54 0.19 0.12 0.08 0.31 0.04 0.16 0.42 0.63 0.30 0.59 0.32 1.00     
14. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.02 0.10 0.25 0.32 0.36 0.24 0.41 0.16 0.37 -0.23 -0.09 0.13 0.40 1.00    
15. Distance to CBD -0.10 -0.28 -0.14 -0.33 0.28 -0.27 -0.03 -0.13 -0.63 0.25 0.18 -0.33 -0.37 -0.29 1.00   
16. % Residential Land Use -0.09 0.05 0.01 0.12 -0.36 0.03 0.09 -0.08 0.33 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.02 0.08 -0.11 1.00  
17. Nearby Violent Crime  0.08 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.05 0.12 -0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.07 0.10 -0.10 0.01 1.00 
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 BRISBANE (N=320) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
2
0
0
6
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00                 
2. % Buddhist  0.14 1.00                
3. % Christian  0.19 0.55 1.00               
4. % Hindu  -0.02 0.55 0.48 1.00              
5. % Muslim   0.18 0.60 0.45 0.55 1.00             
6. % ‘Other’ Religion  -0.03 0.42 0.43 0.52 0.34 1.00            
7. % No Religion  0.06 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.41 0.32 1.00           
8. Religion Diversity  0.29 0.44 0.14 0.20 0.37 0.10 0.51 1.00          
9. Population Density  0.22 0.21 0.13 0.22 0.24 0.05 0.35 0.24 1.00         
10. % Indigenous   0.22 -0.05 -0.19 -0.20 -0.08 -0.16 -0.28 0.13 -0.14 1.00        
11. Disadvantage  0.45 0.17 0.18 -0.08 0.12 -0.05 -0.09 0.18 -0.10 0.39 1.00       
12. Young Males  0.18 0.35 0.08 0.30 0.33 0.15 0.41 0.44 0.24 -0.03 0.01 1.00      
13. % Renting  0.50 0.17 0.06 0.02 0.24 -0.08 0.13 0.43 0.62 0.21 0.36 0.28 1.00     
14. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.06 0.05 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.41 0.17 0.34 -0.17 -0.10 0.10 0.40 1.00    
15. Distance to CBD -0.02 -0.29 -0.18 -0.33 -0.29 -0.13 -0.34 -0.11 -0.63 0.27 0.38 -0.28 -0.38 -0.15 1.00   
16. % Residential Land Use -0.10 0.08 -0.01 0.07 0.05 -0.00 0.06 -0.08 0.34 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.11 1.00  
17. Nearby Violent Crime  0.09 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.03 0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.10 0.01 1.00 
2
0
1
1
 
1. Violent Crime Counts  1.00                 
2. % Buddhist  0.13 1.00                
3. % Christian  0.18 0.52 1.00               
4. % Hindu  0.08 0.60 0.45 1.00              
5. % Muslim   0.20 0.60 0.40 0.55 1.00             
6. % ‘Other’ Religion  0.08 0.53 0.36 0.66 0.51 1.00            
7. % No Religion  0.05 0.59 0.46 0.59 0.41 0.51 1.00           
8. Religion Diversity  0.34 0.56 0.18 0.49 0.53 0.42 0.54 1.00          
9. Population Density  0.19 0.24 0.09 0.40 0.28 0.33 0.45 0.37 1.00         
10. % Indigenous   0.20 -0.10 -0.21 -0.20 -0.08 -0.20 -0.33 0.12 -0.18 1.00        
11. Disadvantage  0.47 0.23 0.18 -0.04 0.21 -0.03 -0.05 0.26 -0.12 0.43 1.00       
12. Young Males  0.16 0.33 0.03 0.30 0.33 0.20 0.36 0.43 0.16 -0.02 0.09 1.00      
13. % Renting  0.49 0.19 0.04 0.28 0.31 0.27 0.23 0.55 0.61 0.20 0.34 0.27 1.00     
14. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.34 0.25 0.26 0.47 0.33 0.47 -0.18 -0.03 0.13 0.62 1.00    
15. Distance to CBD 0.03 -0.30 -0.16 -0.47 -0.30 -0.46 -0.46 -0.26 -0.63 0.33 0.39 -0.26 -0.36 -0.29 1.00   
16. % Residential Land Use -0.10 0.09 -0.05 0.05 -0.00 0.01 0.05 -0.03 0.33 -0.07 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.11 1.00  
17. Nearby Violent Crime  0.07 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.09 -0.03 0.13 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.12 -0.10 0.01 1.00 
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4.8 Study 3: Immigration, segregation and crime  
In Study 3, I shift the focus from considering immigrant concentration effects to segregation. 
Limited immigration-crime scholarship thus far has considered the role segregation plays in shaping 
the immigration-crime relationship (see for exception Barranco, 2013; Feldmeyer et al., 2015). 
Rather studies have typically focused on employing measures of immigrant concentration or 
immigrant growth (Chavez & Griffiths, 2009; Desmond & Kubrin, 2009; Feldmeyer, 2009; 
Feldmeyer & Steffensmeier, 2009; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Kubrin & Ousey, 2009; Martinez et al., 
2010; Ramey, 2013; Stowell, 2007; Wadsworth, 2010).  In the broader criminological literature, 
segregation is argued to weaken social controls and undermine a community’s regulatory capacity 
through mechanisms associated with social inequality and social isolation (Peterson et al., 2009). 
However, some scholars argue immigrant enclaves can shield communities from crime by providing 
residents with a “protective shell of resources” (Feldmeyer et al., 2015, p. 2). By examining the 
relationship between immigrant segregation and violent crime across Australian neighbourhoods, 
this study brings together and empirically tests social disorganisation theory and the immigration 
revitalisation thesis.   
Four key questions guide this study. The first two relate to establishing trends in spatial 
segregation in Brisbane and Sydney as previous (albeit limited) research suggests Australian 
neighbourhoods exhibit low levels of ethnic segregation. I therefore ask, how are various immigrant 
groups spatially distributed across Brisbane and Sydney neighbourhoods? And, do immigrant 
neighbourhoods tend to be co-located or isolated? After establishing these trends, the last two 
questions relate to the effect of segregation on crime. I question firstly whether the residential 
distribution of various immigrant groups impacts violent crime and secondly if the co-location of 
immigrant neighbourhoods is associated with more or less neighbourhood violence.   
Variable Information  
Study 3 employs local spatial segregation measures not previously applied to the study of 
immigration and crime to examine ethnic segregation in Australian neighbourhoods. Acknowledging 
the limitations of traditional segregation indices (outlined in depth in Chapter 7), I capitalise on 
recent advancements in geographical information systems (GIS) technology to create the key 
independent variables of interest. Specifically, I utilise two highly spatialized yet underutilised local 
segregation measures: Location Quotients (LQs) and Local Moran’s I (LM-I) to consider the effect 
of segregation on crime at one time point. These segregation measures focus on one aspect of 
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ethnicity - language spoken at home - with the immigrant population divided into four key language 
groups: immigrants who speak Asian languages, immigrants who speak European languages, 
immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages and immigrants who speak English only. I focus 
specifically on language as it is found to be one of the strongest signifiers of difference in the 
Australian setting (Anderson, 1991; Calhoun, 1993). Aggregating language groups into these broad 
categories also allows for greater variation in ethnic group size across neighbourhoods. However it is 
acknowledged that immigrants belonging to these broad language groups may not necessarily be able 
to communicate effectively with one another and thus language barriers between residents may still 
present challenges to community regulation. Regardless, it is argued that the degree of social and 
cultural distance these immigrants face between immigrant groups will be less. The two key 
measures of local immigrant segregation created for the Study 3 analyses are described below. The 
neighbourhood variables included in the Study 1 and Study 2 models are retained for Study 3. 
Descriptive statistics for these variables, along with the segregation measures and dependent variable 
are included in Table 4.10. Correlations are provided in Table 4.11 and 4.12.  
Location Quotients (LQs)  
As a ratio measure of relative concentration, LQs are utilised in this study to assess the 
concentration-evenness dimension of segregation. Specifically, LQs compare the share of a 
racial/ethnic group in a particular neighbourhood to their overall share in the city and are thus a 
useful tool for examining residential distributions (Brown & Chung, 2006). LQs are also simple to 
interpret. Scores greater than 1 indicate a neighbourhood has more than their expected share of 
immigrants suggesting overrepresentation. Scores less than 1 suggest a neighbourhood has less than 
their expected share indicating underrepresentation. The formula for calculating LQs is as follows:  
𝐿𝑄𝑛 = (
𝑖𝑛
𝑡𝑛
)/ (
𝐼
𝑇
) 
Where in and tn are the immigrant population and total population in the neighbourhood; I and 
T are the immigrant population and total population in the city. There is no statistical test available 
for determining a statistically significant LQ score (Groff, 2011). In stage 1 of the analysis, the LQ 
scores are categorised into three distinct groups: underrepresented (LQ <0.5), neutral (LQ 0.5-1.5) 
and overrepresented (LQ >1.5). This is done to visually represent spatial trends across Brisbane and 
Sydney neighbourhoods.  For the analytic models (stage 2), the LQs are included as a continuous 
variable to prevent arbitrary cut points from skewing the results.  
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Local Moran’s I (LM-I) 
LM-I evaluates each neighbourhood in terms of the characteristics of neighbouring areas and 
reveals incidents of spatial clustering (i.e. the spatial co-location of immigrant neighbourhoods) 
(Anselin, 1995; Brown & Chung, 2006). The LM-I procedure was computed in ArcGIS and employs 
a rook spatial contiguity matrix to capture the spatial arrangement for each study region. A rook 
contiguity matrix was chosen over a queen contiguity matrix due to its more conservative approach 
in identifying neighbouring areas (Dubin, 2009). Detecting statistically significant outliers and 
clusters, the LM-I output includes a LM-I index value, Z score, P-value and cluster type for each 
neighbourhood in the sample. The Z score indicates whether the similarity or dissimilarity found 
between a neighbourhood and adjacent areas is more than expected in a random distribution. High 
positive z scores indicate neighbourhoods share similar features with nearby areas. These 
neighbourhoods are therefore labelled as either High-High (HH) clusters (high concentration 
surrounded by high concentration) or Low-Low (LL) clusters (low concentration surrounded by low 
concentration). Alternatively, low negative Z scores illuminate statistically significant spatial 
outliers. These areas are categorised as either a High-Low (HL) cluster (high concentration 
surrounded by low concentration) or Low-High (LH) cluster (low concentration surrounded by high 
concentration). In stage 1, all group cluster types are presented on the maps to demonstrate where 
immigrant neighbourhoods are located in relation to one another. However, this variable is collapsed 
into a dichotomous variable for the analytic models (stage 2) with HH clusters (1) compared to all 
other categories (0) – LL, LH, HL, NS (this is due to a limited number of HL clusters found).  
Analytic strategy  
To assess the impact of immigrant segregation on violent crime across neighbourhoods, the 
initial assumption of a Poisson model was employed given the dependent variable is a non-negative 
integer. Greene (2008) denotes the formula for a standard Poisson model: 
𝑃[𝑌 = 𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖] =
exp(−𝜆𝑖)𝜆𝑖
𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖!
   𝜆𝑖 = exp(𝛼 +  𝑥𝑖
′𝛽), 𝑦𝑖 = 0, 1, … 𝑁;   𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁  
where 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of covariates and 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 indexes the N observations in a random sample. In 
the Poisson model, the variance is equal to the mean (Lacy, 2014).  However, a test of equidispersion 
identified overdispersion in the data as the variance in the model exceeded the mean value of violent 
crime in both cities. This necessitated the use of a negative binomial model. A Vuong test rejected 
the need to use a zero-inflated model (z =- 1.08, p = 0.86 Sydney and z = -1.57, p = 0.94 Brisbane). 
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A negative binomial model relaxes the restriction of equidispersion in the Poisson model. As such, 
the formula (Greene, 2008) becomes: 
𝐸[𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖𝜀𝑖] = exp(𝛼 + 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖) =  ℎ𝑖𝜆𝑖 
where 𝜀𝑖 is a random variable uncorrelated with x, and ℎ𝑖 = exp(𝜀𝑖) is assumed to have a gamma 
distribution with a mean of 1 and variance of 1. I calculate the negative binomial models in Stata 
using the nbreg command. In all negative binomial models, I include the total number of persons 
usually resident as an exposure term.  
Consistent with the previous studies, the models in Study 3 are stepped out in two stages. In 
the first stage of analysis, just the segregation measures are included. In the second, the socio-
demographic and environmental features are added. This process helps demonstrate how 
neighbourhood contexts shape the relationship between segregation patterns and crime. 
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Table 4.10 Descriptive statistics for Study 3 
 SYDNEY (N=598) BRISBANE (N=313) 
 Mean S.D Min Max Mean S.D Min Max 
Violent Crime Counts  57.36 86.35 0.00 869.33 20.82 25.22 0.00 195.33 
Asian Languages LQ 0.77 0.81 0.00 4.23 0.87 1.08 0.00 6.54 
European Languages LQ 0.95 0.63 0.00 3.23 0.94 0.52 0.00 3.37 
‘Other’ Languages LQ 0.81 1.08 0.00 7.21 0.84 1.09 0.00 7.00 
English Only LQ 1.03 0.45 0.26 2.61 0.98 0.26 0.25 1.76 
Asian Languages Cluster  HH: 16.08% Other: 83.92% HH: 11.18% Other: 88.82% 
European Languages Cluster HH: 16.25% Other: 83.75% HH: 10.54% Other: 89.46% 
‘Other’ Languages Cluster HH: 13.90% Other: 86.10% HH: 7.35% Other: 92.65% 
English Only Cluster HH: 15.41% Other: 84.59% HH: 9.90%% Other: 90.10% 
Disadvantage 0.09 1.06 -1.90 5.35 0.09 0.82 -1.85 2.62 
% Indigenous   1.42 1.76 0.00 15.15 2.13 2.70 0.00 40.29 
% Young Males  6.55 1.66 2.14 16.01 7.21 2.02 1.16 22.58 
% Renting  24.18 12.69 0.83 83.29 26.57 12.09 2.55 54.48 
% Different Address (5 years) 33.70 9.79 17.02 80.25 40.85 9.59 7.68 77.55 
Population Density  28.85 22.11 0.51 201.69 13.94 10.60 0.13 65.20 
Distance to CBM (KM) 26.14 19.26 0.89 88.33 19.77 12.39 1.04 61.67 
Residential Land Use  66.71 19.15 25.17 100.00 66.75 18.62 25.57 100.00 
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Table 4.11 Correlation matrices for Study 3 Sydney (N=598) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Violent Crime  1.00                 
2. Asian Languages LQ 0.31 1.00                
3. European Languages LQ  0.09 0.28 1.00               
4. ‘Other’ Languages LQ  0.31 0.27 0.02  1.00              
5. English Only LQ  -0.12 -0.46 -0.16 -0.36 1.00             
6. Asian Languages Cluster  0.23 0.79 0.17  0.23 -0.46  1.00            
7. European Languages Cluster  0.02 0.21  0.77  0.01 -0.25 0.14 1.00           
8. ‘Other’ Languages Cluster 0.28 0.29  0.00  0.72 -0.32 0.27 -0.04 1.00          
9. English Only Cluster  -0.05 -0.17  -0.02 -0.21 0.73 -0.20 -0.12 -0.17  1.00         
10.  Population Density  0.26 0.27  0.30  0.01 0.29  0.13 0.13 -0.03  0.36 1.00        
11.  % Indigenous   0.15 -0.24 -0.27 0.54 -0.23 -0.16 -0.15 0.34 -0.25 -0.20 1.00       
12.  Disadvantage  0.30  0.26 0.03 0.56 -0.66 0.24  0.12 0.53 -0.43 -0.18  0.61 1.00      
13. % Young Males  0.10 0.27  -0.10 0.27 -0.42 0.23 0.02 0.24 -0.28  -0.24 0.19  0.38  1.00     
14. % Renting  0.46 0.34 0.13 0.42 0.02 0.23 0.04 0.26  0.15 0.59 0.30 0.36 -0.07  1.00    
15. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.18  0.14 -0.08 -0.18 0.40 0.02 -0.11 -0.17  0.34 0.53 -0.16 -0.31 -0.28  0.51 1.00   
16. Distance to CBD -0.04 -0.32  -0.45 0.10 -0.30 -0.15 -0.20 0.10 -0.41 -0.56 0.53 0.40  0.17  -0.23 -0.22 1.00  
17. % Residential Land Use -0.06 0.09  0.17  0.02  -0.02  0.04 0.11 0.00  0.03 0.35 -0.13 -0.04 -0.11 0.02  0.01 -0.23 1.00 
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Table 4.12 Correlation matrices for Study 3 Brisbane (N=313) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Violent Crime  1.00                 
2. Asian Languages LQ 0.15 1.00                
3. European Languages LQ  0.09  0.54 1.00               
4. ‘Other’ Languages LQ  0.46 0.29  0.14 1.00              
5. English Only LQ  -0.08 -0.14 0.30  -0.11 1.00             
6. Asian Languages Cluster  0.13 0.79 0.45 0.20 -0.10 1.00            
7. European Languages Cluster  0.13 0.46 0.65 0.02 -0.06 0.41 1.00           
8. ‘Other’ Languages Cluster 0.27  0.19  0.11 0.81 -0.06 0.19 -0.04 1.00          
9. English Only Cluster  -0.03 -0.12 0.04 -0.08 0.50 -0.11 -0.10  -0.04 1.00         
10.  Population Density  0.21 0.33 0.48 0.03 -0.03 0.25 0.37  -0.06 -0.10 1.00        
11.  % Indigenous   0.20 -0.16 -0.30 0.24 -0.33 -0.11 -0.12 0.21 -0.08 -0.17  1.00       
12.  Disadvantage  0.47  0.18  -0.12 0.48 -0.20 0.18 0.16  0.34 -0.06 -0.09 0.42 1.00      
13. % Young Males  0.17  0.40  0.21 012 -0.20  0.36 0.19  0.08  -0.05 0.17  -0.01  0.10 1.00     
14. % Renting  0.50 0.27  0.29 0.40 -0.21 0.20 0.28 0.24 -0.13 0.62 0.19  0.35 0.27  1.00    
15. % Diff. Add. 5yrs 0.11 0.25 0.37 0.05 0.22 0.17  0.22 -0.01 0.04 0.41 -0.18  -0.06 0.10  0.58 1.00   
16. Distance to CBD -0.01 -0.40  -0.54 -0.03 -0.00 -0.27  -0.31 0.02  0.11 -0.63  0.31 0.34 -0.28  -0.38  -0.25 1.00  
17. % Residential Land Use -0.11 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.12  -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.16 0.29  0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05  1.00 
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4.9 Chapter summary 
Concerns about increased immigration and increased crime are not limited to the United 
States with anti-immigrant sentiment expressed across the global. Evidence from the United States 
suggests these concerns are largely unwarranted (Alaniz et al., 1998; Akins et al., 2009; Desmond & 
Kubrin, 2009; Kubrin & Ousey, 2009; Lee et al., 2001; Martinez et al., 2008; Reid et al., 2005; 
Stowell et al., 2009; Wadsworth, 2010). However, in a country with limited ethnic segregation, high 
levels of ethnic diversity and a largely skilled immigrant population, will similar relationships 
unfold? The overarching aim of this thesis is to understand how theories of immigration and crime 
derived from the United States apply to other settings. To explore the dynamic role neighbourhood, 
city and national contexts play in shaping the immigration-crime relationship, this thesis is 
comprised of three quantitative studies designed to better understand how immigrant growth, 
concentration, diversity and segregation affects crime rates across neighbourhoods located in two 
Australian cities: Sydney - an established immigrant gateway and Brisbane - a relatively new 
immigrant destination (Singer, 2004). In the following chapters, I present the results for each of the 
three empirical studies outlined.
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Chapter Five: Immigrant Growth, Concentration and Crime    
 
5.1 Introduction  
The bulk of immigration-crime research to date is based on the United States experience.  
Here, studies find that neither immigrants nor their children represent a greater criminal threat to 
society than the native born population once appropriate controls are considered (Butcher & Piehl, 
1998a; Butcher & Piehl, 1998b; Butcher & Piehl, 2007; Hagan & Palloni, 1999; Morenoff & Astor, 
2006; Rumbaut et al., 2006; Sampson, 2008). Contrary to popular perceptions, immigrant 
concentration is actually associated with lower levels of crime across many neighbourhoods and 
cities (Chavez & Griffiths, 2009; Desmond & Kubrin, 2009; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Kubrin & 
Ousey, 2009; Martinez et al., 2010). Evidence at both the local and national level suggests no 
relationship, or indeed a negative relationship between increased immigration and crime over time 
(Ousey & Kubrin 2009; Ousey & Kubrin, 2014; Stowell et al., 2009; Wadsworth, 2010). In fact, 
Sampson (2008, p. 30) argues that increased immigration may, in some part, be responsible for the 
violent crime drop and claims “cities of concentrated immigration are some of the safest places 
around.”  
The empirical examination of the immigration-crime nexus outside of the United States is 
relatively rare and presents a much less consistent picture. For example, immigrant concentration is 
linked to lower crime rates in England (Bell & Machin, 2013) but in France, the presence of 
immigrants is positively associated with crime (Aoki & Todo, 2009). In Belgium, research finds no 
significant relationship between total immigrants and crime, however, when focusing on group 
specific effects, concentrations of non-EU nationals and African nationals are related to higher crime 
in certain municipalities (Bircan & Hooghe, 2011). In Canada, the relationship between immigration 
and crime is indirect and a result of changes to the demographic composition of neighbourhoods, 
namely increases in the most criminogenic subpopulation - young males (Andersen, 2012). Taken 
together, these findings suggest that in some countries, under certain conditions, increased 
immigration may suppress crime while in others, increased immigration may heighten it. 
Previous immigration-crime scholarship has either focused on how changes in immigrant 
concentration over time impact crime within a unit, such as a neighbourhood or city (see for example 
Martinez et al., 2010; Ousey & Kubrin, 2009), or how static levels of immigrant concentration are 
associated with more or less crime between units (see for example Stowell & Martinez, 2009; Velez, 
2009). Yet experiencing an influx of new immigrants into a neighbourhood (i.e. the process that is 
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captured by change measures) is inherently different to exhibiting a generally high immigrant 
presence (i.e. the process that is captured by concentration measures). There is thus potential that 
each process may differentially influence crime. Study 1 considers both mechanisms by employing a 
unique hybrid modelling approach which captures both within and between neighbourhood effects. 
Three research questions guide Study 1. First, how do changes in immigrant concentration 
impact changes in violent crime within a neighbourhood over time? Second, do neighbourhoods with 
a higher concentration of immigrants encounter more or less crime? And finally, is the effect of 
changes in immigrant concentration on crime moderated by the neighbourhood context (for example, 
the size of the immigrant population or the level of disadvantage)? In this chapter, I first demonstrate 
how neighbourhoods in Brisbane and Sydney have changed over the period of study with particular 
focus on changing patterns in immigrant concentration. After establishing these changes, I present a 
series of analytic models which assess the within and between effects of immigrant concentration on 
violent crime.   
5.2 Changes in immigrant concentration over time  
As part of Study 1 is interested in how changes in immigrant concentration impact changes in 
neighbourhood violence over time, an important starting point for this research is to demonstrate the 
extent to which neighbourhoods experienced a significant change in immigrant concentration over 
the period of study. Table 5.1 demonstrates an increase in Sydney and Brisbane’s immigrant share 
between 2001 and 2011.  
Table 5.1 National and city immigrant share 
 AUSTRALIA SYDNEY BRISBANE 
 2001 2011 2001 2011 2001 2011 
% Immigrant  23.10% 26.00% 30.38% 33.86% 22.20% 29.70% 
       
Descriptive statistics for the neighbourhood level are provided in Table 5.2 and indicate that 
on average, immigrant concentration has risen across Sydney and Brisbane neighbourhoods. In 2011, 
immigrants represent on average 28.19% of the residential population across Sydney 
neighbourhoods, up from 26.52% in 2001. Further, the maximum level of immigrant concentration 
grew from 67.53% in 2001 to 74.40% by 2011. A similar upward trend is seen in Brisbane. While in 
2001, the average level of immigrant concentration across Brisbane neighbourhoods was 19.48%, by 
2011 immigrants comprise on average 22.79% of the neighbourhood population. The upper end of 
immigrant concentration also increased in Brisbane from 50.54% in 2001 to 56.61% in 2011. Yet 
while neighbourhoods in both cities saw an upsurge in immigrant concentration over time, 
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concentration levels remain much lower across Brisbane neighbourhoods. 
Table 5.2 Neighbourhood immigrant share 2001-2011 
 
Figure 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the changing nature of immigrant concentration across the two 
sites over time. While these maps show that a number of neighbourhoods in Sydney and Brisbane 
experienced substantial growth in immigrant concentration, considerable differences in immigrant 
settlement patterns are identified between the two cities. In the most highly concentrated areas in 
Sydney, immigrants represent between 45.69% and 74.40% of the residential population. In other 
words, there are a number of neighbourhoods in Sydney (N=61) where immigrants outnumber 
natives. Also notable about the Sydney context is that these immigrant neighbourhoods are widely 
scattered across the city rather than confined to a certain geographic area. Comparisons between the 
2001 and 2011 maps show that the spatial clustering of neighbourhoods with high concentrations of 
immigrants has increased over time. However, several neighbourhoods located near these long 
standing immigrant areas reach a high level of immigrant concentration by 2011. Examples of this 
trend are most evident when comparing the inner city region (refer to inset in Figure 5.1). This 
suggests clusters of high concentration neighbourhoods are growing over time.  
Change is even more apparent in the Brisbane context. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, 
neighbourhoods located in Brisbane’s south present the highest levels of immigrant concentration in 
the city with between 33.65% and 56.65% of the population foreign born. Further these highly 
concentrated neighbourhoods share a common boundary with other high concentration areas. These 
neighbourhoods form together to create a relatively large contiguous immigrant enclave. Like 
Sydney, most of the densely concentrated areas in 2001 continue to exhibit a high level of 
concentration in 2011. Yet by 2011, this high concentration has spread to adjacent neighbourhoods. 
Also visible in Brisbane is the increasing presence of immigrants in the city’s northern suburbs in 
2011. In 2001, most neighbourhoods located on the north side of Brisbane recorded low levels of 
immigrant concentration, falling within the 0.00% to 14.15% bracket. Many of these areas sit within 
the 14.16% to 22.94% range by 2011. While hardly any north side neighbourhoods exceeded 
concentration levels of 25% in 2001, a small handful reach a level of immigrant concentration above 
the city average in 2011. Several of these newly concentrated neighbourhoods share a boundary with 
one another. This trend points to a series of growing immigrant enclaves on Brisbane’s north. 
 2001 2011 
 Mean S.D Min Max Mean S.D Min Max 
% Immigrant (Sydney) 26.52 11.80 7.71 67.53 28.19 13.46 8.12 74.40 
% Immigrant (Brisbane) 19.48 7.24 6.33 50.54 22.79 9.01 5.14 56.61 
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Figure 5.1 Immigrant concentration in Sydney (2001 and 2011) 
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Figure 5.2 Immigrant concentration in Brisbane (2001 and 2011) 
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These maps highlight significant differences in the spatial distribution of the immigrant 
population across the two sites. While the most highly concentrated neighbourhoods in Sydney have 
between 45.69% and 74.74% of the population foreign born, the upper category for Brisbane ranged 
between 33.56% and 56.61%. Thus despite considerable growth in immigration, concentration levels 
across Brisbane neighbourhoods are much lower level than what is seen in Sydney. Unlike Sydney, it 
is rare for immigrants to comprise the majority of the population in Brisbane. In 2011, immigrant 
concentration exceeded 50% in only six Brisbane neighbourhoods (total N=36515) compared to 61 
neighbourhoods in Sydney (total N=735). Further still, immigrant concentration is spatially clustered 
in Brisbane. In this city, most highly concentrated immigrant neighbourhoods are co-located and 
situated in the south. While some highly concentrated neighbourhoods in Sydney share a boundary 
with other highly concentrated areas, there are pockets of immigrant neighbourhoods dispersed 
across the city. These divergent patterns reflect each city’s status as either a new or established 
destination.   
To ascertain whether neighbourhood differences in immigrant concentration between 2001 
and 2011 are statistically significant, a series of paired t-tests were conducted. Results from these t-
tests are presented in Table 5.3. Here we can see that the increase in immigrant concentration that 
each site experienced is statistically significant. Additional t-tests were run on all presumed time 
variant variables in order to justify their inclusion as change measures. I find neighbourhoods in both 
sites experienced a statistically significant change over the period of study in all of the key predicator 
variables.  
Table 5.3 Paired t-tests of time variant predictors 
 SYDNEY BRISBANE 
 z p< z p< 
% Immigrant  11.64 *** 17.87 *** 
% Indigenous   9.24 *** 6.52 *** 
% Young Males  -5.35 *** -2.28 * 
% Renting  2.35 * 6.09 *** 
% Different Address 5 years -17.09 *** -8.81 *** 
Disadvantage  7.97 *** -10.04 *** 
Population Density  11.71 *** 12.30 *** 
                                        * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
                                               
15 Neighbourhoods with over 300 persons usually resident in 2011.  
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5.3 Analytic strategy  
To assess the effect of immigrant concentration on crime, Study 1 utilises Allison’s hybrid 
modelling approach (Allison, 2009). These models allow for the examination of both within 
neighbourhood and between neighbourhood effects and unlike fixed effects models, allow for the 
inclusion of time invariant predictors. Theoretically, this allows us to simultaneously test whether it 
is the process of change in neighbourhood conditions that matters for crime and/or the average level 
of concentration. The within effects component of the model considers how changes in the predicator 
variables within a neighbourhood influence changes in that neighbourhood’s level of violent crime 
over time. Interested solely in within unit change, these estimates can be interpreted as fixed effects. 
The between effects component of the model allows for comparisons to be made across 
neighbourhoods by calculating an average score for the predicator variables. Taken together, this 
hybrid modelling approach allows us to determine how change influences violent crime within a 
neighbourhood over time as well as compare across neighbourhoods. To estimate the within and 
between effects, hybrid models comprise two types of variables: mean-deviated variables (for the 
within effects) and mean-centred variables (for the between effects). The process of calculating these 
variables is outlined in Chapter 4. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5.4.   
 As addressed in Chapter 4, violent crimes represent relatively rare neighbourhood events, 
particularly in the Australian context. The distribution of violent crime in both cities is highly 
skewed with many places exhibiting low counts. To deal with overdispersion, estimates for negative 
binomial regression are calculated with the residential population included as the exposure variable. I 
estimate random effects to allow for the dependence of multiple observations for neighbourhoods. 
For further information on the modelling strategy, please refer to Chapter 4. 
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Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics for mean-centred and mean-deviated variables 
 
  
 SYDNEY  BRISBANE  
 Overall Between Within Overall Between Within 
 Mean S.D Min Max S.D Min Max Mean S.D Min Max S.D Min Max 
% Immigrant  29.49 12.07 9.17 65.28 2.09 12.03 51.50 21.57 7.62 7.10 53.09 2.23 12.75 31.33 
% Indigenous   1.24 1.54 0.00 12.03 0.43 -1.86 7.41 1.95 2.48 0.08 35.54 0.48 -4.48 6.50 
% Young Males  6.75 1.48 3.05 15.00 0.73 0.08 12.84 7.33 1.92 2.36 22.46 0.61 4.45 10.56 
% Renters  24.31 12.78 1.21 81.35 2.19 7.33 54.22 25.71 11.58 2.78 50.49 2.31 16.29 41.32 
% Different Address 5 years 34.15 8.56 19.78 63.11 5.08 9.72 66.42 40.97 7.69 10.72 71.42 4.33 27.51 58.70 
Population Density  27.23 20.16 0.73 193.52 3.40 -0.08 65.35 13.11 9.75 0.19 52.00 1.65 -8.33 28.61 
Disadvantage  0.06 1.08 -1.87 5.42 0.27 -1.21 1.99 0.19 0.80 -1.59 2.66 0.30 -0.81 1.27 
Nearby Crime  6.42 0.71 0.00 8.58 - - - 5.40 1.04 0.00 7.35 - - - 
N 1740  906 
n 580  302 
T 3 3 
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5.4 Results  
The models are stepped out in three stages. In the first stage of modelling, the mean-centred 
and mean-deviated immigrant concentration variables are included. After assessing the bivariate 
relationship between immigration and crime, the socio-demographic and environmental features are 
added to the model. This allows us to determine the role context plays in shaping the immigration-
crime connection. In the final stages of modelling, two interaction terms are considered. These terms 
test central arguments of the revitalisation thesis, namely that changes in immigrant concentration 
will have the largest effect in certain types of places – particularly in areas with an established 
immigrant presence (Ramey, 2013) and in more disadvantaged communities (Velez, 2009). The 
results for stage 1 and stage 2 are discussed for each city before turning to the interaction effects. 
Sydney  
In the initial stages of modelling, only the immigrant concentration measure is included. 
Here, the within effects component of the model suggests a significant negative relationship between 
changes in immigrant concentration and crime in Sydney (B=-0.030 p< 0.001). That is, as immigrant 
concentration increases within a neighbourhood over time, violent crime decreases. However, in the 
between effects component of the model, the relationship between immigrant concentration and 
violent crime does not reach statistical significance. This suggests that for Sydney it is the process of 
change in immigrant concentration that is most impactful in protecting communities against violent 
crime rather than just levels of concentration. Thus neighbourhoods undergoing a greater influx of 
immigrants experience less violent crime over time while areas with a higher average level of 
immigrant concentration see no effect.  
Next, the socio-demographic and environmental features of neighbourhoods are entered into 
the model. Once accounting for the neighbourhood context, the within effects component of the 
model demonstrates that changes in immigrant concentration in Sydney - an established immigrant 
gateway - continue to have a significant and negative effect on violent crime over time (B= -0.012 
p<0.001). Other significant predictors of violent crime include changes in the presence of young 
males, renters, those at a different address five years ago and population density. In Sydney 
neighbourhoods, as the young male population increases over time, so too does violent crime 
(B=0.040 p<0.001). This supports other studies that find a link between the size of the young male 
population and neighbourhood violence (Andersen, 2012; Wadsworth, 2010). Consistent with social 
disorganisation theory, measures of population turnover (namely, percent renters and percent at a 
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different address five years ago) are significantly and positively associated with violent crime. As the 
number of renters increase over time, violent crime rises (B=0.009 p<0.01). Neighbourhood violence 
similarly rises as the percent of new residents within a given neighbourhood increases over time 
(B=0.002 p<0.05). Taken together, these findings suggest that in more unstable neighbourhoods, 
residents are unable to develop the networks necessary for the informal social control of crime. 
Increasing population density is negatively related to violent crime in Sydney (B= -0.026 p<0.001). 
Thus, as population density increases over time, violent crime levels decline. Changes in 
disadvantage had no significant effect on violent crime over time - this finding is surprising given the 
strong support for this relationship in the international literature.  
The between effects component of the model reveals no significant relationship between the 
average level of immigrant concentration and violent crime across neighbourhoods once accounting 
for the broader socio-demographic context. However, I find several other factors are significant 
predictors of violent crime when comparing between neighbourhoods. Factors positively linked to 
higher violent crime include Indigenous presence, disadvantage, renters and population density. For 
example, areas with a higher average number of Indigenous persons experience more violent crime 
than neighbourhoods with fewer Indigenous residents (B= 0.075 p<0.001). This finding is in line 
with previous research (McCausaland & Vivian, 2010) and reflects the high levels of disadvantage 
the Indigenous population face in Australia (Altman et al., 2008).  
According to social disorganisation theory, disadvantaged and residentially unstable 
neighbourhoods lack the capacity for the informal regulation of crime (Shaw & McKay, 1942; 
Sampson & Groves, 1989). In Sydney, the results of Study 1 show that traditional indicators of 
disorganisation are significantly and positively linked to violent crime across neighbourhoods. Here 
the results suggest areas with a higher level of disadvantage encounter more violent crime than 
neighbourhoods with lower disadvantage (B= 0.261 p<0.001). This finding is consistent with 
extensive international scholarship which connects neighbourhood disadvantage to crime (Bursik & 
Grasmick, 1993; Krivo & Peterson, 1996; Lee et al., 2001; Sampson et al., 2005). Some support is 
also found for the effect of residential mobility on crime. Specifically, the concentration of renters is 
positively linked to violent crime. Thus, areas with more renters report more violent crime (B= 0.023 
p<0.001). This indicates that without an invested stake in the community, renters may be less willing 
to intervene in social problems like crime. Yet the other measure of residential mobility - those at a 
different address five years ago - is not significantly associated with violent crime when comparing 
across Sydney neighbourhoods.   
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Table 5.5 Effects of immigrant concentration on violent crime within and between 
neighbourhoods  
 SYDNEY (N=580) BRISBANE (N=302) 
  Β (SE) Β (SE) Β (SE) Β (SE) 
 Within Within 
% Immigrant  -0.030 (0.00) *** -0.012 (0.00) *** -0.030 (0.00) *** -0.012 (0.00) * 
% Indigenous     -0.056 (0.01)    0.016 (0.02)  
% Young Males    0.040 (0.01) ***   0.039 (0.02) * 
% Renting    0.009 (0.00) **   -0.0004 (0.00)  
% Different Address (5yrs)   0.002 (0.00) *   -0.0005 (0.00)  
Disadvantage    0.019 (0.02)    0.160 (0.3) *** 
Population Density    -0.026 (0.00) ***   -0.032 (0.01) *** 
 Between Between 
% Immigrant  0.001 (0.00)  -0.002 (0.00)  0.004 (0.01)  -0.001 (0.01)  
% Indigenous     0.075 (0.02) ***   0.042 (0.02) * 
% Young Males    -0.018 (0.01)    0.038 (0.03)  
% Renting    0.023 (0.00) ***   0.041 (0.01) *** 
% Different Address (5yrs)   0.0002 (0.00)    -0.011 (0.01)  
Disadvantage    0.261 (0.05) ***   0.273 (0.07) *** 
Population Density    0.008 (0.00) ***   0.003 (0.001)  
Nearby Violent Crime    -0.032 (0.03)    -0.019 (0.02)  
 Random Random 
Distance to CBD   0.006 (0.00) **   0.009 (0.00)  
% Residential Land Use   -0.007 (0.00) ***   -0.007 (0.00) *** 
Constant  -5.05 (0.11) *** -4.865 (0.27) *** -4.541 (0.23) *** -4.680 (0.43) *** 
ln (r)  1.294 (0.07) 2.624  (0.08) 1.921 (0.159) 3.280 (0.257) 
ln (s) 1.308 (0.07) 2.272 (0.08) 0.707 (0.10) 1.577 (0.12) 
Log likelihood  -6940.724 -6516.356 -2936.414 -2758.75 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Population density is another significant predictor of violent crime in Sydney. In more 
densely populated areas, violent crime is higher (B= 0.008 p<0.001). In this study, the relationship 
found between population density and crime in the between effects component of the model, 
contrasts the association seen in the within effects component. As experiencing change in population 
density is inherently different to presenting a generally high level of population density, it’s not 
surprising the results vary. While at first, these results might appear to contradict one another, it is 
important to recognise that these two measures capture very distinct neighbourhood processes. The 
within effects component of the model measures change and thus increasing population density may 
be associated with urban renewal and neighbourhood growth - but may not have reached the 
threshold where anonymity is achieved. By contrast, the between effects component of the model 
differentiates between areas that exhibit (on average) a high or low level of population density. In 
this case, the positive association between the level of population density and violent crime may be 
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due to a greater number of opportunities (i.e. more potential victims) and greater anonymity for 
would be offenders (Glaeser & Sacerdote, 1996; Kelly, 2000).  
Ecological theories of crime predict neighbourhoods more proximate to the city centre will 
encounter higher levels of crime and disorder. As these areas are perceived to be undesirable and 
unsafe, residents will chose to move to more distal and safer neighbourhoods once they have 
sufficient economic capital (Burgess, 1928; Shaw & McKay, 1942). This process thereby 
exacerbates disadvantage and population turnover in these inner city areas. In contrast to this 
argument, I find the opposite in the Sydney context. Here, the results show a neighbourhood’s 
distance from the city centre is positively linked to violent crime. In other words, more distally 
located neighbourhoods report a higher number of violent crimes (B= 0.006 p<0.01). Considering 
Sydney’s real estate market, this finding isn’t overly surprising with some of the most expensive and 
sought after homes located in neighbourhoods in and around the central business 
district.16Alternatively, more distal areas offer cheaper rent, lower costs of living and access to social 
housing.  
Environmental perspectives suggest that certain non-residential land uses create opportunities 
for crime (Ihlanfeldt, 2003; Grubesic et al., 2013; Livingston, 2008; Murray & Swatt, 2010; Nielsen 
& Martinez, 2003). Therefore at the neighbourhood level, areas with greater non-residential land use 
are expected to encounter a higher rate of crime. In this study, I find a significant and negative 
relationship between residential land use and violent crime across Sydney neighbourhoods. Here, the 
results indicate areas with a higher degree of residential land use experience fewer violent crimes 
(B= -0.007 p<0.001). The concentration of young males and nearby violent crime is not significantly 
associated with higher crime across Sydney neighbourhoods.  
Brisbane  
Despite being a new destination city - with a differing immigration history and immigrant 
composition to Sydney - changes in immigrant concentration similarly impact violent crime in 
Brisbane. Only the immigration measures are included in the first stages of modelling for Brisbane. 
In the within effects component of the model, I find a significant and negative relationship between 
changes in immigrant concentration and crime over time (B =-0.030 p<0.001). In the between effects 
component of the model, I find no statistically significant relationship between the average level of 
immigrant concentration and violent crime when comparing across neighbourhoods. As with 
                                               
16 The CBD itself was not included in the neighbourhood sample.  
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Sydney, it is the process of change in immigrant concentration that is most consequential for violent 
crime in the Brisbane setting.  
Once controlling for neighbourhood contexts, the within effects component of the model 
continues to point to a significant and negative relationship between changes in immigrant 
concentration and violent crime over time (B=-0.012, p<0.05). Thus despite possessing fewer 
established networks and resources for immigrants upon arrival, an increase in immigrant 
concentration in Brisbane neighbourhoods is linked to lower crime. Other variables significantly 
associated with more violent crime over time include the increased presence of young males and 
increased disadvantage. In Brisbane, as neighbourhood disadvantage increases over time, the level of 
violent crime also rises (B=0.160, p<0.001). This effect is not seen in the Sydney context. In line 
with the Sydney models, the increasing presence of young males is associated with more 
neighbourhood violence over time (B=0.039, p<0.05). Increasing population density over time has a 
similar effect on crime in both cities. In Brisbane, I find a significant and negative relationship 
between changes in population density and changes in violent crime. Thus as population density 
increases over time in a given neighbourhood, violent crime decreases (B=-0.032 p<0.001). 
The between effects component of the model continues to reveal no significant relationship 
between immigrant concentration and violent crime across Brisbane neighbourhoods once 
appropriate controls are considered. Several of the neighbourhood characteristics associated with 
more violent crime across Sydney neighbourhoods are again significant in the Brisbane context. In 
particular, measures of social disorganisation including the level of disadvantage and presence of 
renters are positively linked to violent crime when comparing between Brisbane neighbourhoods. In 
Brisbane, neighbourhoods which exhibit higher levels of disadvantage experience more violent 
crime compared to neighbourhoods with lower levels of disadvantage (B=0.273 p<0.001). 
Additionally, areas with a larger presence of renters report more neighbourhood violence (B=0.041 
p<0.001). Indigenous presence is also significantly and positively associated with violent crime 
across Brisbane. Here I find areas with a greater number of Indigenous residents tend to encounter 
more violence than those with fewer Indigenous residents (B=0.042 p<0.05). Like Sydney, 
residential land use is negatively linked to violent crime in Brisbane (B=-0.007 p<0.001). This 
suggests neighbourhoods with greater residential land use face fewer violent crime problems.   
Interaction terms  
Emerging research from the United States suggests that certain socio-structural features of 
the neighbourhood moderate the immigration-crime relationship. For example, scholars argue that 
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areas with an established immigrant presence will fare better following increased immigration when 
compared to newer settlement sites (Martinez et al., 2004; Ramey, 2013). This is because new 
immigrants arriving in areas with an established immigrant presence will presumably have greater 
access to co-ethnics, social institutions and ethnic economies (Portes & Rumbaut 2006; Singer, 
2004). Established neighbourhoods should therefore be well equipped to facilitate integration and 
absorb influxes of new immigrants. However, without these established ties and resources, new 
immigrant areas may struggle - at least in the short term - and experience more crime following 
increased immigration (Martinez et al., 2004). Results from empirical studies which test these 
assumptions are far from conclusive. While some find that newer destination cities experience poorer 
crime outcomes following increased immigration (Martinez et al., 2004; Ramey, 2013), others argue 
that new settlement zones experience the largest drop in crime (Ferraro, 2016).   
To test this moderation effect, scholars generally categorise neighbourhoods or cities as either 
established/traditional or new/non-traditional (Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013; Light, 2017; Painter- 
Davis, 2015). This process often involves using the level of immigrant concentration at the starting 
time point or a time prior to the study to split the sample into two groups. Yet immigrant 
concentration occurs on a continuum and by dichotomously classifying neighbourhoods as new or 
established, this nuance is lost. Thus, in addition to broadly classifying Brisbane and Sydney as an 
established gateway and new destination, I include an interaction to conduct a more robust 
investigation of this moderation effect at the neighbourhood level. To determine whether the effect 
of change in immigrant concentration varies depending on the average level of immigrant 
concentration, I include an interaction term between the mean-deviated and mean-centred variables.  
Table 5.6 presents the models with the interaction term included. Here, I find a statistically 
significant effect in Sydney (B= 0.001, p<0.001) but not in Brisbane. In Sydney, changes in 
immigrant concentration impact crime differently depending on a neighbourhood’s level of 
immigrant concentration. Yet contrary to expectations, areas with a lower level of immigrant 
concentration experience the greatest reduction in crime following an influx of immigrants into the 
neighbourhood. As Figure 5.3 reveals, areas with one standard deviation below the mean level of 
immigrant concentration see the largest drop in crime following positive immigrant growth. 
Comparatively, the effect of an increase in immigration on violent crime is smaller in areas with an 
above average level of immigrant concentration. In fact, once the level of immigrant concentration 
reaches two standard deviations above the mean (around 54%), changes in immigrant concentration 
have little effect on violent crime. These results point to a threshold effect. Once a community 
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reaches a certain level of immigrant concentration, the effect of changes in immigrant concentration 
on violent crime diminishes. This also suggests that despite theoretical predictions, a large and 
established immigrant population is not required in order for changes in immigrant concentration to 
have a protective effect against crime. As Brisbane has very few neighbourhoods with a foreign born 
population above 50%, it’s not surprising this threshold effect is not found in this setting.  
Figure 5.3 Immigrant concentration interaction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another neighbourhood factor argued to moderate the immigration-crime link is 
disadvantage. Research from the United States suggests that the negative relationship between 
immigrant concentration and crime is particularly pronounced in areas of concentrated disadvantage 
(MacDonald et al., 2013; Velez, 2009). Indeed Velez (2009) found influxes of recent immigrants 
differentially affected crime in advantaged neighbourhoods compared to disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. In disadvantaged neighbourhoods, increased immigrant presence was associated 
with reductions in lethal violence while in advantaged areas an increased number of immigrants was 
related to more crime. Velez (2009) suggests that this is because influxes of immigrants into 
disadvantaged areas effectively revitalise neighbourhood organisations and institutions, stimulate the 
local economy and strengthen social networks. Yet in advantaged communities, an increased 
presence of immigrants potentially disrupts social networks and informal social control and in turn, 
crime increases.  
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Figure 5.4 Mean-deviated immigrant concentration and mean-centred disadvantage  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To test this perspective, an additional interaction term between the mean-deviated immigrant 
concentration measure and the mean-centred disadvantage measure was entered into the model. 
Specifically, I examine whether the effects of changes in immigrant concentration on violence vary 
across neighbourhoods with different levels of disadvantage. Again, this interaction term is 
statistically significant in the Sydney context only (B= 0.007, p<0.001). Here, I find that changes in 
immigrant concentration in more affluent areas are associated with the largest reduction in crime (see 
Figure 5.4). However in more disadvantaged areas, an increase in immigrant concentration slightly 
increases violent crime. These findings suggest disadvantage differentially moderates the 
immigration-crime relationship in the Australian context compared to what is seen in the United 
States. When taken together, these interaction terms suggest some of the key arguments of the 
revitalisation thesis do not hold in the Australian setting - at least when considering total immigrant 
concentration.  
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Table 5.6 Interaction Effects  
 SYDNEY (N=580) BRISBANE (N=302) 
 Β (SE) Β (SE) Β (SE) Β (SE) 
 Within Within 
% Immigrant  -0.049 (0.01) *** -0.016 (0.00) *** -0.027 (0.01)  -0.017 (0.01) ** 
% Indigenous   -0.055 (0.01) *** -0.052 (0.01) *** 0.021 (0.02)  0.015 (0.02)  
% Young Males  0.036 (0.01) *** 0.035 (0.01) *** 0.029 (0.02)  0.028 (0.01)  
% Renting  0.007 (0.00) ** 0.008 (0.00) ** 0.001 (0.00)  -0.001 (0.00)  
% Different Address (5yrs) 0.003 (0.00) * 0.003 (0.00)  0.001 (0.00)  -0.001 (0.00)  
Disadvantage  0.017 (0.02)  0.030 (0.02)  0.149 (0.03) *** 0.164 (0.03) *** 
Population Density  -0.027 (0.00) *** 0.009 (0.00) *** -0.031 (0.01) *** -0.030 (0.01) *** 
 Between Between 
% Immigrant  -0.002 (0.00)  -0.002 (0.00)  -0.001 (0.01)  -0.002 (0.00)  
% Indigenous   0.007 (0.02) ** 0.073 (0.02) ** 0.042 (0.02) * 0.073 (0.02) ** 
% Young Males  -0.020 (0.01)  -0.018 (0.01)  0.038 (0.02)  -0.018 (0.01)  
% Renting  0.023 (0.00) *** 0.023 (0.00) *** 0.040 (0.01) *** 0.023 (0.00) *** 
% Different Address (5yrs) 0.000 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  -0.010 (0.01)  0.000 (0.00)  
Disadvantage  0.266 (0.05) *** 0.264 (0.05) *** 0.273 (0.07) *** 0.264 (0.05) *** 
Population Density  0.009 (0.00) *** 0.009 (0.00) *** 0.003 (0.01)  0.009 (0.00) *** 
Nearby Violent Crime  -0.031 (0.03)  -0.030 (0.03)  -0.019 (0.03)  -0.030 (0.03)  
 Random Random 
Distance to CBD 0.006 (0.00) ** 0.006 (0.00) * 0.009 (0.00)  0.006 (0.00) ** 
% Residential Land Use -0.007 (0.00) *** -0.007 (0.000) *** -0.007 (0.00) *** -0.007 (0.00) *** 
 Interaction Interaction 
Within Immigrant X Between Immigrant  0.001 (0.00) ***   0.000 (0.00)    
Within Immigrant X Between Disadvantage    0.007 (0.00) ***   0.007 (0.00)  
Constant  -4.832 (0.27) *** -4.862 (0.27) *** -4.669 (0.43) *** -4.648 (0.43) *** 
ln (r)  2.642 (0.08) 2.641 (0.08) 3.291 (0.03) 3.309 (0.27) 
ln (s) 2.258 (0.08) 2.260 (0.082)  1.573 (0.01) 1.569 (0.12) 
Log likelihood  -6503.812 -6510.270 -2758.065 2757.049 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001     
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Site comparison  
Despite the substantial differences in each city’s immigration history and immigrant 
composition, changes in immigrant concentration over time as well as the level of immigrant 
concentration impact neighbourhood crime in similar ways across the two sites. In both cities, 
changes in immigrant concentration over time are linked to less violent crime, even after controlling 
for broader neighbourhood features like disadvantage. Additionally, the level of immigrant 
concentration is not significantly linked to neighbourhood violence in either city. Thus 
neighbourhoods with a higher immigrant concentration do not experience significantly higher or 
lower violence compared to neighbourhoods with a lower immigrant concentration. Thus while 
Sydney and Brisbane differ considerably in terms of established networks and resources for 
immigrants, the results do not vary between the new and established site. As the recruitment of 
immigrants is controlled at the national level in Australia, this (at least partially) may explain the 
similarity between the two city contexts. 
Overall the results demonstrate that increased immigration does not lead to greater 
neighbourhood violence - a consistent finding to research in the United States. However, what 
remains unclear is whether this similarity is due to a process of revitalisation. The measures included 
here (similar to previous scholarship) do not directly test the effect of immigrant concentration on the 
neighbourhood social processes important for the regulation of crime (such as collective efficacy). 
From a revitalisation perspective, we would expect immigrant neighbourhoods to exhibit strong 
social networks that foster shared expectations for informal social control which in turn lead to a 
reduction in crime. This missing link in the current study makes it difficult to determine whether the 
similarities found between the two countries is a result of the same processes.  
However, the two interaction terms included in the models do not provide support for some 
of the arguments central to the revitalisation thesis. While scholars contend increased immigration 
will exert the largest protective effect on crime in areas with an established immigrant presence, this 
is not the case in Australia. In fact in Sydney, the effect of increased immigration on crime is 
strongest in areas with a lower average level of concentration. Additionally, I find no support for the 
argument that the effect of increases in immigrant concentration over time is strongest in 
disadvantaged communities destined for decline. Rather in Sydney, more affluent areas see the 
largest drop in violent crime following increased immigration. If anything, increased immigrant 
concentration in disadvantaged communities increases crime (although only slightly).  
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The push/pull factors which drive migratory decisions may explain some of the similarities 
found across the two contexts. In Australia, the foreign born population represents the “motivated 
immigrant” described in the selection effects thesis. Most new arrivals are highly skilled and secure 
employment prior to arrival (DIBP, 2015). The point-based program of migration effectively chooses 
migrants who have high stakes in conformity and wish to avoid the criminal justice system. 
Similarly, the United States attracts a large volume of workers (although low skilled and at times 
arriving via illegitimate routes) as well as immigrants hoping to reunite with family. Thus, despite 
differences in socio-economic and legal status, immigrants in the United States and Australia are 
pulled to the host country in pursuit of a better livelihood for themselves and their family. On a 
larger scale, Sampson (2008, p. 30) argues that this selection bias “favours the argument that 
immigration may be causally linked to lower crime.”  
Finally, it is important to note that when explaining crime across place, immigrant 
concentration represents only a modest piece of the overall puzzle. Rather, other factors such as 
disadvantage and land use play a more crucial role in determining the spatial distribution of violent 
crime.  The evidence presented here suggests disorganised neighbourhoods, places with higher levels 
of disadvantage, Indigenous presence and renters, experience the greatest share of violent crimes. 
Taken together, these findings reinforce the importance of considering the broader context of 
neighbourhoods when assessing the immigration-crime link.   
5.5 Chapter summary  
Overall there is no evidence in either city to suggest that neighbourhoods with a greater 
concentration of immigrants have more violent crime or that increases in the immigrant population 
over time are associated with greater violence. In fact, even after accounting for neighbourhood 
context, increasing immigrant concentration is significantly linked to lower violence in both cities. 
Yet statistically significant effects are found only in the within effects component of the model. 
Comparing across neighbourhoods, the level of immigrant concentration had no effect on crime, 
even after controlling for context. These findings therefore indicate that it is the process of change 
that is most consequential for crime rather than levels of concentration. The interaction terms reveal 
differences between the two sites. In Sydney, changes in immigrant concentration differentially 
impacts crime depending on the average level of immigrant concentration and the average level of 
disadvantage. Contrary to theoretical predictions, the crime-reducing effect of change in immigrant 
concentration is most pronounced in areas with a lower average level of immigrant concentration and 
disadvantage. No statistically significant interactions are uncovered in Brisbane.   
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While this study focuses on a broad measure of immigration to assess the immigration-crime 
connection, in reality, immigrants represent a diverse group, arriving under different circumstances 
with varied resources and backgrounds. With this in mind, relying solely on a measure of total 
immigrant concentration may oversimplify the relationship and wash out any effect of ethnicity on 
crime - particularly because immigrants from the United Kingdom and New Zealand comprise the 
largest foreign born groups in Australia. Therefore, group specific measures focused on capturing the 
effects of ethnicity are introduced in Study 2. More specifically, these variables disaggregate the 
total immigrant concentration measure by two indicators of ethnicity - language and religion. By 
tapping into the presence of culturally similar immigrants, these refined measures allow for a more 
meaningful test of the immigration revitalisation thesis in Australia. Further, as social 
disorganisation theory predicts crime to be higher in more ethnically diverse areas (rather than highly 
concentrated areas), Study 2 includes two diversity indices to more rigorously test the central tenets 
of this theory.  
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Chapter Six: Immigration, Ethnicity and Crime    
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
To provide a point of comparison to international studies and a baseline for Australian 
research, Study 1 focused on understanding the relationship between total immigration and violent 
crime. The results suggest that when immigrants are considered as a homogenous group, neither 
increasing immigrant concentration over time nor higher average levels of immigrant concentration 
are linked to more neighbourhood crime. In this study, total immigrant concentration is 
disaggregated by two measures of ethnicity - language and religion. Study 2 thus extends on Study 1 
by considering the influence of specific immigrant groups on violent crime – with particular focus on 
emerging immigrant populations that have experienced growth in recent years. These groups tend to 
be more ‘visible’ and culturally distinct from native Australians and experience greater social 
distance. 
 By examining the presence of culturally similar immigrants, these group specific 
concentration measures provide a more robust test of the immigration revitalisation thesis which 
emphasises the importance of co-ethnics. However from a social disorganisation perspective, ethnic 
diversity is argued to lead to higher neighbourhood crime rather than simply ethnic group 
concentration. While there is a tendency to conflate concentration and diversity measures in 
immigration-crime studies, there are reasons to believe these two processes will differentially impact 
neighbourhood crime. For example, while the concentration of ethnic minorities may insulate 
communities from crime by strengthening social networks and providing residents with a “protective 
shell” of resources (Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013, p. 203) ethnic diversity is likely to have the opposite 
effect. Instead in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods, cultural differences between immigrant groups, 
language barriers and in-group preferences cause residents to “hunker down,” and avoid neighbourly 
interactions (Feldmeyer at al., 2016; Putnam, 2007; Wickes et al., 2013b). In turn, residents in 
ethnically diverse neighbourhoods are less likely to engage in informal social control actions thereby 
providing a social environment conducive to crime. To simultaneously test the central tenets of 
social disorganisation theory, the Study 2 models include corresponding diversity measures. By 
considering both concentration and diversity effects and by accounting for the dynamic socio-
structural and environmental features of the neighbourhood, this study rigorously tests the key 
arguments of both the immigration revitalisation thesis and social disorganisation theory.  
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Three key overarching questions guide this study. First, how do increases in ethnic group 
concentration and ethnic diversity impact changes in violent crime within neighbourhoods over 
time? Second, how does ethnic group concentration and ethnic diversity effect violent crime when 
comparing across neighbourhoods? And finally, do changes in immigrant group concentration and 
ethnic diversity differentially impact violent crime across different neighbourhood contexts (i.e. at 
varying levels of immigrant concentration and disadvantage)? In this chapter, I first explain the 
theoretical importance of accounting for ethnicity in immigration-crime research and detail the key 
ethnic groups of interest. Next, I demonstrate how neighbourhoods in Brisbane and Sydney have 
changed over the period of study with particular focus on changing patterns in ethnic group 
concentration and diversity. Once establishing these changes, I present a series of analytic models 
which assess the within and between effects of ethnic group concentration and ethnic diversity on 
neighbourhood violent crime.   
6.2 Immigrant ethnicity  
 Immigrant ethnicity is fundamental to both the revitalisation and disorganisation 
perspectives. According to the revitalisation thesis, immigrants from the same cultural and linguistic 
background can provide new arrivals with essential resources and ties that assist with integration 
(Martinez & Lee, 2000; Martinez et al., 2004; Martinez et al., 2010; Nielsen et al., 2005). With this 
in mind, the effect of immigrant concentration on crime is predicted to vary across ethnic groups 
depending on the size of the established co-ethnic population. An influx of a relatively new ethnic 
group may be linked to an increase in neighbourhood crime in the short term until the co-ethnic 
population reaches a size where these resources and ties are established (Martinez et al., 2004) As 
outlined in Chapter 3, Sydney has a long history as a gateway city while Brisbane’s immigrant 
population has only recently begun to grow. As such it is expected that Sydney is more likely to have 
established ethnic groups with ties and resources that support the integration of recent arrivals - 
hence support for the revitalisation thesis may be more evident in this site.  
In contrast, social disorganisation theory predicts that a greater mixture of ethnic groups in a 
neighbourhood can weaken a community’s regulatory capacity by creating language and cultural 
barriers amongst residents. In ethnically diverse communities, residents may struggle to find the 
common ground necessary to come together to collectively solve community problems like crime 
(Sampson et al., 1997; Shaw & McKay, 1942). Immigration thus indirectly leads to greater 
neighbourhood crime by heightening the level of diversity within a given community.  
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Ethnicity is a multi-dimensional construct and can be measured using a variety of indicators. 
To capture the ethnic profile of residents, a number of questions related to country of birth, ancestry, 
language and religion are included in the Australian census. In this study, I focus on two aspects of 
immigrant ethnicity - language and religion. Unlike country of birth or ancestry, both language and 
religion involve some level of active participation. I discuss the theoretical importance of each in 
turn below and introduce the key ethnic groups of interest for this study.  
Immigrant concentration by language  
Immigrants from white, English speaking countries are rarely perceived to be a source of 
public concern and tend to experience low levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in Australia (Markus, 
2012). Theoretically, the common ground that English speaking immigrants share with the native 
population may prevent a breakdown in social cohesion and informal social control (Sampson et al., 
1997). However, immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds who enter Australia via the 
skilled migration program are required to speak English proficiently. As such, the number of 
immigrants who are linguistically isolated in Australia is relatively small (approximately 3%) (ABS, 
2011). Nevertheless, over 50% of Australia’s immigrant population speak a language other than 
English at home (ABS, 2011). Australian research finds that language is a powerful signal of social 
and cultural difference and an important marker of ethnicity (Anderson, 1991; Wickes et al., 2013). 
Scholarship from the United States suggests the concentration of immigrants who speak the same 
language can help create ‘little worlds’ and foster a sense of home for immigrants struggling with 
feelings of disorientation and displacement. Such places encourage opportunities to build ties with 
culturally similar individuals (Breton, 1964; Desmond & Kubrin, 2009) which in turn, strengthens 
neighbourhood networks and informal social control.  
To assess the effects of language concentration on crime, I divide the immigrant population 
into nine broad language groups as classified by the ABS (ABS, 2011). These language groups 
reflect the languages other than English immigrants speak at home and to some extent, map onto 
their region of origin. These language groups include: Northern European; Southern European; 
Eastern European; Southeast Asian; Southwest and Central Asian; Southern Asian; Eastern Asian; 
Other; and English only. Table 6.1 provides a more detailed description of the languages that 
comprise each of the broad categories.  
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Table 6.1 Composition of broad language categories  
Broad Category  Description  
Northern European  Celtic; German Related Languages; Dutch Related Languages; 
Scandinavian; Finish Related Languages (Excluded English) 
Southern European  French; Greek; Iberian Romance; Italian; Maltese 
Eastern European  Baltic; Hungarian; East Slavic; South Slavic; West Slavic; 
Southeast Asian  Burmese; Hmong-Mien; Mon-Khmer; Tai; South-East 
Austronesian   
Southwest and Central Asian  Iranic, Middle Eastern Semitic Languages; Turkic 
Southern Asian  Dravidian; Indo-Aryan 
Eastern Asian  Chinese; Japanese; Korean 
‘Other’  American Languages, African Languages, Pacific Austronesian 
Languages; Oceanian Pidgins and Creoles; Papua New Guinea 
Languages.   
English Only  English  
                    (ABS, 2011) 
City Trends  
While the number of immigrants increased as a share of each city’s total population between 
2001 and 2011 (see Chapter 5), Figure 6.1 and 6.2 show significant variation in growth between 
language groups. In both cities, immigrants who speak Northern European, Southeast Asian, 
Southwest and Central Asian, Southern Asian and Eastern Asian languages comprise a larger share 
of the city’s total population in 2011 compared to 2001. However, other groups saw a reduction in 
size. In 2011, immigrants who speak Southern European, Eastern European, ‘Other’ languages and 
English only represent a smaller share of Sydney’s population than in 2001. Similar trends are seen 
in Brisbane. While the size of the immigrant population who speak Southern European languages 
remained fairly stable over time, the share of immigrants who speak Eastern European and ‘Other’ 
languages is smaller in 2011. In contrast to Sydney, the number of immigrants who speak English 
only increased in Brisbane over time.  
These patterns reflect a nationwide shift in the incoming countries of origin. While earlier 
waves of immigrants originated from Europe and English speaking countries like New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom, new immigrants are increasingly sourced from the Asian region (ABS, 2011). 
The reduction in the share of the population who speak ‘Other’ languages reflects changes in the 
regional priorities of the humanitarian migration program in 2009 from the African region to Asia 
and the Middle East (Markus et al., 2009). 
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Figure 6.1 Changes in language groups in Sydney (2001-2011)      
 
Figure 6.1 and 6.2 also highlight clear differences between the two cities in terms of the size 
of these language groups. As a share of the total population, immigrants who speak Southern 
European, Eastern European, Eastern Asian, Southeast Asian, Southern Asian and Southwest and 
Central Asian languages are more prominent in the Sydney context. Other groups - namely 
immigrants who speak Northern European languages, ‘Other’ languages or English only - represent a 
larger share of the total population in Brisbane compared to Sydney. However, as demonstrated in 
Table 6.2, the extent of change (particularly growth) is much greater in Brisbane. These differences 
between the two sites further reinforce Sydney’s status as an established immigrant gateway and 
Brisbane’s status as a new immigrant destination city.  
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Figure 6.2 Changes in language groups in Brisbane (2001-2011)  
 
Table 6.2 Language group growth rate 
 SYDNEY BRISBANE 
Northern European  22.00% 40.68% 
Southern European  -14.02% 0.00% 
Eastern European  -31.79% -19.61% 
Southeast Asian  16.12% 46.96% 
Southwest and Central Asian  19.64% 119.23% 
Southern Asian  95.27% 194.64% 
Eastern Asian  29.13% 55.11% 
‘Other’ -38.79% -16.39% 
English only  -3.58% 6.38% 
Neighbourhood Trends  
Similar trends are seen at the neighbourhood level. The descriptive statistics provided in 
Table 6.4 indicate that while some language groups became on average, more prevalent across 
neighbourhoods in 2011 compared to 2001, others experienced limited change, or indeed reduced in 
size.  In both cities, the mean neighbourhood level of concentration for immigrants who speak 
Northern European, Southwest and Central Asian, Southern Asian, Southeast Asian and Eastern 
Asian languages is higher in 2011. Yet for other groups, such as immigrants who speak Southern 
European, Eastern European and ‘Other’ languages, their mean level of concentration in 2011 is 
unchanged or less than in 2001. The main difference I find between the two cities is the 
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concentration of immigrants who speak English only. In Sydney neighbourhoods, the mean level of 
concentration for this group decreased between 2001 and 2011, while in Brisbane the concentration 
of immigrants who speak English only increased from 2001 levels.17  
To assess whether these neighbourhood differences over time are statistically significant, I 
conducted a series of paired t-tests. The results are presented in Table 6.3 and show that the change 
each language group experienced is statistically significant with the exception of immigrants who 
speak Southern European languages in Brisbane.  
Table 6.3 Paired t-tests of time variant group specific language measures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
                                               
17 It is important to note that these figures reflect a proportionate increase or decrease. In other words, a group may still 
increase in raw numbers even if its market share diminishes. Nevertheless, the percentage figure better speaks to influx 
and reflects the groups that are growing at a faster rate.  
 SYDNEY BRISBANE 
 z p< z p< 
% Northern European  3.87 *** 7.00 *** 
% South European  -8.20 *** -0.33  
% East European  -12.77 *** -4.83 *** 
% Southeast Asian  9.46 *** 10.59 *** 
% Southwest Central Asian  7.85 *** 9.08 *** 
% Southern Asian  11.28 *** 14.99 *** 
% Eastern Asian  9.06 *** 8.20 *** 
% ‘Other’  -12.70 *** -3.08 ** 
% English Only  -5.54 *** 6.33 *** 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001     
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Table 6.4 Descriptive statistics for language measures  
 SYDNEY  BRISBANE 
 2001 2011 2001 2011 
 Mean  (S.D) Min Max Mean  (S.D) Min Max Mean  (S.D) Min Max Mean  (S.D) Min Max 
% Northern European  0.51 (0.36) 0.00 2.88 0.60 (0.48) 0.00 2.43 0.63 (0.37) 0.00 2.17 0.84 (0.53) 0.00 3.03 
% Southern European  3.53 (2.26) 0.00 20.97 3.13 (2.71) 0.00 16.34 1.08 (1.01) 0.00 7.85 1.08 (0.93) 0.00 6.82 
% Eastern European  2.04 (1.93) 0.00 18.38 1.59 (1.42) 0.00 12.60 0.90 (0.86) 0.00 4.47 0.75 (0.63) 0.00 3.35 
% Southwest and Central Asian  2.26 (3.22 0.00 21.24 2.74 (3.97) 0.00 27.85 0.22 (0.30) 0.00 1.85 0.49 (0.68) 0.00 4.95 
% Southern Asian  1.37 (2.16) 0.00 22.21 2.65 (4.53) 0.00 42.39 0.50 (0.61) 0.00 4.50 1.49 (1.56) 0.00 8.14 
% Southeast Asian  2.46 (3.98) 0.00 33.19 2.84 (4.29) 0.00 36.00 1.10 (2.19) 0.00 20.47 1.57 (2.21) 0.00 18.13 
% Eastern Asian  3.92 (4.73) 0.00 29.29 4.92 (6.54) 0.00 42.37 1.46 (3.17) 0.00 28.91 2.29 (4.41) 0.00 31.29 
% ‘Other’  1.07 (1.60) 0.00 18.82 0.65 (1.12) 0.00 10.09 0.97 (1.44) 0.00 9.87 0.85 (1.40) 0.00 9.19 
% English Only  11.70 (4.52) 2.31 29.42 11.40 (5.02) 2.83 29.85 13.43 (3.49) 4.66 25.47 14.14 (3.62) 3.55 25.28 
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Immigrant concentration by religion   
In response to national security concerns, immigrant religion is an increasingly contentious 
issue across many western countries. Compared to other aspects of ethnicity, Markus and colleagues 
(2009) argue that religion is one of the strongest drivers of fear and anti-immigrant attitudes in 
Australia (Markus et al., 2009). Studies find Islamic immigrants encounter much higher levels of 
anti-immigrant sentiment than other religious denominations. In the 2016 Scanlon Foundation 
Survey, 25% of respondents expressed either somewhat negative or very negative attitudes towards 
Muslims (Markus, 2016). By comparison, only 5% of the sample indicated negative attitudes 
towards Christians or Buddhists (Markus, 2016). Right wing politicians further reinforce these 
negative attitudes by explicitly linking Muslims to crime problems. In her maiden speech to 
parliament, Australian senator Pauline Hanson described Muslims as prominent in organised crime, 
violence and drug dealing (Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, 2016, p. 939).  Hanson even went 
on to argue, “neighbourhoods of Muslim settlement are suffering from collapsing social cohesion 
and fear of crime” (Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, 2016, p. 939). Similar vitriol is heard 
elsewhere across the Western world - particularly in Europe where Muslim immigrants comprise a 
large proportion of the incoming foreign born population. Here, Islam is viewed as an almost 
insurmountable barrier to social integration (Foner & Alba, 2008). 
While religion remains a relatively understudied aspect of ethnicity in immigration-crime 
research, scholars in the United States find that participating in religious practices can help 
immigrants adjust to life in their new country (Ebaugh & Chafetz, 2000; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). 
Referring to the three R’s (refuge, respectability and resources), Hirschman (2004) argues that 
actively engaging in religious activities can provide immigrants with the critical social and economic 
capital necessary for successful settlement. Religious organisations can create a sense of belonging 
and present opportunities for immigrants to form social support networks by creating a community 
of co-ethnics who regularly gather in a familiar cultural environment (Ebaugh & Cafetz, 2000; Foner 
& Alba, 2008; Ley, 2008; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). Indeed Foner and Alba (2008, p. 362) describe 
religious organisations as “a source of solace and shelter from the stresses, setbacks, and difficulties 
of coming to terms with life in a new country.” By being a good Christian, Muslim or Buddhist, 
immigrants can earn respect and prestige within their religious community (Foner & Alba, 2008). 
Therefore religion can provide immigrants with an alternative source of respectability - this is 
particularly important for those who experience downward occupational mobility following 
migration (Foner & Alba, 2008). Finally, religious organisations provide immigrants with access to 
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an array of vital resources and services ranging from employment opportunities to housing to 
English classes (Connor & Koenig, 2013; Ley, 2008). In doing so, religious organisations help 
facilitate integration within their own religious group.   
 Much of the scholarship in the United States focuses on Christian institutions (Janzen, 
Chapman & Watson, 2012; Ley, 2008; Menjivar, 2003), as Christian immigrants comprise the 
largest religious group (Pew Research Center, 2017). Yet emerging research indicates that other 
religions like Buddhism and Sikhism share many of the same integrative effects (Levitt, 2007). Thus 
at the neighbourhood level, the concentration of immigrants affiliated with the same religion should 
have a protective effect on crime as their involvement in religious activities allows for the additional 
development of social networks and in turn helps generate informal social control.18  
City Trends 
In this study, I divide the immigrant population into six broad religious groups following the 
ABS classification. These groups include: Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, ‘Other’ 
Religions (including Judaism), and No Religion. In both Sydney and Brisbane, non-Christian groups 
increased as a share of the total population over the period of study (see Figure 6.3 and 6.4). In 2011, 
immigrants affiliated with Buddhism, Hinduism and Islam make up a larger proportion of each city’s 
residential population than in 2001. Similarly, immigrants who report no religious affiliation or a 
religious affiliation classified as ‘Other’ represent a greater share of both Sydney and Brisbane’s 
population in 2011. In comparing the two sites, I find one key difference. In Sydney, Christian 
immigrants decreased in size between 2001 and 2011, while in Brisbane, this group experienced 
growth.  
The majority of immigrants in both sites are affiliated with Christianity - the most commonly 
practiced religion amongst native born Australians (ABS, 2011). By comparison, immigrants 
affiliated with non-Christian religions comprise a much smaller share of the total population in both 
Sydney and Brisbane. As can be seen in Figure 6.3 and 6.4, immigrants affiliated with Islam, 
Buddhism or Hinduism are far more visible in Sydney than in Brisbane. Yet I find that the rate of 
growth in these groups is more pronounced in Brisbane (see Table 6.5). These differences again 
reaffirm Sydney’s status as an established immigrant gateway and Brisbane’s status as a new 
immigrant destination.  
                                               
18 It is recognized that differences between nominal religion and practicing religion do exist. The data included here 
relate to nominal religion as questions related to practice are not asked as part of the Australian census.  
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Figure 6.3 Changes in religious groups in Sydney (2001-2011) 
 
Figure 6.4 Changes in religious groups in Brisbane (2001-2011) 
 
Table 6.5 Growth rate for religion groups  
 SYDNEY BRISBANE 
Buddhist   15.64% 27.03% 
Christian  -5.18% 6.60% 
Hindu 108.91% 172.72% 
Muslim  46.97% 102.22% 
Other Religions  90.63% 147.37% 
No Religion  52.86% 66.76%  
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Neighbourhood trends 
When considering these changes at the neighbourhood level, I find similar trends. In both 
cities, the concentration of most religion groups increased between 2001 and 2011. In 2011, 
immigrants affiliated with Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, ‘Other’ religions or no religion comprise, on 
average, a larger share of the population across neighbourhoods (see Table 6.7). I find one key 
difference between the two sites. In Sydney - in line with citywide trends - the concentration of 
immigrants affiliated with Christianity is lower in 2011 compared to 2001. Yet in Brisbane, this 
group experienced continued growth across neighbourhoods over the period of study. Again, I 
performed a series of paired t-tests in order to determine whether these differences are statistically 
significant. As noted in Table 6.6, the concentration of all religion groups – with the exception of 
immigrants affiliated with Christianity in Sydney - significantly increased between 2001 and 2011.  
Table 6.6 Paired t-tests of group specific religion measures  
 SYDNEY BRISBANE 
 z p< z p< 
% Buddhist  8.77 *** 7.11 *** 
% Christian  -9.99 *** 6.36 *** 
% Hindu  9.20 *** 14.78 *** 
% Islamic  7.60 *** 8.50 *** 
% Other Religions (Judaism) 7.78 *** 10.14 *** 
% No Religion  22.12 *** 23.63 *** 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001     
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Table 6.7 Descriptive statistics for religion groups  
 SYDNEY  BRISBANE 
 2001 2011 2001 2011 
 Mean  (S.D) Min Max Mean  (S.D) Min Max Mean  (S.D) Min Max Mean  (S.D) Min Max 
% Buddhist  2.12 (3.44) 0.00 36.96 2.44 (3.55) 0.00 35.58 1.00 (1.71) 0.00 12.29 1.27 (1.69) 0.00 9.41 
% Christian   17.65 (6.09) 5.56 42.17 16.82 (5.67) 6.72 39.97 12.03 (3.85) 4.46 25.99 12.76 (2.70) 3.96 23.53 
% Hindu  0.84 (1.42) 0.00 18.49 1.60 (3.11) 0.00 33.27 0.29 (0.40) 0.00 2.58 0.44 (0.57) 0.00 3.49 
% Islamic  1.54 (2.34) 0.00 21.72 1.98 (3.29) 0.00 33.72 0.38 (0.57) 0.00 4.58 0.79 (1.20) 0.00 12.98 
% Other Religion 0.77 (1.78) 0.00 22.62 0.93 (4.31) 0.00 25.32 0.24 (0.23) 0.00 1.47 0.48 (0.47) 0.00 2.93 
% No Religion  3.86 (2.60) 0.35 14.95 5.81 (4.31) 0.00 28.11 3.37 (1.49) 0.67 11.62 5.46 (2.61) 0.88 18.32 
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Diversity  
While ethnic group concentration may strengthen social networks and informal social 
control, the mixture of ethnic groups is argued to weaken a community’s regulatory capacity (Shaw 
& McKay, 1942). From a social disorganisation perspective, the diversity that comes with increased 
immigration leads to cultural and language barriers amongst residents making it difficult to reach 
shared expectations of behaviour. In more diverse areas, the critical networks necessary for the 
informal social control of crime become limited and crime flourishes (Shaw & McKay, 1942; 
Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999; Sampson et al., 1997). Chapter 4 provides 
further information on how the language diversity and religion diversity index were constructed. To 
establish whether the level of diversity significantly changed across neighbourhoods over time, I 
conducted a series of paired t-tests. The results, presented in Table 6.8, suggest that the level of both 
language and religion diversity significantly increased over the period of study in both cities.  
Table 6.8 Paired t-tests of diversity measures  
 
 
To more clearly illustrate this increasing diversity over time, I created a series of maps for the 
two cities. Figure 6.5 and 6.6 demonstrate the changing nature of language and religion diversity 
across Sydney neighbourhoods over time.  
In Sydney, the most linguistically diverse neighbourhoods are located in and around the inner 
city and are typically co-located (see Figure 6.5). The maps demonstrate a clear increase in the 
number of highly diverse neighbourhoods in Sydney between 2001 and 2011. This trend is most 
evident when comparing the inner city region. Many neighbourhoods located near highly diverse 
areas in 2001 reach a high level of language diversity in 2011, indicating growth in the spatial 
clustering of language diversity. Similar changes are seen in the spatial patterning of religion 
diversity (see Figure 6.6). Neighbourhoods which exhibit a high level of religion diversity are 
similarly located in close proximity to the CBD. A greater number of neighbourhoods reached a 
level of high religion diversity in 2011 compared to 2001.  
 SYDNEY BRISBANE 
 z p< z p< 
Language Diversity  10.18 *** 20.28 *** 
Religion Diversity  22.62 *** 27.18 *** 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001     
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Figure 6.5 Language diversity in Sydney (2001 and 2011) 
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Figure 6.6 Religion diversity in Sydney (2001 and 2011)   
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Figure 6.7 Language diversity in Brisbane (2001 and 2011)  
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Figure 6.8 Religion diversity in Brisbane (2001 and 2011)    
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Brisbane neighbourhoods experienced notable changes in diversity between 2001 and 2011. 
In 2001, most Brisbane neighbourhoods fell within the lowest category of language diversity (see 
Figure 6.7). The few neighbourhoods that show high levels of language diversity are largely situated 
in the inner city and on Brisbane’s south side. Language diversity was particularly low in Brisbane’s 
northern suburbs and in areas located on the outskirts of the city. The neighbourhoods highlighted in 
2001 as linguistically diverse, continue to present high levels of language diversity in 2011 with 
several experiencing an increase in diversity. The clustering of language diversity also appears to 
have grown in 2011. While language diversity remains much less common in Brisbane’s northern 
suburbs in 2011, a handful of neighbourhoods have increased in diversity moving from the lowest 
category up to the second or third category.  
Religion diversity is also fairly uncommon across Brisbane neighbourhoods. In 2001, very 
few Brisbane neighbourhoods recorded a high level of religion diversity (see Figure 6.8). However 
by 2011, limited neighbourhoods remain in the lowest category of religion diversity. Interestingly, 
these maps reveal clear differences between neighbourhoods that are linguistically diverse and 
religiously diverse. This further emphasises the importance of considering multiple aspects of 
ethnicity.  
6.3 Analytic strategy 
In this study, I am primarily interested in assessing two types of effects: (1) how increases in 
ethnic group concentration and ethnic diversity influence changes in violent crime within 
neighbourhoods; and (2) how ethnic group concentration and ethnic diversity is associated with 
violent crime across neighbourhoods. By including in the analysis mean-deviated variables 
(differenced scores which capture the degree of change over the three time points) and mean-centred 
variables (the average score for each neighbourhood over the period of study), I can address these 
questions. However, the preliminary analyses revealed that some ethnic groups significantly reduced 
in size at both the neighbourhood and city level over time. Given the aims of the study - to 
understand the impact of increases in ethnic group concentration on crime - for parsimony I examine 
within effects for only the ethnic groups that experienced a significant increase in size between 2001 
and 2011 in both cities.19 Table 6.9 provides a breakdown of the group variables included in the 
hybrid model. Descriptive statistics for the mean-centred and mean-deviated variables are presented 
in Table 6.10.  
                                               
19 Groups that increased in Brisbane but not in Sydney (i.e. Christian immigrants and English only) were not significantly 
associated with violent crime when included in the within effects component of the model in Brisbane.  
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Table 6.9 Summary of variables included in within and between effects   
 Within Between 
Language Measures    
Northern European    
Southern European    
Eastern European    
Southeast Asian    
Southwest and Central Asian    
Southern Asian    
Eastern Asian    
‘Other’    
English Only    
Language diversity    
Religion Measures    
Buddhism   
Christianity    
Hinduism   
Islam    
‘Other’ Religions    
No Religion    
Religion diversity    
 
Consistent with the Study 1 analyses, I calculate hybrid estimates for negative binomial 
regression models using the xtnbreg command in Stata with total persons as the exposure variable. 
To allow for multiple observations for neighbourhoods, I estimate random effects. The language and 
religion models are estimated separately and are both stepped out in two stages. In stage 1, only the 
immigration measures are included. In stage 2, the socio-demographic and environmental features of 
neighbourhoods are added. All neighbourhood variables employed in Study 1 are retained for Study 
2. As such, I focus primarily on reporting the effects of the concentration and diversity measures in 
this chapter.  
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Table 6.10 Descriptive statistics for mean-centred and mean-deviated variable
 SYDNEY  BRISBANE  
  Overall Between Within Overall Between Within 
 Mean S.D Min Max S.D Min Max Mean S.D Min Max S.D Min Max 
 Language Concentration                
% Northern European  0.57 0.39 0.00 2.21 0.22 -0.81 2.52 0.73  0.42 0.00 2.85 0.27 -0.33 2.14 
% Southern European  3.31 3.05 0.00 18.63 - - - 1.06 0.94 0.00 7.48 - - - 
% Eastern European  1.76 1.62 0.00 15.58 - - - 0.80 0.72 0.00 3.91 - - - 
% Southeast Asian  2.61 4.09 0.00 33.92 0.47 -0.85 4.91 1.30 2.144 0.00 18.19 0.43 -0.93 4.56 
% Southwest and Central Asian  2.52 3.58 0.00 24.39 0.64 -5.75 9.24 0.34 0.44 0.00 3.13 0.28 -1.37 3.55 
% Southern Asian  1.94 3.16 0.00 29.92 1.32 -11.00 15.36 0.90 0.94 0.00 4.72 0.68 -1.96 4.40 
% Eastern Asian  4.41 5.53 0.00 35.11 1.31 -11.16 24.71 1.85 3.70 0.00 29.29 0.88 -6.87 9.20 
% Other Languages  0.61 0.72 0.00 7.51 - - - 0.73 0.86 0.00 6.15 - - - 
% English Only  11.47 4.61 2.81 28.90 - - - 11.97 2.91 4.54 23.44 - - - 
Religion Concentration                
% Buddhist  2.27 3.49 0.00 35.95 0.40 -0.81 5.20 1.13 1.70 0.00 10.02 0.33 -0.70 3.41 
% Christian  17.18 5.78 7.27 40.33 - - - 13.17 3.76 4.77 24.10 - - - 
% Hindu  1.19 2.13 0.00 21.74 0.94 -10.95 12.72 0.52 0.57 0.00 3.15 0.38 -1.22 2.38 
% Islamic  1.73 2.78 0.00 27.14 0.59 -5.28 8.31 0.56 0.87 0.00 8.74 0.44 -3.60 4.80 
% Other Religions  0.84 1.85 0.00 24.63 0.34 -2.34 4.41 0.32 0.27 0.00 1.58 0.24 -0.64 1.90 
% No Religion  4.76 3.33 0.66 21.95 1.25 -5.27 19.08 4.34 1.92 0.99 14.15 1.13 -1.42 9.87 
Diversity Indices                
Language Diversity  46.07 22.01 10.52 94.24 3.09 31.21 63.83 26.07 14.13 7.19 93.39 3.97 12.27 40.46 
Religion Diversity  51.33 11.61 20.33 91.66 3.26 33.17 72.35 51.91 7.06 37.62 95.17 3.48 37.83 63.40 
N 1740  906 
n 580  302 
T 3 3 
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6.4 Results: Language  
Sydney  
In the initial stages of modelling, only the immigration variables are included. Before 
controlling for neighbourhood contexts, the within effects component of model suggests an increase 
in the number of immigrants who speak Northern European, Southeast Asian, Southwest and Central 
Asian, Southern Asian or Eastern Asian languages is significantly and negatively linked to violent 
crime (see Table 6.11). In other words, regardless of the language group under consideration, an 
increasing presence of immigrants speaking a language other than English within a neighbourhood 
over time is associated with a reduction in crime problems.  
Specifically, as the presence of immigrants who speak Northern European languages 
increases over time, fewer violent crimes are recorded (B=-0.202 p<.001). Similarly neighbourhoods 
that experience growth in the number of immigrants who speak Southeast Asian languages also 
report fewer violent crimes over time (B=-0.040 p<.001). Likewise, as the number of immigrants 
who speak Southwest and Central Asian languages increases within a neighbourhood, violent crime 
decreases (B=-0.043 p<.001). An increase in the number of immigrants who speak Southern Asian 
languages is also associated with a reduction in neighbourhood violence (B=-0.023 p<.001). 
Neighbourhoods that experience growth in the number of immigrants who speak Eastern Asian 
languages similarly encounter less violent crime (B=-0.035 p<.001). However, changes in language 
diversity within a neighbourhood over time are positively associated with changes in violent crime. 
As language diversity increases within a neighbourhood, so too do official reports of violence 
(B=0.005 p<.05).   
In the between effects component of the model I find several significant and negative 
relationships between the average concentration of certain language groups and violent crime. For 
example, compared to neighbourhoods with fewer immigrants who speak Northern European 
languages, areas with a greater average concentration of this group encounter fewer violent crime 
problems (B=-0.466 p<.001), as do neighbourhoods with more immigrants who speak Southern 
European languages (B=-0.062 p<.001). Neighbourhoods with a greater average presence of 
immigrants who speak Southeast Asian languages also report fewer violent crimes (B=-0.024 p<.01), 
as do areas with more immigrants who speak Eastern Asian languages (B=-0.034 p<.001). 
Neighbourhoods with a greater average presence of immigrants who speak English only also 
encounter fewer violent crimes (B=-0.002 p<.001).    
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Table 6.11 Language, immigration and neighbourhood crime  
 SYDNEY (N=580) BRISBANE (N=302) 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE 
 Within  Within  
% Northern European  -0.202 *** 0.03 -0.104 ** 0.03 -0.078  0.04 -0.024  0.04 
% South East Asian  -0.040 *** 0.01 -0.035 *** 0.01 0.022  0.02 0.005  0.02 
% South West Central Asian -0.043 *** 0.01 -0.033 *** 0.01 -0.027  0.03 -0.037  0.03 
% Southern Asian  -0.023 *** 0.00 -0.012 *** 0.00 -0.078 *** 0.02 -0.041 * 0.02 
% Eastern Asian  -0.035 *** 0.00 -0.022 *** 0.00 0.014  0.01 -0.008  0.01 
Language Diversity  0.005 * 0.00 0.008 *** 0.01 -0.008 ** 0.00 0.005  0.00 
% Indigenous      -0.055  0.01    0.003  0.02 
% Young Males     0.037 *** 0.01    0.027  0.01 
% Renting     0.009 *** 0.00    -0.001  0.00 
% Different Address (5yrs)    0.003 * 0.00    0.000  0.00 
Disadvantage     0.054 ** 0.02    0.175 *** 0.03 
Population Density     -0.020 *** 0.00    -0.033 *** 0.01 
 Between Between 
% Northern European  -0.466 *** 0.12 -0.073  0.09 -0.643 *** 0.11 -0.257 ** 0.10 
% Southern European  -0.062 *** 0.01 -0.034 ** 0.01 -0.079  0.06 -0.077  0.05 
% Eastern European 0.029  0.02 -0.023  0.02 -0.114  0.08 -0.034  0.06 
% Southeast Asian  -0.024 ** 0.01 -0.029 *** 0.01 -0.092 ** 0.03 -0.063 ** 0.02 
% Southwest Central Asian  -0.017  0.01 -0.034 *** 0.01 0.107  0.14 0.058   0.11 
% Southern Asian  -0.011  0.01 -0.009  0.01 -0.464 *** 0.08 -0.296 *** 0.06 
% Eastern Asian  -0.034 *** 0.01 -0.039 *** 0.01 -0.039 * 0.02 -0.022  0.02 
% ‘Other’  0.183 *** 0.03 -0.091 *** 0.02 0.067  0.05 -0.105 ** 0.04 
% English Only  -0.002 *** 0.01 -0.004  0.01 0.040 * 0.02 0.006  0.01 
Language Diversity  0.014 *** 0.00 0.019 *** 0.00 0.062 *** 0.01 0.039 *** 0.01 
% Indigenous      0.046  0.03    0.029  * 0.01 
% Young Males     -0.020  0.01    -0.016  0.02 
% Renting     0.019 *** 0.00    0.024 ** 0.01 
% Different Address (5yrs)    0.006  0.00    0.005  0.01 
Disadvantage     0.376 *** 0.06    0.443 *** 0.08 
Population Density     0.008 *** 0.00    -0.003  0.01 
Nearby Violent Crime    -0.008  0.03    -0.003  0.03 
 Random Random 
Distance to CBD    0.006 ** 0.00    -0.002  0.01 
Residential Land Use     -0.007 *** 0.00    -0.006 ** 0.01 
Constant  -4.959 *** 0.14 -5.242  ** 0.30 -5.227 *** 0.32 -4.593 *** 0.46 
ln (r) 1.649 (0.07) 2.802 (0.09) 2.587 (0.21) 3.594(0.31) 
ln (s) 1.583 (0.08) 2.333 (0.08) 1.161 (0.11) 1.71 (0.12) 
Log likelihood  -6798.77 -6451.28 -2858.26 -2732.16 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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However, areas with a higher average concentration of immigrants who speak other 
languages (for example African or Polynesian languages), report more violent crime (B=0.183 
p<.001). Higher levels of language diversity are positively associated with violent crime across 
neighbourhoods. In other words, more diverse areas experience higher rates of violent crime 
(B=0.014 p<.01). The average concentration of immigrants who speak Eastern European, Southern 
Asian or Southwest and Central Asian languages is not significantly associated with violent crime 
when comparing between neighbourhoods.  
Next the neighbourhood variables are entered into the model. Once controlling for 
neighbourhood contexts, the relationships identified in the within effects component of the model 
remain largely unchanged. Neighbourhoods that experience growth in the immigrant population who 
speak Southeast Asian languages continue to encounter fewer violent crimes after the broader 
neighbourhood context is considered (B=-0.035 p<.001). Similar effects are seen in neighbourhoods 
with an increasing presence of immigrants who speak Southwest and Central Asian (B=-0.033 
p<.01), Southern Asian (B=-0.012 p<.001), Eastern Asian (B=-0.022 p<.001) and Northern 
European languages (B=-0.104 p<.01). Thus even after appropriate neighbourhood controls are 
considered, an increasing presence of these language groups within a neighbourhood over time is 
associated with a significant reduction in violent crime.  However, increasing language diversity 
continues to have a significant and positive effect on violent crime after controlling for context. Thus 
as language diversity increases within a neighbourhood over time, so too does violence (B=0.008 
p<.001).    
After accounting for the neighbourhood features of neighbourhoods, there are some slight 
changes in the between effects component of the model. For example, once the neighbourhood 
variables are included, areas with a greater average presence of immigrants who speak Southwest 
and Central Asian languages encounter fewer violent crimes (B=-0.034 p<.001). Alternatively, no 
statistically significant relationship remains between the average concentration of immigrants who 
speak Northern European languages and the level of violent crime when comparing across 
neighbourhoods. After the neighbourhood controls are entered into the model, the relationship 
between the concentration of immigrants who speak English only and violent crime is no longer 
statistically significant. Most notably, the direction of the association between the concentration of 
immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages and violent crime switches once the neighbourhood 
variables are included. Once considering context, the presence of immigrants who speak ‘Other’ 
languages is linked to significantly less violent crime across neighbourhoods (B=-0.091 p<.001).  
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Other relationships are less affected by the addition of the neighbourhood control variables. 
For example, areas with a greater average number of immigrants who speak Southern European 
languages continue to experience less violent crime once context is considered (B=-0.034 p<.01). 
Neighbourhoods with a greater average number of immigrants who speak Southeast Asian languages 
also report less violent crime (B=-0.029 p<.001), as do areas with more immigrants who speak 
Eastern Asian languages (B=-0.039 p<.001). The average concentration of immigrants who speak 
Eastern European or Southern Asian languages is not significantly associated with violent crime 
across neighbourhoods.  
However, it is important to note again that these groups only account for a relatively small 
amount of the variation in violent crime. Other factors continue to be important predicators of violent 
crime in Sydney. Most of these findings align with the Study 1 models and suggest that disorganised 
neighbourhoods (places with high levels of disadvantage and mobility) encounter more violent crime 
problems. The most notable difference between the Study 1 and 2 models is the significant 
relationship between increasing disadvantage over time and neighbourhood violence (B=0.054 
p<.01). Once disaggregated measures of immigrant group concentration are entered into the model 
(in addition to diversity), increases in disadvantage are related to more violent crime.  
Brisbane  
Like Sydney, only the immigration measures are included in the initial model. Here, the 
within effects component of the model suggests that an increase in the immigrant population who 
speaks Southern Asian languages is negatively associated with violent crime. Thus neighbourhoods 
that experience an increase in the number of immigrants who speak Southern Asian languages see a 
reduction in the number of violent crimes over time (B=-0.078 p<.001). Unlike Sydney, increasing 
language diversity in Brisbane is negatively associated with violent crime before controlling for 
neighbourhood context (B=-0.008 p<.01). This suggests that as language diversity increases within a 
neighbourhood, violent crime decreases. Changes in the number of immigrants who speak Northern 
European, Southeast Asian, Southwest and Central Asian and Eastern Asian languages are not 
significantly associated with changes in violent crime in Brisbane.  
In the between effects component of the model, the average concentration of immigrants who 
speak Northern European, Southeast Asian, Southern Asian and Eastern Asian languages is 
negatively and significantly associated with violent crime across neighbourhoods. For example, 
neighbourhoods with more immigrants who speak Northern European languages report fewer violent 
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crimes (B=-0.643 p<.001), as do neighbourhoods which attract more immigrants who speak 
Southeast Asian (B=-0.092 p<.01), Southern Asian (B=-0.467 p<.001) and Eastern Asian languages 
(B=-0.039 p<.05). Before controlling for context, the average concentration of immigrants who 
speak English only is positively associated with crime. Areas with more immigrants who speak 
English only experience more violence (B=0.040 p<.05). The average level of language diversity 
across neighbourhoods is also positively linked to violence. This suggests that more linguistically 
diverse areas experience more than their expected share of violent crime problems (B=0.062 
p<.001).  
Next the socio-demographic and neighbourhood features of neighbourhoods are entered into 
the model. Once accounting for the broader neighbourhood context, the effect of increases in the 
immigrant population who speak Southern Asian languages on violent crime remains significant and 
negative (B=-0.041 p<.05). This group, comprised largely of Indian immigrants, grew by over 194% 
between 2001 and 2011. Yet despite the relatively small co-ethnic population in 2001, it appears that 
the large influx of immigrants who speak Southern Asian languages has not increased violence, 
suggesting that the increase in this language group has most likely not undermined informal social 
control.  Thus despite Brisbane’s status as a new immigrant destination site (particularly for these 
groups) influxes of relatively “new” immigrants do not lead to an increase in neighbourhood crime. 
 After controlling for neighbourhood context, changes in language diversity are no longer 
significantly associated with changes in violent crime. Changes in the immigrant population who 
speak Southeast Asian, Southwest and Central Asian and Eastern Asian languages continue to have 
no significant effect on changes in violent crime over time. This too is notable given the significant 
shifts in these populations over the period of study.  
When comparing across neighbourhoods, the presence of immigrants who speak Northern 
European languages continues to have a significant and negative effect on violent crime after context 
is considered (B=-0.257 p<.01). The average concentration of immigrants who speak Southeast 
Asian (B=-0.063 p<.01) and Southern Asian languages (B=-0.269 p<.001) also remain significant 
and negative predictors of violent crime across neighbourhoods. Areas with a greater concentration 
of immigrants who speak these languages report less violence. After controlling for the structural 
features of neighbourhoods, the presence of immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages is significantly 
and negatively associated with violent crime across Brisbane neighbourhoods (B=-0.105 p<.01). Yet 
more linguistically diverse neighbourhoods continue to encounter more violent crime problems, 
when compared to more linguistically homogenous neighbourhoods, even after context is considered 
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(B=0.039 p<.001). After accounting for context, the average concentration of immigrants who speak 
English only or Southern European, Eastern European, Southwest and Central Asian and Eastern 
Asian languages has no effect on violent crime across neighbourhoods. 
6.5 Results: Religion  
Sydney  
Next I consider the concentration and diversity effects of religion on violent crime. To begin, 
only the immigration measures are included in the model (see Table 6.12). The within effects 
component of the model suggests increases in the immigrant population affiliated with any religion  -
whether it be Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam or other - within a neighbourhood over time are not 
significantly associated with more neighbourhood violence. Contrary to popular opinion and current 
debate, an increased presence of Muslim immigrants within a neighbourhood is actually linked to 
less violent crime (B=-0.024. p<0.001). An influx of immigrants with no religious affiliation is also 
associated with a reduction in neighbourhood violence over time (B=-0.049. p<0.001). Changes in 
the percentage of immigrants affiliated with Hinduism, Buddhism or other religions are not 
significantly associated with changes in violent crime over time. I find no significant association 
between increasing religion diversity and increasing neighbourhood violence over time.  
The between effects component of the model reveals a fairly similar story. Areas with a 
higher average concentration of most immigrant groups do not experience more violent crime. In 
fact, several religious affiliations are significantly and negatively linked to neighbourhood violence. 
For example, areas with greater average concentrations of Buddhist immigrants encounter less 
violent crime (B=-0.041 p<0.001). Likewise, areas with more Muslim immigrants also exhibit fewer 
violent crime problems (B=-0.036 p<0.01). Neighbourhoods with a greater average presence of 
immigrants affiliated with ‘Other’ religions (like Judaism) also experience less violent crime (B=-
0.115 p<0.001). However, similar effects are seen for immigrants without a religious affiliation. 
Areas with a higher average concentration of non-religious immigrants report fewer violent crimes 
(B=-0.147 p<0.001). This suggests that the protective effect of immigrant group concentration is not 
limited to immigrants who are actively participating in religious activities. 
I find one exception to the rule - the concentration of Christian immigrants. Specifically, I 
find areas with a greater average concentration of Christian immigrants record more violent crime 
problems (B=0.014 p<0.01). Similar to the language models, I find a positive and significant 
relationship between religion diversity and violent crime across Sydney neighbourhoods  
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Table 6.12 Religion, immigration and neighbourhood crime  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 SYDNEY (N=580) BRISBANE (N=302) 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE 
 Within  Within  
% Buddhist 0.013  0.01 0.013  0.01 0.048  0.03 0.026  0.03 
% Hindu  -0.002  0.00 -0.002  0.00 -0.080 * 0.03 -0.032  0.03 
% Muslim  -0.024 *** 0.01 -0.024 *** 0.01 -0.021  0.02 -0.029  0.02 
% No Religion  -0.049 *** 0.00 -0.049 *** 0.00 -0.045 *** 0.01 -0.027 * 0.01 
% ‘Other’ Religions -0.006  0.01 -0.006  0.01 0.026  0.05 -0.023  0.05 
Religion Diversity  -0.002  0.00 -0.002  0.00 -0.007 * 0.00 0.005  0.00 
% Indigenous      -0.042  0.01    0.003  0.02 
% Young Males     0.030 *** 0.01    0.026  0.02 
% Renting     0.009 *** 0.00    -0.000  0.00 
% Different Address (5yrs)    0.000  0.00    -0.000  0.00 
Disadvantage     0.039 * 0.02    0.172  *** 0.03 
Population Density     -0.015 *** 0.00    -0.026 *** 0.01 
 Between Between 
% Buddhist  -0.041 *** 0.01 -0.037 *** 0.01 -0.010  0.04 -0.007  0.03 
% Christian  0.014 * 0.01 0.008  0.00 0.015  0.01 -0.014  0.02 
% Hindu 0.005  0.01 0.009  0.01 -0.135  0.11 -0.064  0.09 
% Muslim  -0.036 ** 0.01 -0.036 ** 0.01 0.035  0.07 -0.050  0.05 
% No Religion -0.147 *** 0.01 -0.051 *** 0.01 -0.156 *** 0.03 -0.020  0.03 
% ‘Other’ Religions  -0.115 *** 0.02 -0.032 * 0.01 -0.229  0.20 -0.078  0.16 
Religion Diversity  0.060 *** 0.00 0.016 *** 0.00 0.087 *** 0.01 0.036 *** 0.01 
% Indigenous      0.029  0.02    0.033 * 0.01 
% Young Males     -0.009  0.01    -0.002  0.02 
% Renting     0.019 *** 0.00    0.024 *** 0.02 
% Different Address (5yrs)    0.004  0.00    -0.003  0.02 
Disadvantage     0.358 *** 0.05    0.386 *** 0.07 
Population Density     0.010  *** 0.00    0.003  0.01 
Nearby Violent Crime    -0.027  0.03    -0.006  0.03 
 Random  Random 
Distance to CBD    0.003  0.00    -0.000   0.00 
Residential Land Use     -0.007 *** 0.00    -0.006 ** 0.00 
Constant  -6.922 *** 0.23 -5.239  *** 0.32 -8.041 *** 0.49 -5.700 *** 0.05 
ln (r) 1.801(0.08) 16.578 (1.51) 2.625 (0.22) 3.552 (0.31) 
ln (s) 1.373 (0.07) 9.174 (0.74) 1.077 (0.105) 1.659 (0.12) 
Log likelihood  -6730.644*** -6443.66*** -2852.964*** -2736.257*** 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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(B=0.060 p<0.001). Specifically, more religiously diverse areas encounter more violent crime than 
less religiously diverse neighbourhoods.  
Next the neighbourhood variables are entered into the model. Once controlling for 
neighbourhood contexts, the relationships identified in the stage 1 analysis remain largely 
unchanged. In the within effects component of the model, an increasing presence of Muslim 
immigrants is significantly linked to less violent crime over time (B=-0.024 p<0.001). When holding 
neighbourhood context constant, the increasing presence of immigrants without a religious affiliation 
continues to be related to less violent crime within a neighbourhood over time (B=-0.049 p<0.001). 
Changes in other groups (Buddhists, Hindus and ‘Others’) have no significant effect on violent crime 
over time, nor does changes in religion diversity once controlling for neighbourhood features.  
In the between effects component of the model, the concentration of Muslim immigrants 
continues to be significantly and negatively associated with violent crime across neighbourhoods 
even after controlling for broader neighbourhood factors (B=-0.036 p<0.01). This finding is 
particularly notable. Despite concerns surrounding the concentration of Muslim immigrants in 
Australian neighbourhoods, the results presented here suggest such anxieties are largely 
unwarranted. Areas with a greater presence of immigrants affiliated with ‘Other’ religions like 
Judaism also experience less violent crime (B=-0.032 p<0.001), as do areas with a greater average 
concentration of Buddhist immigrants (B=-0.037 p<0.001). Similar to the within effects component 
of the model, these effects are not limited to immigrants affiliated with a particular religion. 
Neighbourhoods with a greater concentration of immigrants who report no religious affiliation also 
encounter fewer violent crime problems (B=-0.051 p<0.05). After accounting for neighbourhood 
context, no significant relationship remains between the concentration of Christian immigrants and 
violent crime. The presence of Buddhist immigrants and Hindu immigrants continues to have no 
effect on violent crime across neighbourhoods. Yet, areas with a higher average level of religion 
diversity continue to experience more violent crimes – even after controlling for the socio-
demographic and environmental features of neighbourhoods (B=0.016 p<0.001).  
Brisbane  
Relatively consistent patterns are seen in Brisbane. In the initial stages of modelling, only the 
immigration variables are included. The within effects component of the model shows areas with an 
increasing number of Hindu immigrants experience less violent crime over time (B=-0.080 p<0.05). 
Similarly, an influx of immigrants who report no religious affiliation is linked to fewer counts of 
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violence within a neighbourhood (B=-0.045 p<0.01). Increasing religious diversity is related to less 
violent crime over time (B=-0.007 p<0.01). Changes in the Buddhist, Muslim or ‘Other’ Religions 
population has no effect on violent crime over time in Brisbane.  
In the between effects component of the model, only the presence of immigrants without a 
religious affiliation is significantly linked to violent crime. Specifically, areas with a greater presence 
of immigrants who report no religion encounter fewer violent crimes over time (B=-0.156 p<0.001). 
The average presence of immigrants affiliated with Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam or 
‘Other’ Religions is not significantly associated with violent crime across neighbourhoods. Yet, the 
findings suggest greater religion diversity is significantly and positively associated with more crime 
across Brisbane neighbourhoods. Thus areas with a more religiously diverse population report more 
violent crimes compared to areas with lower levels of religion diversity (B=0.087 p<0.001). 
In the next stage of the analyses, the neighbourhood variables are entered into the model. 
After controlling for the broader neighbourhood context, change in the immigrant population with no 
religious affiliation remains a significant and negative predicator of violent crime over time (B=-
0.027 p<0.01). Once these neighbourhood variables are included in the model, changes in the Hindu 
immigrant population are no longer significantly linked to changes in violent crime. I find no effect 
for all other religious affiliations. The relationship between changes in religion diversity and violent 
crime is no longer statistically significant after the socio-demographic and environmental features of 
neighbourhoods are considered.   
In the between effects component of the model, no immigrant group is significantly 
associated with violent crime after accounting for context. Yet, the relationship between religion 
diversity and violent crime remains (B=0.036 p<0.001). This suggests areas with a greater average 
level of religious diversity experience more violent crimes than less religiously diverse 
neighbourhoods. 
6.6 Interaction terms 
 To more fully examine the central tenets of the revitalisation thesis, a series of interaction 
terms are considered. In line with Study 1, I assess whether certain neighbourhood features moderate 
the relationship between ethnic group concentration and violent crime. Of particular interest is 
whether areas with a larger co-ethnic population fare better following an influx of immigrants. From 
the revitalisation perspective, increased immigration into popular immigrant settlement zones should 
have either a protective or null effect on crime as immigrants moving into these areas have greater 
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access to social ties, institutions and ethnic economies (Martinez et al., 2004; Ramey, 2013). To test 
this moderation effect, I include an interaction term in the model between the mean-deviated and 
mean-centred variables. In doing so, I establish whether changes in the concentration of a particular 
ethnic group (measured by the mean-deviated variable) differentially impact violent crime at varying 
levels of concentration (measured by the mean-centred variable). Table 6.13 and 6.14 present the 
results from these interaction models. Each interaction term was included in the full model and 
modelled separately. I focus solely on the groups that experienced a statistically significant increase 
in concentration over the period of study (i.e. the groups included in the within effects component of 
the model). I first discuss the language group interactions before turning to the religion groups.  
Table 6.13 Changes in language concentration/diversity at different concentration levels  
 SYDNEY  
(N=580) 
BRISBANE 
(N=302) 
 B (SE) p< B (SE) p< 
MD Northern European X MC Northern European  -0.103 (0.03)  -0.017 (0.04)  
MD Southeast Asian X MC Southeast Asian  -0.000 (0.00)  -0.001 (0.00)  
MD Southwest and Central Asian X MC Southwest and Central Asian  -0.001 (0.00)  -0.004 (0.04)  
MD Southern Asian X MD Southern Asian  0.001 (0.00) ** 0.006 (0.01)  
MD Eastern Asian X MC Eastern Asian  -0.000 (0.00)  0.003 (0.00) * 
MD Language Diversity X MC Language Diversity  0.001 (0.000)  0.000 (0.00)  
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001     
 
Figure 6.9 Southern Asian languages interaction (Sydney) 
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In these language models, I find little evidence to suggest that the effect of an increase in 
language group concentration on crime is contingent on the size of a neighbourhood’s ethnic 
population. There are two exceptions. In Sydney, the interaction between the mean-deviated and 
mean-centred measures for immigrants who speak Southern Asian languages is statistically 
significant (B=0.001 p<0.01). Here I find that an increase in the number of immigrants who speak 
Southern Asian languages has the greatest effect on violent crime in areas with a smaller average 
concentration of this group. However, once graphed it is clear that the size of the effect is negligible 
(see Figure 6.9).  
Figure 6.10 Eastern Asian languages interaction (Brisbane) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Brisbane, the interaction term between the mean-deviated and mean-centred variable for 
Eastern Asian languages is also statistically significant (B=0.003 p<0.05). The results here suggest 
that an increase in the number of immigrants who speak Eastern Asian languages exerts the largest 
protective effect on crime in neighbourhoods with a relatively small co-ethnic population (see Figure 
6.10). As the level of concentration increases (for example, three standard deviations above the 
mean), an increase in this ethnic group has little effect on violent crime. Although it is important to 
again recognise that the size of the effect is relatively small.  
Next I consider the interaction between the mean-deviated and mean-centred religion group 
variables. Table 6.14 presents the results of these interaction models. Similar to the language models, 
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I find limited evidence that the effect of an increase in religion group concentration on crime is 
dependent on the size of a neighbourhood’s ethnic population. Yet there are a few exceptions - 
mainly in the Sydney context.  Here I find a statistically significant relationship between the mean-
deviated and mean-centred Buddhist interaction term and violent crime (B=0.006 p<0.001). As can 
be seen in Figure 6.11, an increase in the proportion of the population who are Buddhist immigrants 
has the greatest protective effect on violent crime in neighbourhoods with a smaller average 
Buddhist immigrant population. In neighbourhoods with a greater average concentration of Buddhist 
immigrants (three standard deviations above the mean), an influx of Buddhist immigrants is actually 
linked to a slight increase in the level of violent crime.  
In these interaction models, I also find a statistically significant relationship between the 
mean-deviated and mean-centred Muslim variables and violent crime (B=0.003 p<0.001). Figure 
6.12 demonstrates that all neighbourhoods experience a reduction in crime following an increase in 
Muslim immigration. However, an increase in the Muslim immigrant population exerts the largest 
protective effect on neighbourhood violence in places with a relatively low average level of Muslim 
concentration. 
Table 6.14 Changes in religion concentration/diversity at different concentration levels 
 SYDNEY 
 (N=580) 
BRISBANE 
(N=302) 
 B (SE) p< B (SE) p< 
MD Buddhist X MC Buddhist  0.006 (0.00) *** 0.010 (0.01)  
MD Hindu X MC Hindu  0.001 (0.00)  0.057 (0.03)  
MD Muslim X MD Muslim  0.003 (0.00) *** -0.007 (0.01)  
MD No Religion X MC No Religion  0.003 (0.00) *** 0.006 (0.00) * 
MD Other Religions X MC Religions  -0.000 (0.00)  0.062 (0.09)  
MD Religion Diversity X MC Religion Diversity  0.000 (0.00)  0.001 (0.00)  
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001     
 
Interestingly, the interaction between the mean-deviated and mean-centred variables for 
immigrants without a religious affiliation is significant in both cities. In Sydney, I find that 
neighbourhoods with fewer non-religious immigrants experience the largest decrease in crime 
following an influx of this group (B=0.003 p<0.001). Similar patterns are seen in Brisbane with the 
effect strongest in areas with lower levels of non-religious immigrant concentration (B=0.006 
p<0.001). In this city, an increase in the non-religious immigrant population has little effect on 
violent crime in areas with a higher level of concentration.  
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  Figure 6.12 Muslim interaction (Sydney)  Figure 6.11 Buddhist interaction (Sydney)  
Figure 6.13 No Religion interaction (Sydney) Figure 6.14 No Religion interaction (Brisbane) 
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Consistent with Study 1, I also examine the potential moderating effect of disadvantage on 
the relationship between changes in ethnic group concentration/diversity and violent crime. 
Scholarship from the United States suggests the effect of immigrant growth is particularly strong in 
areas of concentrated disadvantage (MacDonald et al., 2013; Velez, 2009), as is the effect of ethnic 
diversity (Feldmeyer et al., 2016). This is because influxes of new immigrants into disadvantaged 
areas revitalises neighbourhood organisations and institutions, reinvigorates the local economy and 
strengthens social networks. Alternatively, an increased presence of immigrants in advantaged 
communities is thought to disrupt social networks and informal social control and subsequently 
increase crime (Velez, 2009).  
Table 6.15 Changes in language concentration/diversity at different levels of disadvantage  
 SYDNEY  
(N=580) 
BRISBANE 
(N=302) 
 B (SE) p< B (SE) p< 
MD Northern European X MC Disadvantage  0.080 (0.03)  0.124 (0.05)  
MD South East Asian X MC Disadvantage  -0.006 (0.01)  -0.006 (0.02)  
MD South West Central Asian X MC Disadvantage  0.009 (0.01)  -0.025 (0.03)  
MD Southern Asian X MC Disadvantage  0.006 (0.00)  0.033 (0.02)  
MD Eastern Asian X MC Disadvantage  0.034 (0.00) *** 0.029 (0.02)  
MD Language Diversity X MC Disadvantage  0.00 (0.001)  0.002 (0.00)  
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001     
 
Figure 6.15 Mean-deviated East Asian languages and mean-centred disadvantage (Sydney) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
3
4
5
6
V
io
le
n
t 
C
ri
m
e
 C
o
u
n
t
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
Mean-Deviated % East Asian
Mean-Centred Disadvantage=-0.6
Mean-Centred Disadvantage=0.59
Mean-Centred Disadvantage=1.11
Mean-Centred Disadvantage=2.16
165 
 
To test this effect, additional interaction terms between the mean-deviated ethnic group 
measure and the mean-centred level of disadvantage are added to the model. Specifically, I examine 
whether increases in ethnic group concentration have varying effects on crime at different levels of 
disadvantage. As can be seen in Table 6.15, this interaction term was not statistically significant for 
any language group with the exception of immigrants who speak Eastern Asian languages in Sydney 
(B= 0.034, p<0.001).  
Here I find that an increase in the immigrant population who speak Eastern Asian languages 
is associated with the largest reduction in violent crime in neighbourhoods characterised by low 
levels of disadvantage (i.e. areas where the level of disadvantage is one standard deviation or more 
below the mean) (see Figure 6.15). Yet in disadvantaged communities, an increase in the number of 
immigrants who speak Eastern Asian languages is linked to an increase in violent crime. However, it 
should be noted that this effect is only seen in highly disadvantaged communities - areas where the 
level of disadvantage is more than two standard deviations above the mean. Such neighbourhoods 
represent only a small proportion of the Sydney sample. 
When considering the effect of increases in immigrant concentration by religious affiliation 
on violent across neighbourhoods with different levels of disadvantage, I again find few significant 
effects. In Sydney, increases in the Buddhist immigrant population differentially impact violent 
crime depending on the level of disadvantage (B= 0.020, p<0.05). Figure 6.16 suggests that an 
increase in the Buddhist immigrant population in advantaged communities (neighbourhoods where 
the level of disadvantage is two standard deviations below the mean) is associated with a reduction 
in violent crime. However, in more disadvantaged communities, an increase in the Buddhist 
immigrant population is linked to a slight increase in the level of violent crime. In both cities, 
changes in the presence of non-religious immigrants differentially impacts violent crime at varying 
levels of neighbourhood disadvantage. In Sydney, an increase in the number of immigrants without a 
religious affiliation in advantaged neighbourhoods has a protective effect on violent crime (B= 
0.015, p<0.001). Similar effects are seen in Brisbane. However in this city, an increase in the non-
religious immigrant population in disadvantaged communities is associated with a slight increase in 
crime (B= 0.027, p<0.05). 
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Figure 6.16 Mean-deviated Buddhist and mean-
centred disadvantage (Sydney) 
Figure 6.17 Mean-deviated No Religion and mean-
centred disadvantage (Sydney) 
Figure 6.18 Mean-deviated No Religion and mean-
centred disadvantage (Brisbane) 
Figure 6.19 Mean-deviated religion diversity and 
mean-centred disadvantage (Brisbane) 
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Table 6.16 Religion Group and Disadvantage Interactions  
 SYDNEY (N=580) BRISBANE (N=302) 
 B (SE) p< B (SE) p< 
MD Buddhist X MC Disadvantage  0.020 (0.01) * -0.021 (0.03)  
MD Hindu X MC Disadvantage  0.007 (0.01)  0.053 (0.03)  
MD Muslim X MC Disadvantage  0.009 (0.01)   -0.006 (0.01)  
MD No Religion X MC Disadvantage  0.015 (0.00) *** 0.027 (0.01) * 
MD Other Religions X MC Disadvantage  -0.016 (0.01)  0.104 (0.05)  
MD Religion Diversity X MC Disadvantage  -0.004 (0.00)  -0.022 (0.01) ** 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001     
 
The effect of changes in religion diversity on violent crime also appears to be contingent on 
the level of neighbourhood disadvantage in Brisbane. Figure 6.19 demonstrates that increases in the 
level of religion diversity are linked to slightly more violent crime in more disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods (two standard deviations above the mean level of disadvantage). While in less 
disadvantaged areas (neighbourhoods where the level of disadvantage is two standard deviations 
below the mean), increases in the level religion of diversity are actually associated with a reduction 
in violent crime. 
These findings suggest both the size of the co-ethnic population and the level of disadvantage 
differentially moderate the immigration-crime relationship in the Australian context in comparison to 
the United States. In Australia, the presence of established co-ethnics is not necessary in order for 
increases in ethnic groups to have a protective impact on violent crime. In fact in some cases, the 
effect of increases in ethnic group concentration are most pronounced in areas with a relatively small 
established co-ethnic presence. These findings are contrary to the arguments put forward in the 
revitalisation thesis which suggest areas with a more established co-ethnic population better absorb 
influxes of new immigrants. Further, I find little evidence to suggest that influxes of immigrants 
revitalise disadvantaged neighbourhoods. In most cases, the effect of increases in ethnic group 
concentration does not depend on the level of neighbourhood disadvantage. In the few cases where 
significant effects are found, I find the opposite to be true with increased ethnic group concentration 
in less disadvantaged neighbourhoods linked to the greatest reduction in violent crime. Taken 
together, these models suggest some of the key arguments of the revitalisation thesis do not hold in 
the Australian setting.  
6.7 Site comparison  
Once disaggregating the total immigrant concentration measure by language and religion, the 
conclusions drawn from Study 1 remain. Growth in the immigrant population – regardless of the 
168 
 
language or religion group under consideration - does not lead to more violent crime within a 
neighbourhood. Further, no language or religion group concentration is associated with more violent 
crime once the socio-structural and environmental features of neighbourhoods are considered. 
Indeed, the growth and concentration of some ethnic groups is actually linked to less violent crime. I 
thus find no evidence that increased immigration leads to more neighbourhood violence.  
However, these models do highlight some additional differences between the two sites than 
what is seen in Study 1. For example, changes in the five language groups included in the within 
effects component of the model (Northern European, Southeast Asian, Southern Asian, Southwest 
and Central Asian and Eastern Asian languages) are linked to less violent crime over time in Sydney. 
While in Brisbane - with the exception of immigrants who speak Southern Asian languages - 
changes in language concentration have a null effect on violent crime over time. Thus the protective 
effect of increases in language group concentration over time is more prevalent in the Sydney 
context (yet is still not harmful in the Brisbane setting).  
When considering the effect of language concentration across neighbourhoods there are again 
some differences between the two cities. For example, the concentration of immigrants who speak 
Northern European and Southern Asian languages is linked to less violent crime across Brisbane 
neighbourhoods but not across neighbourhoods in Sydney. Conversely, neighbourhoods with a 
greater concentration of immigrants who speak Southern European, Eastern Asian and Southwest 
and Central Asian languages experience fewer violent crimes in Sydney but not in Brisbane. For the 
most part, these differences may be a result of varying levels of concentration across neighbourhoods 
in the two sites. Neighbourhoods in Brisbane may not reach the level of concentration necessary in 
order for the presence of immigrants who speak Southern European, Eastern Asian or Southwest and 
Central Asian languages to have a protective effect on crime. Similarly, the concentration of 
immigrants who speak Northern European languages is slightly higher in the Brisbane context. The 
exception here is immigrants who speak Southern Asian languages. The concentration of this group 
across neighbourhoods is higher in the Sydney context compared to Brisbane - although is only 
significant in Brisbane.  
Some consistencies are found across the two sites. For example, the concentration of 
immigrants who speak Southeast Asian languages is linked to less violent crime across both 
Brisbane and Sydney neighbourhoods. This group (comprised largely of Vietnamese) is well 
established in both cities - first arriving in Sydney during the 1970s and in Brisbane in the 1990s 
(Burnley, 2001). Before including the socio-structural and environmental variables, the concentration 
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of immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages was linked to more crime across Sydney 
neighbourhoods (with no significant association found in Brisbane). After the controls were 
included, the concentration of immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages is associated with 
significantly less violent crime across neighbourhoods in both sites. This finding in particular 
reinforces the importance of considering the broader neighbourhood context in immigration-crime 
research. The concentration of immigrants who speak Eastern European languages or English only is 
not significantly related to violent crime across neighbourhoods in either city.  
Similar patterns are seen in the religion models. I find no evidence that increases in ethnic 
group concentration over time or the average level of ethnic group concentration is associated with 
more neighbourhood violence. Similar to the language models, I find that the growth of certain 
religious groups is actually linked to a reduction in violent crime over time. Moreover, once the 
broader features of neighbourhoods are considered, the concentration of groups is not linked to more 
neighbourhood violence. The models again indicate some differences between the two research sites 
with more significant effects found in the Sydney setting. Most notable, both growth in the Muslim 
immigrant population over time as well as higher average concentrations of Muslim immigrants is 
linked to lower violence in Sydney but has no effect on crime in Brisbane. This is likely due to the 
more sizeable presence of Muslims in Sydney compared to Brisbane.  
While the concentration of particular ethnic groups is largely beneficial for crime, the effect 
of language and religion diversity is problematic in both cities. In Sydney, increasing language 
diversity within a neighbourhood is associated with more violent crime over time. This relationship 
remains once neighbourhood controls are included in the model. In Brisbane, the effect of changes in 
diversity (significant and negative initially) is non-significant after other neighbourhood factors are 
considered. When comparing across neighbourhoods, the effect of language diversity is consistent 
across the two sites. In both cities, areas with a higher average level of language diversity encounter 
greater crime problems, so too do more religiously diverse neighbourhoods. Thus in more ethnically 
diverse areas, residents appear unable to find the common ground necessary in order to collectively 
solve local problems. These findings highlight the opposing effects of concentration and diversity 
and provide empirical support for both disorganisation and revitalisation arguments.  
6.8 Chapter summary  
After accounting for ethnicity, the key takeaway message from Study 1 remains. Regardless 
of the ethnic group under consideration, neither the presence of immigrants nor influxes of 
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immigrants are related to more violent crime. In fact, both growth and concentration are significantly 
associated with less violent crime for certain ethnic groups. While I find greater variation between 
the two cities than in Study 1, I find little evidence to suggest neighbourhoods in the new destination 
city (Brisbane) fare worse following increases in ethnic group concentration than those in the 
established ethnic gateway city (Sydney). Rather, the protective effect of ethnic group growth is just 
stronger in the Sydney context.  
Diversity however, appears to be more problematic especially when comparing across 
neighbourhoods. In Sydney, increasing language diversity is associated with more violent crime over 
time - even after accounting for neighbourhood context. When comparing between neighbourhoods, 
the effect of language diversity is consistent across the two sites. In both cities, areas with a higher 
level of language diversity encounter more crime problems. Similar effects are seen when 
considering religion diversity. While changes in religion diversity are not significantly related to 
violent crime over time, more religiously diverse neighbourhoods experience more violent crime.  
Thus in both cities, more diverse neighbourhoods encounter more violent crime while at the 
same time, areas with a greater concentration of certain ethnic groups experience less violent crime. 
Rather than presenting the immigration revitalisation thesis and social disorganisation theory as a 
competing dichotomy, the results here suggest that each theory’s hypothesised effects of immigration 
on violent crime can occur simultaneously. However, while increases in the concentration of ethnic 
groups are not linked to more crime in either city, whether this is due to a process of revitalisation is 
unclear – particularly as I find limited evidence in the interaction models to support the moderation 
effects outlined in the revitalisation thesis. I elaborate on the theoretical implications of these 
findings in Chapter 8.  
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Chapter Seven: Immigration, Segregation and Crime     
 
7.1 Introduction 
To date, most studies interested in untangling the immigration-crime nexus have examined 
whether immigrant concentration or growth in the immigrant population is linked to crime at the 
neighbourhood or city level (Chavez & Griffiths, 2009; Desmond & Kubrin, 2009; Feldmeyer, 2009; 
Feldmeyer & Steffensmeier, 2009; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Kubrin & Ousey, 2009; Martinez et al., 
2010; Ramey, 2013; Stowell, 2007; Wadsworth, 2010). Internationally, there is a paucity of 
scholarship on the association between the segregation of immigrant groups and crime (see for 
exception Barranco, 2013; Feldmeyer et al., 2015). However, segregation differs from diversity and 
concentration as it is characterised by isolation and contains both structural and spatial elements 
(Massey & Denton, 1988; Morrill, 1991).Further, there are theoretical reasons to believe that 
immigrant segregation affects neighbourhoods in ways that either promote or inhibit crime. 
Segregation is argued to weaken social controls and undermine a community’s regulatory 
capacity through mechanisms associated with social inequality and social isolation (Peterson et al., 
2009). As such, segregation is thought to contribute to higher rates of crime at both the local and city 
level. However, results from empirical scholarship testing the link between black-white segregation 
and crime in the United States are far from conclusive (see for example Krivo, Peterson & Kuhl, 
2009; Peterson & Krivo 1993, 1999; Shihadeh & Flynn, 1996; Shihadeh & Maume, 1997). Further 
still, emerging evidence from this context indicates that immigrant enclaves may actually insulate 
communities from crime by providing residents with a “protective shell of resources” (Feldmeyer et 
al. 2015, p. 2). Thus the strong social networks prevalent in immigrant enclaves can potentially 
mediate the effect of isolation and deprivation on crime. This study brings together and empirically 
tests these conflicting viewpoints on the segregation-crime link. 
Few studies have examined patterns of residential segregation in Australia (see for exception 
Johnston et al., 2007; Markus et al., 2009). In this setting, scholars find relatively low levels of 
residential segregation and suggest immigrant neighbourhoods are multicultural rather than 
dominated by a single birthplace (Markus et al., 2009). In their comparative analysis Johnston and 
colleagues (2007) found cities in Australia and New Zealand exhibited less segregation than those in 
Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. With this in mind, an important starting point for 
this research is to establish whether or not immigrant groups are actually spatially separated in the 
Australian context. I therefore ask: (1) how are various immigrant groups spatially distributed across 
172 
 
Brisbane and Sydney and; (2) are immigrant neighbourhoods co-located within each city or isolated? 
These questions guide stage 1 of the analysis. Considering the lack of scholarship interested in 
residential segregation patterns in the Australian context, it is not particularly surprising there is also 
a dearth of research focused on the link between residential segregation and violent crime. Therefore 
after determining spatial segregation trends, I next examine the effect of immigrant group 
segregation on violent crime. Specifically I question: (3) how does the residential distribution of each 
immigrant group impact violent crime and; (4) is the co-location of immigrant neighbourhoods 
associated with more or less neighbourhood violence? These questions guide stage 2 of the analysis.  
7.2 Defining and measuring segregation  
 
Segregation is not accidental, but a consequence of purposeful behaviour. It is at once a structural 
and a spatial concept. The motivations for segregation are structural-that is, a desire to minimise 
interaction with certain other kinds of people. The most effective tool or manifestation is territorial 
separation (Morrill, 1991, p. 26). 
Effectively measuring residential segregation is not a straightforward task. While an 
extensive range of indices are available, scholars disagree on the best approach due to varied 
understandings of how groups are separated from one another (Massey & Denton, 1988). In their 
landmark review, Massey and Denton (1988) proposed a multidimensional reconceptualisation of 
residential segregation. Here, the authors identified five different dimensions of group variation - 
evenness, exposure, concentration, centrality and clustering - arguing each dimension is both 
conceptually and empirically distinct (see Table 7.1). Measures of segregation are typically designed 
to tap into one of these five dimensions and thus Massey and Denton (1988, p. 312) contend that 
segregation should be measured by “a battery of indices” rather than a single measure.   
Few studies interested in the effect of residential segregation on crime have employed 
spatialized segregation measures. Rather, studies continue to rely predominantly on traditional 
segregation indices, particularly the dissimilarity index and the exposure index (see for example 
Barranco, 2013; Feldmeyer et al., 2015; Feldmeyer, 2010; Lee & Ousey, 2005; Peterson & Krivo, 
1993; Shihadeh & Flynn, 1996). These measures limit our understanding of the relationship between 
segregation and crime in two important ways. First, they are aspatial in nature and thus each 
neighbourhood unit is treated independently with the composition of nearby units ignored. As a 
consequence, relatively arbitrary administrative boundaries are treated as absolute barriers to 
interaction (Wong, 2016). This approach implicitly assumes residents will not crossover into 
neighbouring areas, yet in reality, residents regularly come into contact with nearby populations 
(Wong, 2002). 
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Table 7.1 Dimensions of segregation  
 
Dimension  Description Structural/Spatial 
Evenness Refers to the spread of ethnic/racial groups across a 
city. While some groups may be over or under 
represented in particular areas, others may be more 
evenly dispersed across the city. Commonly measured 
with the dissimilarity index.  
Structural  
Exposure  Refers to the degree to which minorities share their 
neighbourhood and/or neighbourhood boundaries with 
other groups and subsequently have opportunities for 
interaction. Groups with limited exposure are more 
likely to be isolated from majority group members.  
Structural  
Concentration  Refers to the density of ethnic/racial groups within a 
small areal unit. Some groups are more densely 
populated within neighbourhoods compared to others. 
Structural  
Centrality  Refers to the proximity of ethnic/racial groups to the 
city centre. In the United States and elsewhere, 
centralization is a common component of segregation 
as high levels of discrimination in the suburban real 
estate market limit minorities to living in declining and 
undesirable areas in the inner city. 
Spatial  
Clustering Refers to how minority areas are distributed in respect 
to one another. When minority dominated 
neighbourhoods are adjacent to one another, they can 
form a contiguous ethnic enclave. Alternatively, 
immigrant neighbourhoods can be randomly scattered 
across the city.  
Spatial  
      (Massey and Denton, 1988) 
The failure to account for the relative position of areal units is widely referred to as “the 
checkerboard problem” and illustrated in Figure 7.1 (White, 1983). Here, the squares on the 
checkerboard represent individual neighbourhoods located within two hypothetical cities. While City 
A and City B each possess 50 black neighbourhoods and 50 white neighbourhoods, they present 
markedly different patterns of spatial segregation. Without accounting for where neighbourhoods are 
located in relation to one another, both would generate the same segregation score (Dawkins, 2004). 
Wong (2002) warns researchers can potentially overestimate the level of segregation by artificially 
imposing spatial separation amongst groups. To reduce the likelihood of inflating segregation, Wong 
(2002) recommends segregation measures allow individuals to interact with space by accounting for 
the conditions in nearby neighbourhoods (Wong, 2002). 
Another key limitation of traditional segregation indices is that they are global and therefore 
provide a single number score which summarizes segregation patterns for an entire city (Reardon 
and O’Sullivan, 2004). While these measures are useful for comparing segregation levels between 
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cities, they fail to adequately capture local variations within cities. By ignoring local trends, Brown 
and Chung (2006, p. 126) argue global measures are “slighting if not losing, the spatiality of 
segregation.” They suggest that by moving from global to local indices, researchers can better 
understand how the spatial fabric of the city is delineated along ethnic lines (Brown and Chung, 
2006).  
Figure 7.1 Checkerboard problem  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Considering the shortcomings of traditional segregation indices, the use of global measures 
like the dissimilarity index is not appropriate given the aims of this study. While decomposed 
spatialized versions of the dissimilarity index are available, these measures are convoluted and 
difficult to interpret. To address the research questions, I employ two highly spatialized yet 
underutilised local segregation measures: Location Quotients (LQs) and Local Moran’s I (LM-I). 
Brown and Chung (2006) argue that together, these two measures effectively capture four of Massey 
and Denton’s (1988) five dimensions of segregation.20 As a measure of relative concentration, LQs 
tap into the concentration-evenness dimensions of segregation. LM-I on the other hand, measures the 
clustering-exposure dimension of segregation by assessing each areal unit in relation to neighbouring 
units. Taken together, these measures can capture the multidimensional nature of residential 
segregation at the local level.  
7.3 Methods  
Taking a cross sectional approach, this study utilises data from the 2011 ABS census and 
crime data provided by BOSCAR and the QPS. To address the research questions, the analysis is 
                                               
20 This study does not consider centrality. In the Australian context, inner city neighbourhoods are typically more 
affluent, thus proximity to the city center is not an indicator of discrimination and social disadvantage. 
City A City B 
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conducted in two stages. Stage 1 involves a descriptive analysis that considers the spatial distribution 
of immigrants across neighbourhoods located in the two research sites. Stage 2 presents a series of 
negative binomial regression models which firstly explore the bivariate relationship between 
immigrant segregation and violent crime and secondly examine the role neighbourhood contexts play 
in moderating these relationships.  
Consistent with Study 1 and Study 2, the unit of analysis in Study 3 is the state suburb (N= 
824 in Sydney and N= 429 in Brisbane). In line with previous chapters, specific criteria were used to 
determine appropriate neighbourhoods for inclusion. For the descriptive analysis (stage 1) in Study 
3, neighbourhoods were included if their population exceeded 300 persons in 2011. This process 
generated a total sample of 768 neighbourhoods in Sydney and 384 neighbourhoods in Brisbane. In 
stage 2, the same criteria applied in the Study 1 and Study 2 analytic models was used. However, as 
Study 3 is cross sectional and draws only on data from 2011, a greater number of neighbourhoods 
met the minimum population requirement. Thus the analytic sample is slightly larger in Study 3 
(N=598 in Sydney and N=313 in Brisbane) (see Chapter 4 for further information on the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria for the Study 3 neighbourhood sample).  
7.4 Stage 1- Immigrant segregation across Sydney and Brisbane neighbourhoods  
Variables  
As segregation is (at least in part) the result of strong in-group preferences and a desire to live 
with culturally similar individuals (Emerson, Chai & Yancey, 2001; Morrill, 1991), the immigrant 
population was divided into four distinct groups determined by their language spoken at home. These 
groups include: immigrants who speak Asian languages, immigrants who speak European languages, 
immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages and immigrants who speak English only. The language 
categories employed in Study 2 were therefore further aggregated into these broader categories for 
Study 3 to allow for greater variation in ethnic group size across neighbourhoods. Language was 
chosen over other indicators of ethnicity (namely region of birth or religion) for several reasons. 
First, in the Australian context, language can create a sense of otherness and can cause an individual 
to be perceived as an outsider (Anderson, 1991; Calhoun, 1992; Leigh, 2006; Wickes et al., 2013a). 
Second, the Study 2 models highlight a greater number of statistically significant relationships 
between language concentration and crime compared to religion and crime. Finally, preliminary 
analyses for this study revealed a tendency for immigrants from English speaking countries to settle 
in similar areas. By focusing on language rather than region of birth, this trend is captured. While 
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immigrants belonging to these broad language groups may not necessarily be able to communicate 
effectively with one another, it is argued that the degree of social and cultural distance immigrants 
from similar origins face will be less (although perhaps not for those who belong to the ‘Other 
languages category).  
Table 7.2 Collapsed language categories for Study 3 
Collapsed Category  Broad Category  Description  
European  Northern European  Celtic; German Related 
Languages; Dutch Related 
Languages; Scandinavian; Finish 
Related Languages (Excluded 
English) 
European  Southern European  French; Greek; Iberian Romance; 
Italian; Maltese 
European  Eastern European  Baltic; Hungarian; East Slavic; 
South Slavic; West Slavic; 
Asian  Southeast Asian  Burmese; Hmong-Mien; Mon-
Khmer; Tai; South-East 
Austronesian   
Asian  Southern Asian  Dravidian; Indo-Aryan 
Asian  Eastern Asian  Chinese; Japanese; Korean 
‘Other’  Southwest and Central Asian  Irenic, Middle Eastern Semitic 
Languages; Turkic 
‘Other’   ‘Other’  American Languages, African 
Languages, Pacific Austronesian 
Languages; Oceanian Pidgins and 
Creoles; Papua New Guinea 
Languages.   
English Only   English  
 
LQ 
LQs are a ratio measure of relative concentration. In this study, LQs are used to compare the 
share of a racial/ethnic group in a particular neighbourhood to their overall share in the city (Brown 
and Chung, 2006) (formula outlined in Chapter 4). Table 7.2 includes the denominator values used to 
create the LQs (i.e. the (
𝐼
𝑇
) component of the equation). These values represent each group’s size as a 
proportion of the total population in the city. Consistent with earlier chapters, these figures highlight 
significant differences in the composition of each city’s residential population. While in Sydney, 
immigrants who speak Asian languages comprise the largest foreign born group, in Brisbane, 
English only speaking immigrants are most dominant.  
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Table 7.3 City immigrant share   
 
 SYDNEY BRISBANE 
Asian Languages  0.1337 0.0607 
European Languages  0.0554 0.0280 
‘Other’ Languages  0.4109 0.0164 
English Only  0.1104 0.1435 
 
A summary of the numerator values is provided in Table 7.3 (i.e. descriptives for the (
𝑖𝑛
𝑡𝑛
) 
component of the equation). These values again reveal considerable differences in the ethnic 
composition of neighbourhoods located within the two research sites. Specifically, immigrants who 
speak languages other than English are far less common in Brisbane neighbourhoods in comparison 
to Sydney neighbourhoods.  
Table 7.4 Neighbourhood immigrant share   
  
 SYDNEY (N=769) BRISBANE (N=384) 
 Mean S.D Min Max Mean S.D Min Max 
Asian Languages 0.0894 0.1068 0.0000 0.6002 0.0485 0.0630 0.0000 0.3977 
European Languages  0.0486 0.0345 0.0000 0.1858 0.0247 0.0152 0.0000 0.0946 
‘Other’ Languages  0.0287 0.0417   0.0000 0.2964 0.0129 0.0178 0.0000 0.1145 
English Only  0.1130 0.0467 0.0283 0.2885 0.1389 0.0385 0.0287 0.2527 
 
In the Stage 1 descriptive analysis, the LQ scores for each group are summarized. There is 
currently no statistical test available for determining a significant LQ value and studies vary 
considerably in identifying appropriate cut-off points (for example Miller et al., 1991 suggest 1.31 
while Rengert, Ratcliffe & Chakravorty, 2005 suggest 2.0). To visually demonstrate spatial patterns, 
the LQ scores in this study are categorized into three distinct groups for the maps. These include: 
underrepresented (LQ <0.5), neutral (LQ 0.5-1.5) and overrepresented (LQ >1.5).  
LM-I:  
LM-I considers each neighbourhood unit in terms of the characteristics of neighbouring units 
and identifies statistically significant spatial outliers and clusters (Anselin, 1995). The LM-I 
procedure was conducted in ArcGIS (see Chapter 4 for further details). Areas are classified into five 
categories: High High (HH) clusters (high concentration surrounded by high concentration); Low 
Low (LL) clusters (low concentration surrounded by low concentration); High Low (HL) cluster 
(high concentration surrounded by low concentration); Low High (LH) cluster (low concentration 
surrounded by high concentration) or Non-Significant (NS). In this analysis, HH clusters represent 
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incidences of spatial clustering (i.e. the co-location of immigrant neighbourhoods) and HL indicate 
cases of spatial isolation. This variable is created for each of the four immigrant language groups.   
Spatial distribution of immigrants across Sydney neighbourhoods   
In Sydney, immigrants who speak Asian languages are unevenly distributed across the city 
with a mean LQ score of 0.67 (see Table 7.4). The LQ map reveals Asian speaking immigrants are 
mainly overrepresented in inner city and western neighbourhoods (see Figure 7.2). These relatively 
concentrated areas are then surrounded by a neutral buffer zone (neighbourhoods with their expected 
share of Asian immigrants). However, as the distance from the CBD increases, there appears to be a 
growing underrepresentation of Asian speaking immigrants. The LM-I analysis shows similar spatial 
trends (see Table 7.5). Of significant cluster types, HH clusters are most common. In fact, a total of 
16.9% of Sydney neighbourhoods are classified as a HH cluster. The LM-I map shows HH clusters 
are located mostly in the inner city and western suburbs. Located adjacent to one another, many of 
these neighbourhoods form together to create a contiguous enclave. Well-established Asian 
neighbourhoods that attracted early waves of Asian migration during the 1970s and 80s (such as 
Cabramatta) remain popular settlement zones with neighbouring areas also labelled HH clusters.  
Table 7.5 LQ values (Sydney) 
 
 SYDNEY (N=769) 
 Mean S.D Min Max 
Asian Languages  0.67 0.80 0.00 4.49 
European Languages 0.88 0.62 0.00 3.36 
‘Other’ Languages  0.70 1.02 0.00 7.21 
English Only  1.02 0.42 0.26 2.61 
 
Immigrants who speak European languages are slightly more dispersed across Sydney 
neighbourhoods (mean LQ score= 0.88). However, there are neighbourhoods in Sydney where 
European immigrants account for more than three times their expected share of the population. 
Similar to Asian speaking immigrants, immigrants who speak European languages are relatively 
concentrated in and around the Sydney CBD with two large clusters of overrepresented 
neighbourhoods in this area (see Figure 7.2). Interestingly, these neighbourhoods are distinct from 
those identified as relatively concentrated Asian neighbourhoods. The LQ map also shows a greater 
number of neutral areas for immigrants who speak European languages which suggests this group is 
more evenly distributed across the city. Yet, several areas on the outskirts of the city are marked as 
having an underrepresentation of immigrants who speak European languages. The LM-I analysis 
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reveals similar spatial trends. HH clusters are again the most common of the significant cluster types 
(13.28% of neighbourhoods) and thus neighbourhoods with a strong presence of European residents 
tend to be located nearby one another. As can be seen in Figure 7.3, HH clusters for immigrants who 
speak European languages tend to reflect historical migratory trends (particularly neighbourhoods 
located east of the CBD). For example, Leichardt - where many Italian small businesses were 
established during the 1970s - continues to be a prime location for immigrants who speak European 
languages (Collins, 2006). 
Table 7.6 Results of LM-I Analyses (Sydney) 
 SYDNEY (N=768) 
 HH HL LL LH NS 
Asian Languages 13.28% 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 86.59% 
European Languages  13.28% 0.00% 3.91% 0.39% 82.81% 
‘Other’ Languages 11.46% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 88.54% 
English Only  13.02% 0.00% 10.42% 0.00% 76.56% 
 
Immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages are underrepresented in most Sydney 
neighbourhoods (mean LQ score of 0.70). Looking at the LQ map, it is evident that most 
neighbourhoods host less than their expected share of immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages with 
only a few overrepresented areas identified. However, one neighbourhood (Fairfield) reported an LQ 
value of 7.21 therefore hosting over seven times its expected share of immigrants who speak ‘Other’ 
languages. This neighbourhood is one of the most popular resettlement zones for humanitarian 
immigrants in Australia. In 2016, 3,000 new refugees were resettled in this neighbourhood and 
surrounding areas (ABS, 2011a; Hunter, 2017). Due to the conditions surrounding their migration, it 
is likely humanitarian immigrants have fewer economic and social resources upon arrival compared 
to immigrants who arrived through the family or skilled stream.  The LM-I analysis classified 
11.46% of neighbourhoods in Sydney as HH clusters for immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages. 
HH cluster zones for this group are located further away from the CBD and include some of 
Sydney’s most notoriously disadvantaged and stigmatized areas such as Macquarie Fields, Mt Druitt 
and Claymore. The history of these neighbourhoods is worth highlighting. Originally built as public 
housing estates in the 1960s and 70s by the New South Wales government, decades later, they 
comprise some of Australia’s most impoverished communities (Groenhart, 2012). 
As the most established immigrant group in Australia and culturally quite similar to the 
native born population, the settlement patterns of English speaking immigrants are distinct to other 
groups. Akin to an “invisible” migrant group (Collins, 2006), the mean LQ value (1.02) suggests this  
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Figure 7.3 Clustering-exposure dimension (LM-I) Sydney  Figure 7.2 Concentration-evenness dimension (LQ) Sydney 
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group is quite evenly dispersed across the city. The LQ map further reinforces this finding with the 
majority of neighbourhoods classified as neutral. Areas that are overrepresented are located along the 
coastline and harbor while some neighbourhoods in and around the CBD are underrepresented. 
Similar trends are identified in the LM-I analysis. A total of 13.02% of neighbourhoods are classified 
as HH clusters for immigrants who speak English only. These neighbourhoods include some of the 
most affluent areas in Australia including Darling Point, Vaucluse and Edgecliffe where the median 
house price sits in the millions. Another key trend identified in the settlement patterns of immigrants 
who speak English only is their absence in more linguistically diverse immigrant areas. In Sydney, 
10.42% of neighbourhoods are classed as LL clusters for immigrants who speak English only.  
As can be seen on the LM-I map, these statistically significant LL clusters for English only speaking 
immigrants are well aligned with HH Asian, HH European and HH ‘Other’ clusters.  
Figure 7.4 Overlap between HH clusters in Sydney  
 
As Australian neighbourhoods are often described as multicultural an additional map was 
created based on the LM-I cluster type. This process helped determine the degree of overlap in the 
HH clusters between the different ethnic groups. Over half of the neighbourhood sample in Sydney 
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identified no significant group cluster - with this particularly common in the outer regions. As can be 
seen in Figure 7.4, single group clusters are the most common cluster type with just under one third 
of the neighbourhood sample highlighted as a HH cluster for just one ethnic group. Overlap between 
groups is fairly uncommon. In fact, less than 10% of neighbourhoods are classified as a HH cluster 
for two or three ethnic groups and no single neighbourhood is identified as a HH cluster for all four 
groups. Table 7.7 describes a further breakdown of the cluster overlap.   
Table 7.7 Degree of overlap of clusters across ethnic groups in Sydney (N=768) 
Cluster Count  No. 
Neighbourhoods  
No Group Clusters Identified 457 (59.51%) 
One Group Cluster Identified 240 (31.25%) 
Two Group Clusters Identified 60 (7.81%) 
Three Group Clusters Identified 11 (1.43%) 
Four Group Clusters Identified 0 (0.00%) 
 
Spatial distribution of immigrants across Brisbane neighbourhoods   
On average, neighbourhoods in Brisbane have less than their expected share of immigrants 
who speak Asian languages (mean score 0.80) (see Table 7.8). Relatively long standing Asian 
neighbourhoods like Macgregor, Runcorn, Stretton, Sunnybank and Sunnybank Hills all host Asian 
speaking populations five or more times their expected share. As can be seen on the LQ map, 
immigrants who speak Asian languages are overrepresented in inner city neighbourhoods and 
neighbourhoods located on the south side of Brisbane (see Figure 7.5). Like in Sydney, the LQ 
analysis shows a neutral buffer zone surrounding these relatively concentrated areas. Areas located 
on the outskirts of the city have less than their expected share of Asian immigrants. Consistent 
patterns are seen in the LM-I analysis. HH clusters are the most common significant cluster type 
(10.42%) and form a large contiguous enclave on Brisbane’s south (see Figure 7.6). Similar to 
Sydney, many of the neighbourhoods identified as a HH cluster in Brisbane reflect historical trends 
in Asian migration. The neighbourhoods that received the first wave of Asian immigrants to 
Brisbane during the 1990s continue to attract a sizeable Asian immigrant presence with spillover 
seen in surrounding neighbourhoods.  
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 Figure 7.5 Concentration-evenness dimension (LQ) Brisbane Figure 7.6 Clustering-exposure dimension (LM-I) Brisbane 
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Table 7.8 LQ values (Brisbane)  
 
 BRISBANE (N=384) 
 Mean S.D Min Max 
Asian Languages  0.80 1.04 0.00 6.55 
European Languages 0.88 0.54 0.00 3.37 
‘Other’ Languages  0.79 1.09 0.00 7.00 
English Only  0.97 0.27 0.20 1.76 
 
Compared to Asian speaking immigrants, immigrants who speak European languages are 
more evenly distributed across the city (mean LQ score= 0.88). While a few areas on Brisbane’s 
south are relatively concentrated, most neighbourhoods have their expected share of European 
speaking immigrants. Immigrants who speak European languages are underrepresented in 
neighbourhoods located along the city boundaries. The LM-I analysis classified 10.16 % of Brisbane 
neighbourhoods as HH clusters for immigrants who speak European languages. The LM-I map 
shows a y-shaped grouping of HH cluster neighbourhoods on Brisbane’s south side. While in a 
similar vicinity to the neighbourhoods identified as HH clusters for Asian speaking immigrants, 
these neighbourhoods are not completely overlapping. One HL cluster for immigrants who speak 
European languages is highlighted in north Brisbane. Another interesting trend concerning this 
population is the relatively high number of LL clusters identified. In Brisbane, 8.07% of 
neighbourhoods are classed as a LL cluster for immigrants who speak European languages. These 
neighbourhoods are particularly common in Brisbane’s western suburbs.  
Table 7.9 Results of LM-I analyses (Brisbane) 
 BRISBANE (N=384) 
 HH HL LL LH NS 
Asian Languages 10.42% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 89.58% 
European Languages  10.16% 0.26% 8.07% 0.00% 81.51% 
‘Other’ Languages 7.29% 0.00% 0.00% 0.26% 92.45% 
English Only  8.85% 0.78% 8.85% 0.00% 82.81% 
 
Immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages are underrepresented across Brisbane 
neighbourhoods (mean LQ score= 0.79). Four neighbourhoods in Brisbane (Goodna, Logan Central, 
Riverview and Woodridge) host over five times their expected share of immigrants who speak 
‘Other’ languages. Of the neighbourhoods included in this analysis, these four suburbs fall within the 
top 5% most disadvantaged. Furthermore, visa category data indicates that Woodridge in particular is 
a popular settlement area for humanitarian immigrants in Brisbane. In fact, 9% of immigrants who 
arrived to Brisbane on humanitarian visas between 2000 and 2011 settled in this neighbourhood 
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(ABS, 2011a). The LQ map shows that immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages are mainly 
overrepresented in neighbourhoods south of the Brisbane River. These neighbourhoods are further 
south compared to the relatively concentrated Asian and European areas or slightly west. A handful 
of neighbourhoods on Brisbane’s north side also have an overrepresentation of immigrants who 
speak ‘Other’ languages. These neighbourhoods are quite scattered and do not share a common 
boundary. For the most part, neighbourhoods in Brisbane have less than their expected share of 
immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages, suggesting this group is highly concentrated in just a 
handful of neighbourhoods. The LM-I analysis highlights similar trends although the 
neighbourhoods identified as overrepresented on Brisbane’s north side are not classified as 
statistically significant clusters. Many of the areas highlighted as HH clusters for immigrants who 
speak ‘Other’ languages are neighbourhoods with high levels of social disadvantage.  
Similar to Sydney, immigrants who only speak English display very distinct settlement 
patterns compared to other immigrant groups. This immigrant population is widely scattered across 
Brisbane neighbourhoods with the average LQ score 0.97. The LQ map classifies most 
neighbourhoods as neutral zones. This further reinforces the argument that this group is quite evenly 
distributed across neighbourhoods in Brisbane. In the LM-I analysis, 8.85% of Brisbane 
neighbourhoods are identified as HH clusters for English only speaking immigrants. These 
neighbourhoods however are located further away from the CBD compared to the HH clusters for 
Asian and European speaking immigrants. These HH clusters tend to fit into one of three categories: 
(1) areas with low population density and plentiful acreage (such as Pullenvale and Mount Cotton); 
(2) areas along the coastline (like Redcliffe); or (3) newly developed master planned estates (for 
example Northlakes and Brookwater). Thus these neighbourhoods reflect clear preferences by this 
group for certain lifestyles whether that is living on a larger property, near the beach or in a master 
planned estate. There are also a number of neighbourhoods identified as LL clusters for immigrants 
who speak English only (5.85% of neighbourhoods). Similar to immigrants who speak European 
languages, these neighbourhoods are located in Brisbane’s western suburbs.  
Like Sydney, an additional map was created to consider the degree of overlap between HH 
clusters in Brisbane (see Figure 7.7). The patterns here are largely consistent with what is seen in 
Sydney. Single clusters are again most common and comprise 19.79% of the Brisbane 
neighbourhood sample. Only 6.25% of neighbourhoods are identified as a HH cluster for two 
immigrant groups and just three suburbs are highlighted as a HH cluster for three groups. No 
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neighbourhood is classified as a HH cluster for all groups. Table 7.10 provides a further breakdown 
of the overlap between HH clusters. 
Figure 7.7 Overlap between HH clusters in Brisbane  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.10 Degree of overlap of HH clusters across ethnic groups in Brisbane (N=384) 
Cluster Count  Number of 
Neighbourhoods 
No Group Clusters Identified 281 (73.18%)  
One Group Cluster Identified 76 (19.79%) 
Two Group Clusters Identified 24 (6.25%)  
Three Group Clusters Identified 3 (0.78%)  
Four Group Clusters Identified 0 (0.00%)  
 
Site comparison 
Overall local segregation patterns are more pronounced in Sydney with fewer clusters 
identified in Brisbane. In Brisbane, 73.18% of the suburb sample present no significant clustering 
compared to 59.51% in Sydney. In both cities, single group clusters are most common. This could 
indicate either strong in-group preferences amongst Australia’s immigrant population or varying 
abilities to compete in the property market. While these suburbs may score highly on diversity 
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indices, such measures treat each birthplace as equally different and fail to account for differing 
levels of social distance between groups. In other words, a neighbourhood dominated by different 
Asian groups is markedly less diverse than one comprised of immigrants from Europe, Asia and 
Africa. When considering broad regional measures that capture the residential distribution of 
immigrant groups (LQs) and where immigrant neighbourhoods are located in relation to one another 
(LM-I), this study finds neighbourhoods differentially attract certain ethnicities.  
 In both sites, English only speaking immigrants are the most dispersed linguistic group. This 
trend is expected as they share a language with the native born population. It is also common for 
English only speaking immigrants to be absent from areas identified as clusters for other non-English 
speaking language groups. Indeed, their low concentration is statistically significant in Sydney’s 
LM-I analysis – with LL clusters for English only speaking immigrants well aligned with HH 
clusters for Sydney’s Asian, ‘Other’ and European population. This spatial patterning may reflect a 
preference amongst English speaking immigrants to settle with culturally similar individuals (i.e. the 
native population) and minimise interaction with other ethnic groups. This finding is in line with 
segregation studies in the United States where group preferences are found to drive segregation 
patterns to a certain extent. In particular, whites’ preference for living with other whites is found to 
be stronger than black’s preference for living with other blacks (Emerson et al., 2001). These 
preferences might translate to the Australian setting given the clear spatial separation of English only 
speaking immigrants from other ethnic groups.  
Another key factor associated with segregation in the United States is disadvantage. Here, 
segregation reflects the varying ability of different groups to compete for space due to unequal 
access to economic resources (Kaplan & Woodhouse, 2005; Morill, 1991). In this analysis, the 
association between neighbourhood disadvantage and segregation varies across ethnic groups and 
between the two cities. Table 7.11, lists the correlations between each immigrant group’s LQ value 
(included here as a continuous variable) and the level of neighbourhood disadvantage.  
Table 7.11 Correlation between disadvantage and immigrant segregation 
 SYDNEY 
(N=769) 
BRISBANE 
(N=384) 
Asian languages LQ 0.27 0.17 
European languages LQ 0.03 -0.07 
‘Other’ languages LQ 0.55 0.48 
English only LQ  -0.66 -0.16 
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In Sydney, the relationship between disadvantage and the presence of immigrants who speak 
‘Other’ languages is relatively strong at 0.55 - particularly compared to the other immigrant groups. 
Similarly, the presence of immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages is positively linked to 
disadvantage in Brisbane (0.48). Settling in primarily lower income neighbourhoods may indicate 
that this group possesses fewer resources. It is also important to note that this broad ‘Other’ category 
includes immigrants who speak African and Middle Eastern languages. Immigrants who originate 
from these regions enter Australia primarily via the humanitarian migrant stream. To aid with 
settlement, these immigrants are placed by the Australian government in certain localities which 
have well established resources for resettlement. Thus the segregation patterns of this group are 
additionally shaped by macro level government policy.  
Conversely, the proportion of immigrants who speak English only is negatively associated 
with disadvantage in both cities. In Sydney, the LQ score for English only speaking immigrants is 
particularly strong at -0.66. Choosing to live in the most desirable and sought after areas in Sydney 
suggests these immigrants possess much greater access to economic capital compared to the other 
ethnic groups. However, while the relationship is in the same direction, it is considerably weaker in 
the Brisbane context at -0.16. This may be explained by differing motivations for migration (ABS, 
2011). Sydney draws a high volume of skilled immigrants with many global businesses situating 
their Australian headquarters in the city (Collins, 2006). English only speaking immigrants in 
Sydney may therefore have greater access to more lucrative positions and employment, which in turn 
affects their settlement practices and purchasing power. Brisbane on the other hand, is less of an 
economic hub and thus may not attract English only speaking immigrants with similar economic 
resources. Rather, as noted earlier, English only speaking immigrants in the Brisbane setting may be 
drawn to neighbourhoods that facilitate certain lifestyles. The relationship between Asian 
segregation and disadvantage is not particularly strong in either city (0.27 in Sydney and 0.17 in 
Brisbane). Nor is the relationship between European segregation and disadvantage (0.06 in Sydney 
and -0.07 in Brisbane). 
Figure 7.8 provides a visual representation of the relationship between immigrant segregation 
and disadvantage in Sydney. Focusing in on the two ethnic groups most strongly correlated with 
disadvantage, this map highlights the spatial separation of immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages 
and immigrants who speak English only and the varying degrees of disadvantage (or lack thereof) 
these groups face.  
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Figure 7.8 Disadvantage and segregation in Sydney  
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7.5 Stage 2: Negative binomial models  
Analytic Strategy  
I employ negative binomial regression to determine the relationship between immigrant 
segregation and crime across Brisbane and Sydney neighbourhoods. In all models, the total 
population residing in the neighbourhood is included as the exposure variable. Further information 
on the analytic strategy for Study 3 is provided in Chapter 4. The models are stepped out in two 
stages. In stage 1, the segregation measures are entered into the model in order to consider the 
relationship between segregation and violent crime. In stage 2, the neighbourhood variables are 
included in order to see if relationships between segregation and crime remain once controlling for 
other neighbourhood characteristics. All neighbourhood variables employed to compare between 
neighbourhoods in Study 1 and 2 are retained for Study 3. This process helps tease apart the 
relationship between immigrant segregation and crime before and after accounting for 
neighbourhood context.  
Results: Sydney  
In the initial stages of modelling, only the LQ measures are included (see Model 1 in Table 
7.12). Without controlling for neighbourhood contextual features, the results suggest areas with a 
greater relative share of immigrants who speak Asian or European languages do not experience more 
violent crime. Similarly, no significant relationship is found between neighbourhoods that exhibit a 
greater relative presence of English only speaking immigrants and violent crime. However, 
neighbourhoods with a larger relative presence of immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages 
encounter significantly more violent crime (B=0.209 p<.001).  
In Model 2, the socio-demographic and environmental features of neighbourhoods are 
included. Once accounting for the socio-structural and environmental features of neighbourhoods, 
the relative concentration of immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages is no longer significant. 
However interestingly, the relative concentration of immigrants who speak European languages is 
positively associated with violent crime (B=0.099 p<. 01). Thus once including the neighbourhood 
features that we know are linked to violent crime, the uneven dispersion of this language group is 
associated with more neighbourhood violence. Additionally, once including the neighbourhood 
control variables, hosting a greater share of Asian speaking immigrants is significantly and 
negatively linked to violent crime (B=-0.059 p<.05). In other words, neighbourhoods with more than 
191 
 
their expected share of immigrants who speak Asian languages encounter fewer violent crime 
problems. The residential distribution of immigrants who speak English only remains non-
significant.  
In addition to these segregation measures, several neighbourhood factors are associated with 
greater violent crime across Sydney neighbourhoods. Specifically, areas with a higher level of 
disadvantage experience significantly more violent crime (B=0.220 p<.001). A greater Indigenous 
presence is also linked to more neighbourhood violence (B=0.087 p<.001). Areas with more renters 
similarly encounter greater violent crime incidents (B=0.027 p<.001). Population density is also 
problematic for violent crime, with more densely populated areas experiencing more violence 
(B=0.007 p<.001). A neighbourhood’s distance from the CBD is positively linked to violent crime 
meaning that as the distance from the CBD increases, so too does violence (B=0.07 p<0.001). 
Conversely, other neighbourhood factors were linked to lower counts of violent crime. In particular, 
areas with a greater presence of young males encounter fewer violent crimes (B=-0.033 p<0.05).  
Similarly areas with more land use classified as residential record fewer violent crimes (B=-0.009 
p<0.001). The number of residents at a different address five years ago has no effect on violent crime 
across Sydney neighbourhoods. 
In Model 3, the cluster variables are included in place of the LQ variables and the 
neighbourhood variables are omitted. Here neighbourhoods identified as a HH cluster for Asian 
speaking immigrants and English only speaking immigrants are not significantly related to violent 
crime. Yet neighbourhoods identified as a cluster for immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages are 
significantly linked to more violent crime (B=0.807 p<.001). Alternatively, neighbourhoods classed 
as a HH cluster for Europeans are negatively associated with crime (B=-0.195 p<.05). 
Once controlling for neighbourhood contexts, HH cluster neighbourhoods for immigrants 
who speak European languages or ‘Other’ languages are no longer significantly associated with 
violent crime.  In Model 4, neighbourhoods identified as HH clusters for Asian speaking immigrants 
are negatively associated with violent crime once these additional variables are considered (B=-0.176 
p<.05). Thus, while non-significant in Model 3, once accounting for context, these clusters 
experience less violent crime. The differences uncovered between the two segregation measures 
(particularly in terms of the effect of European immigrant segregation) further highlight the need to 
consider multiple dimensions of segregation. Focusing on one measure of segregation alone may fail 
to capture some of these nuances. It is also important to note that these segregation measures account  
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Table 7.12 Predicators of violent crime across Sydney neighbourhoods (N=598)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Β (SE) Β (SE)   (SE) Β (SE) 
Asian Languages LQ  -0.010 (0.04)  -0.059 (0.04) *     
European Languages LQ  0.113 (0.05)  0.099 (0.04) **     
‘Other’ Languages LQ  0.209 (0.02) *** 0.004 (0.03)      
English Only LQ  -0.068 (0.08)  -0.143 (0.08)      
Asian Languages Cluster      -0.079 (0.09)  -0.176 (0.06) * 
European Languages Cluster     -0.195 (0.08) * -0.001 (0.06)  
‘Other’ Languages Cluster      0.807 (0.09) *** 0.007 (0.07)  
English Only Cluster      -0.078 (0.09)  -0.081 (0.07)  
Disadvantage    0.220 (0.05) ***   0.277 (0.04) *** 
% Indigenous     0.087 (0.02) ***   0.065 (0.02) ** 
% Young Males    -0.033 (0.01) *   -0.032 (0.01) * 
% Renting    0.027 (0.00) ***   0.028 (0.00) *** 
% Different Address (5yrs)   0.003 (0.00)    0.001 (0.00)  
Population Density    0.007 (0.00) ***   0.007 (0.00) *** 
Distance to CBD   0.007 (0.00) **   0.005 (0.00) ** 
% Residential Land Use   -0.009 (0.00) ***   -0.009 (0.00) *** 
Intercept  -4.850 (0.12) *** -5.439 (0.22) *** -4.888(0.04) *** -5.418 (0.17) *** 
/lnalpha  -0.642 (0.06)  -1.815 (0.07)  -0.636 (0.06)  -1.797 (0.07)  
Alpha  0.53 (0.03)  0.163 (0.01)  0.529 (0.03)  0.166 (0.01)  
Log likelihood  -2681.30  -2318.10  -2679.99  -2363.83  
Pseudo R2 0.010  0.128  0.010  0.127   
Likelihood ratio test of alpha  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Chibar2(01)  1.5e +04***  4944.38***  1.5e+04***  4864.55***  
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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for only a relatively small amount of the variation in violent crime. The addition of the socio-
structural variables increased the pseudo - R2 from 0.029 and 0.020 in Model 1 and Model 3 
respectively to 0.128 in Model 2 and 0.127 in Model 4. Thus other neighbourhood factors such as the 
level of disadvantage and population density are more central to explaining the variations in violent 
crime across neighbourhoods.   
Results: Brisbane  
The same modelling procedure is followed for Brisbane. In Model 1 (see Table 7.13), the LQ 
measures are included. Here we see areas with a greater relative presence of immigrants who speak 
‘Other’ languages encounter more violence (B=0.250 p<.001). Conversely, the presence of 
immigrants who speak English only is negatively linked to crime (B=-0.846 p<.001). Similarly areas 
with a larger relative presence of immigrants who speak Asian language experience less violence 
(B=-0.118 p<.001). In Model 2, I include the neighbourhood variables. After controlling for 
neighbourhood contexts, no significant relationships between these segregation measures and violent 
crime remain. The relative concentration of immigrants who speak Asian languages, European 
languages, ‘Other’ languages or English only has no significant effect on violent crime across 
Brisbane neighbourhoods.  
However, several statistically significant relationships between the neighbourhood socio-
structural variables and violent crime are evident. Similar to Sydney, disadvantage is a strong 
predicator of violent crime across Brisbane neighbourhoods (B=0.201 p<.01). The more highly 
disadvantaged an area, the more likely it will experience violent crime. Areas with a greater presence 
of Indigenous residents also report more violent crimes (B=0.034 p<.05). Areas with more renters 
similarly encounter more neighbourhood violence (B=0.046 p<.001).  
Contrary to what is known from the broader neighbourhood effects literature, the number of 
residents at a different address five years ago is negatively linked to violent crime in Brisbane (B=-
0.020 p<.01). In other words, areas with higher levels of population turnover experience less violent 
crime. No significant effect is seen in Sydney. On average, levels of mobility are higher across 
Brisbane neighbourhoods compared to Sydney (mean: 40.85% compared to 33.70%). Further 
investigation shows that this mobility in Brisbane is driven largely by population growth. Indeed 
35.64% of the neighbourhood sample in Brisbane experienced positive growth greater than 10% 
between 2001 and 2011 and recorded an above average level of residential mobility. This is 
compared to just 22% of Sydney neighbourhoods. Therefore the number of residents at a different  
194 
 
Table 7.13 Predicators of violent crime across Brisbane neighbourhoods (N=313)  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Β (SE) Β (SE) Β (SE) Β (SE) 
Asian Languages LQ  -0.118 (0.05) * 0.013 (0.05)      
European Languages LQ  0.148 (0.10)  0.073 (0.10)      
‘Other’ Languages LQ  0.250 (0.05) *** -0.033 (0.04)      
English Only LQ  -0.846 (0.19) *** -0.097 (0.18)      
Asian Languages Cluster      -0.124 (0.16)  -0.112 (0.12)  
European Languages Cluster     0.393 (0.16) * 0.083 (0.11)  
‘Other’ Languages Cluster      0.623 (0.17) *** -0.128 (0.13)  
English Only Cluster      -0.415 (0.15) ** -0.132 (0.13)  
Disadvantage    0.201 (0.07) **   0.184 (0.06) ** 
% Indigenous     0.034 (0.02) *   0.036 (0.02) *  
% Young Males    0.023 (0.02)    0.027 (0.02)  
% Renting    0.046 (0.01) ***   0.042 (0.01) *** 
% Different Address (5yrs)   -0.020 (0.01) **   -0.017 (0.01) ** 
Population Density    0.007 (0.01)    0.008 (0.01)  
Distance to CBD   0.015 (0.01) **   0.015 (0.00) ** 
% Residential Land Use   -0.010 (0.00) ***   -0.011 (0.00) *** 
Intercept  -5.131 (0.18) *** -6.243 (0.33) *** -5.719 (0.05) *** -6.308 (0.29) ***  
/lnalpha  -0.702 (0.09)  -1.512 (0.11)  -0.596 (0.09)  -1.527 (0.11)  
Alpha  0.496 (0.05)  0.219 (0.02)  0.551 (0.05)  0.217 (0.02)  
Log likelihood  -1134.05  -1017.17  -1148.44  -1031.71  
Pseudo R2 0.026  0.110  0.013  0.114  
Likelihood ratio test of alpha  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Chibar2(01)  2158.49***  793.18***  2527.93***  778.60***  
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.0001 
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address five years ago does not necessarily reflect an unstable residential population in Brisbane but 
rather represents new and developing areas.  
Consistent with Sydney, a neighbourhood’s distance from the CBD was positively and 
significantly related to violent crime in Brisbane (B=0.015 p<.001). This suggests that areas located 
further away from the CBD experience more violence. This finding reflects the layout of Brisbane 
with more affluent and desirable neighbourhoods located in and around the city centre while more 
disadvantaged communities with cheaper rents and available social housing are situated further 
away from the CBD.  Residential land use is also an important predictor of violent crime in 
Brisbane neighbourhoods (B=-0.010 p<.001). As non-residential land use increases, so too does 
violent crime. Similar to Sydney the presence of young males had no effect on violent crime across 
Brisbane neighbourhoods. Unlike Sydney, population density was not a significant predicator of 
violent crime in Brisbane. 
Next the LQ measures are omitted and the LM-I clusters are entered into the model (see 
Model 3, Table 7.13). These cluster measures indicate similar patterns to Model 1. Before 
considering other neighbourhood factors, neighbourhoods classed as a HH cluster for immigrants 
who speak European languages are linked to more neighbourhood violence (B=0.393 p<.05). 
Similarly, areas identified as a HH cluster for immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages are 
positively associated with violent crime (B=0.623 p<.001). Neighbourhoods highlighted as a HH 
cluster for English only speaking immigrants experience fewer violent crimes (B = -0.415 p<.01). 
Neighbourhoods classified as a cluster for immigrants who speak Asian languages are not 
significantly associated with violent crime. In Model 4, the neighbourhood variables are included. 
Here the findings are similar to Model 2. Once controlling for the socio-demographic and 
environmental conditions of neighbourhoods, none of the segregation measures are significantly 
related to violent crime. Whether an area is identified as a HH cluster does not appear to be 
problematic for neighbourhood violence.  
Site comparison 
The results suggest that immigrant segregation has a different effect on violent crime across 
the two cities. In Brisbane, all of the significant relationships I find in the initial models are 
mediated by the neighbourhood variables. This is not the case in Sydney. By comparison, the 
relationship between immigrant segregation and crime is less clear-cut in this context. Both the LQ 
and LMI measures for Asian speaking immigrants are linked to significantly less crime. This 
suggests that both the residential distribution of the Asian speaking immigrant population and the 
co-location of Asian neighbourhoods protects communities from violent crime.  
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However, for European speaking immigrants, the relationship between segregation and 
crime varies depending on the measure employed. This is not overly surprising as the two measures 
tap into different processes. Specifically I find neighbourhoods that host more than their expected 
share of immigrants who speak European languages encounter more violent crime; however the co-
location of neighbourhoods popular for European immigrants has no effect. This suggests that it is 
the residential distribution of the European population rather than the spatial patterning of 
neighbourhoods that matters most for crime. This variation reinforces the need to use multiple 
measures of segregation when assessing its effects on crime at the neighbourhood level.  
Prior to controlling for neighbourhood factors, the segregation of immigrants who speak 
‘Other’ languages (measured both by LM-I and the LQ score) is a significant predictor of violent 
crime. However once accounting for neighbourhood context (in particular, disadvantage) this 
relationship is no longer statistically significant. This finding in particular highlights the importance 
of considering the broader neighbourhood context.  
7.6 Chapter summary  
By moving from the global to the local level, this study illuminates spatial segregation 
trends that are not captured by traditional indices. Indeed, global segregation indices constructed 
during the preliminary stages of this study revealed limited segregation in either city. However, 
when moving to the local level, the results of both the LQ and LM-I analyses reveal clear spatial 
trends and show very distinct differences in where ethnic groups choose to settle. The LQ analysis 
shows that immigrant groups from non-English speaking backgrounds are not randomly distributed 
across the city, but are overrepresented in certain communities. Yet the degree of dispersion varies 
considerably between groups. Additionally, immigrants who speak English only are quite evenly 
spread across the city landscape. The LM-I analysis highlights similar spatial trends with the co-
location of immigrant neighbourhoods relatively common in both cities. Most notable here was the 
prevalence of single group clusters in both sites. These findings could reflect strong in-group 
preferences to settle with culturally similar individuals or varying abilities to compete in the 
property market.  
The results of the analytic models indicate immigrant segregation differentially impacts 
crime in the two cities. In Brisbane, the relationship between segregation and crime does not remain 
statistically significant once the context of the neighbourhood is considered - this finding was 
consistent regardless of the segregation measure employed and the ethnic group under examination. 
It is likely that in Brisbane- the new destination city- segregation levels have not reached the 
required threshold to impact crime. The relationship between immigrant segregation and crime is 
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more complex in Sydney and varies depending on the segregation measure utilised and the group 
under consideration. This variance highlights the need to empirically examine multiple dimensions 
of segregation when testing its effects on neighbourhood crime.  
 Reflecting on the implications for theory and policy, the following chapter discusses the 
results of the three empirical studies. In addition, the limitations of this thesis are addressed with 
areas for future research highlighted. 
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 Chapter Eight: Discussion and Conclusions     
 
 
 8.1 Introduction  
Those who support restrictive immigration policies tend to cite four key reasons for their 
anti-immigration stance: (1) immigrants threaten a nation’s cultural identity; (2) immigrants place a 
strain on the economy; (3) immigrants take jobs from natives and; (4) immigration increases crime 
rates (Mayda, 2006; McLaren & Johnson, 2007; Sides & Citrin, 2007). In this thesis, I have 
robustly tested the latter - the presumption that increased immigration leads to increased crime. The 
consequences of these perceptions are far-reaching. Election results worldwide show growing 
public support for anti-immigration parties who propagate the myth of the criminal immigrant and 
the crime-generating effects of immigration. Once in power, these conservative governments 
capitalise on the public’s fear of immigration to garner support for restrictive immigration policies, 
deportation practices and hard-line anti-terrorism strategies (Mears 2001; Sniderman et al., 2004; 
Stumpf, 2006). Consequently, certain immigrant groups are marginalised in their local community 
and face discrimination in both the workforce and housing market (Chavez & Griffiths, 2009; 
Mayda, 2006; Semyonov et al., 2004; Sniderman et al. 2004). These negative stereotypes can 
motivate the use of racial profiling practices by police (Epp et al., 2014) and incite ethnically 
motivated crimes (Beneck & Martin, 2016; Corcoran & Smith, 2017; Southern Poverty Law Center, 
2016). There is also evidence to suggest residents in immigrant neighbourhoods are more fearful of 
crime (Hooghe & Vroome, 2016) and perceive more crime and disorder (Wickes et al., 2013a). 
Understanding the actual association between immigration and crime is thus important given the 
widespread and damaging effects of this perceived link.   
In his ASC presidential address Sampson (2013, p. 25) called for a “relentless focus on 
context” in the study of neighbourhoods and crime. I argue this is particularly important in 
evaluating the immigration-crime link. International migration trends demonstrate a high degree of 
variability in immigrant composition not only across national contexts but also within. Each 
setting’s immigrant population is shaped by a range of factors including geography, immigration 
policy, histories of colonisation, shared languages, economic opportunities as well as proximity to 
conflict/ humanitarian crises. These macro-level conditions are likely to determine the significance 
and direction of the immigration-crime relationship at the neighbourhood and city level.  
The central aim of my thesis was therefore to unpack the dynamic role national, city and 
neighbourhood contexts play in shaping the relationship between immigration and crime over time. 
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In particular, I questioned whether theories of immigration and crime derived from the United 
States experience translate well to other settings like Australia. In a country with high levels of 
ethnic diversity and a largely skilled immigrant population, would similar relationships to the 
United States unfold? To answer this question, I conducted three quantitative studies, which 
together considered how immigrant growth, concentration, diversity and segregation impacts 
violent crime across over 800 neighbourhoods located in two cities: Sydney - an established 
immigrant gateway and Brisbane- a relatively new immigrant destination site (Singer, 2004). 
Although Australia is a nation of immigrants, very little is known about the impact of 
immigration on neighbourhood crime. To bridge this gap and set a baseline for Australian research, 
I employed broad measures of total immigrant concentration and total immigrant growth in Study 1. 
I also utilised an innovative hybrid modelling approach to simultaneously examine whether 
increases in immigrant concentration over time influence changes in violent crime within a 
neighbourhood while also considering whether levels of immigrant concentration are linked to more 
or less crime between neighbourhoods. I therefore questioned whether it is increases in the 
immigrant population that matter for neighbourhood crime or simply the average level of immigrant 
concentration. Study 1 thus advances the international literature by testing both of these distinct 
effects at the same time.  
Study 1 also builds on previous scholarship by robustly examining (in a non-United States 
setting) whether the effect of increases in immigrant concentration are contingent on the 
neighbourhood context in which they occur. Rather than dichotomising neighbourhoods as new and 
established (see for example Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013; Light, 2017; Painter-Davis, 2015), I 
capitalised on the hybrid modelling approach utilised in Study 1 to assess whether the effect of 
increases in immigrant concentration on violent crime depends on the size of the immigrant 
population. This approach recognises that immigrant concentration occurs on a continuum and 
avoids the need to define appropriate cut points for what constitutes a ‘new’ versus ‘established’ 
neighbourhood context. Such blunt classification may potentially undermine previous work by 
failing to capture the considerable variance in levels of immigrant concentration across place.  
Study 2 progresses international immigration-crime scholarship in two important ways: first, 
by considering the potential for group specific effects and second, by assessing both concentration 
and diversity effects. The immigration-crime literature to date, has largely focused on broad 
measures of total/recent immigrant concentration (see for example Feldmeyer and Steffensmeir, 
2009; Lee et al., 2001; Martinez et al., 2008; Martinez et al., 2010; Wadsworth, 2010) or more 
focused measures of percent Latino/Hispanic/Mexican (see for example Feldmeyer, 2009; Harris & 
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Feldmeyer, 2013; Light, 2017) - with other groups often ignored (see for exception Kubrin et al., 
2016). However, immigrants do not represent a monolithic group. Considering the high degree of 
heterogeneity in the immigrant population, in Study 2 I disaggregated immigrant concentration by 
two key indicators of ethnicity - language and religion. By capturing the presence of culturally 
similar immigrants in a given neighbourhood, these measures provide a better test of the 
revitalisation thesis which emphasises the importance of co-ethnics for integrating new arrivals and 
the formulation of strong social networks.  
Secondly I advanced current empirical scholarship in Study 2 by comparing these group 
specific concentration effects to the effect of ethnic diversity on violent crime. From the social 
disorganisation view, ethnically diverse immigrant populations are particularly damaging to a 
community’s regulatory capacity as language barriers and cultural differences impede residents 
ability to come together to collectively solve local problems like crime. To determine whether 
neighbourhoods with a greater mixture of ethnic groups encounter more crime, I included two 
diversity indices (language diversity and religion diversity) in the Study 2 models. By assessing 
both concentration and diversity effects side by side, Study 2 robustly examines the central tenets of 
both the revitalisation thesis and social disorganisation theory.  
Study 3 also progresses the current literature both theoretically and methodologically. In this 
study, I explored a largely unexamined aspect of the immigration-crime nexus - the effect of 
immigrant group segregation on crime. To date, most studies have relied solely on measures of 
concentration or growth, with the effect of immigrant segregation on crime (particularly at the 
neighbourhood level) unexplored. Acknowledging the limitations of traditional segregation indices 
and the multidimensional nature of residential segregation, I drew on two underutilised yet highly 
spatialized measures of local segregation - Location Quotients and Local Moran’s I. As a starting 
point for this study, I first established trends in local segregation across the two sites (identifying 
segregation patterns often missed by traditional global indices) before considering the consequences 
of immigrant group segregation for violent crime.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the key findings of these three empirical studies 
and highlight the implications for theory and policy. I conclude this chapter, and this thesis by 
considering the limitations of this research and identify future directions for immigration-crime 
scholarship.  
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8.2 Key findings  
This thesis was interested in determining the effect of immigration on violent crime across 
over 800 neighbourhoods located in two Australian cities: Sydney - an established immigrant 
gateway and Brisbane - a relatively new destination site. The results of the three empirical studies 
comprising this thesis all point to similar conclusions: regardless of how immigration is 
conceptualised (measured by growth, concentration or segregation) or the ethnic group under 
consideration (with ethnicity defined by both language and religion) - there is little evidence to 
suggest immigration is linked to greater violent crime in either city. However, the effect of ethnic 
diversity on crime is more problematic, particularly when comparing across neighbourhoods. I 
discuss the key findings of each of the three empirical studies before turning to the broader socio-
structural and environmental factors linked to violent crime in Australian neighbourhoods.   
Growth, concentration and crime  
In Study 1 I asked three questions. First, how do changes in immigrant concentration impact 
violent crime within a neighbourhood over time? Second, do neighbourhoods with a higher 
concentration of immigrants encounter more or less violent crime? And finally, do neighbourhood 
factors moderate the immigration-crime relationship? Overall I find no evidence in either city to 
suggest that increases in the immigrant population over time are linked to greater neighbourhood 
violence or that neighbourhoods with a greater concentration of immigrants experience more violent 
crime. In fact, even after accounting for the broader neighbourhood context, growth in the 
immigrant population is associated with less violence within Brisbane and Sydney neighbourhoods 
over time. On the other hand, average levels of immigrant concentration are not significantly related 
to violent crime. These findings therefore indicate that it is the process of an influx of immigrants 
into a neighbourhood that is most consequential for crime rather than simply the degree of 
concentration. Despite differences in immigration histories and immigrant composition, these 
findings were consistent across both sites. As immigration is monitored at the national level, the 
similarities across sites may be reflective of Australia’s tightly controlled immigration policy which 
is focused on recruiting highly skilled immigrants and protecting Australia’s borders.   
When more closely examining the caveats of context, important differences between the two 
research sites were found. In the United States, scholars argue that an influx of new immigrants will 
differentially affect crime depending on the size of the immigrant population (Martinez et al., 2004; 
Ramey, 2013) and the level of neighbourhood disadvantage (Velez, 2009). Specifically, it is argued 
that neighbourhoods with a larger immigrant population will more easily ‘absorb’ new arrivals 
whereas neighbourhoods with fewer immigrants may struggle to facilitate integration (Portes and 
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Rumbaut, 2006; Ramey, 2013; Singer, 2004). Neighbourhood disadvantage is also argued to 
moderate the immigration-crime relationship with the effect of immigration on crime thought to be 
particularly strong in disadvantaged communities where immigrants are seen to revitalise local 
institutions and networks (Velez, 2009).  
Like research elsewhere, the findings of this thesis suggest the effect of changes in 
immigration on crime is contingent on the broader neighbourhood context in which they occur - at 
least in the Sydney context. In this city, I find that the size of the immigrant population and the level 
of disadvantage does matter for how changes in immigration impact neighbourhood violence - 
although not as predicted in the revitalisation thesis. Contrary to theoretical expectations, I find the 
crime-reducing effect of an influx of immigrants is most pronounced in areas with fewer established 
immigrants and in the least disadvantaged communities. These effects are not significant in 
Brisbane, perhaps because levels of immigrant concentration and disadvantage do not reach the 
required threshold in this city. Nevertheless, this indicates that a large and established immigrant 
population is not required in order for changes in immigrant concentration to insulate communities 
from crime. As these findings do not align with theoretical predictions or prior research in the 
United States, they suggest context may matter in different ways for how the immigration-crime 
relationship plays out in Australia. Together, these findings raise questions about the applicability 
of the revitalisation thesis in the Australian setting.  
Group specific and diversity effects  
Study 2 posed similar questions to Study 1 although the focus here was on establishing 
whether the immigration-crime relationship varies across different ethnic groups. First, I asked how 
do changes in immigrant group concentration and diversity impact changes in violent crime over 
time within a neighbourhood. Second, I questioned whether neighbourhoods with a higher 
concentration of certain immigrant groups or higher levels of diversity report more or less violent 
crime. And finally, I asked whether the effect of changes in immigrant concentration and diversity 
vary across different neighbourhood contexts (namely, in neighbourhoods with few immigrants 
versus neighbourhoods with more immigrants and in more versus less disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods). 
 After disaggregating the total immigrant concentration measure by immigrant language and 
religion, I find no evidence that the growth or concentration of any ethnic group is associated with 
more neighbourhood violence after adjusting for neighbourhood context. Net of neighbourhood 
controls, several growth and concentration measures are significantly associated with less violent 
crime. While total immigrant concentration levels have a null effect on crime in Study 1, in Study 2 
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I find areas with a greater concentration of certain groups encounter fewer violent crimes. While I 
find fewer significant relationships in Brisbane, there is little evidence to suggest neighbourhoods in 
this new destination city with a typically Anglo-Saxon immigration history have fared worse 
following unprecedented growth in the Asian population. Indeed growth in the immigrant 
population who speak Southern Asian languages is actually associated with a significant drop in 
violent crime within Brisbane neighbourhoods over time.  
 Similar results are seen when examining the immigrant population by religious affiliation. 
In Sydney, an influx of Muslim immigrants into a neighbourhood is associated with a significant 
decrease in violent crime, so too is an influx of immigrants without a religious affiliation. 
Moreover, areas with a greater average concentration of immigrants affiliated with Buddhism, 
Islam, ‘Other’ religions or No Religion experience fewer violent crimes. Both growth and 
concentration in these religious groups has little impact on crime in Brisbane. Only an influx in the 
immigrant population with no religious affiliation is significantly associated with changes in violent 
crime over time. No religious group concentration is significantly linked to violent crime in 
Brisbane. These findings are important given current political rhetoric. While Australian politicians 
like Pauline Hanson explicitly link Muslim immigration to violent crime (Commonwealth of 
Australia, Senate, 2016, p. 939), I find no evidence to substantiate these claims. If anything, the 
presence of Muslims makes communities safer when holding all else equal in Sydney.  
In addition to considering these group specific effects, I also assessed the effect of ethnic 
diversity on crime within and between neighbourhoods. Here I find that the effect of ethnic 
diversity contrasts the effect of ethnic group concentration. In Sydney, increasing language diversity 
is associated with more violent crime over time independent of the broader neighbourhood context. 
By comparison, changes in language diversity have no effect on crime in Brisbane once context is 
considered. However, linguistically diverse neighbourhoods in both cities experience greater 
violence, pointing to a break down in regulatory capacity in areas with greater diversity. Similar 
effects are seen when considering religion diversity. While changes in religion diversity are not 
significantly related to violent crime over time, more religiously diverse neighbourhoods report 
greater violent crime. Thus in both cities, more diverse neighbourhoods encounter more violent 
crime while at the same time, areas with a greater concentration of certain ethnic groups experience 
less violent crime. I consider the theoretical implications of these findings in section 8.3.  
Segregation and crime  
In Study 3, I examined the effect of immigrant group segregation on violent crime. Four key 
questions guided this study. The first two were related to identifying general trends in spatial 
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segregation in Brisbane and Sydney as previous (albeit limited) scholarship indicates low levels of 
ethnic segregation in Australia. Specifically I asked, how are various immigrant groups spatially 
distributed across Brisbane and Sydney neighbourhoods? And, do immigrant neighbourhoods tend 
to be co-located or spatially isolated? After determining these spatial trends, the last two questions 
focused on the effect of segregation on crime. Here I questioned whether the residential distribution 
of various immigrant groups impacts crime and if the co-location of immigrant neighbourhoods is 
associated with more or less neighbourhood violence.   
The LQ analysis assessed the residential distribution of each language group throughout the 
city. The findings indicate that these groups from non-English speaking backgrounds are not evenly 
dispersed but rather overrepresented in particular neighbourhoods. However, the degree of 
dispersion varies considerably between groups with English only speaking immigrants quite evenly 
spread while immigrants who speak ‘Other’ languages are highly concentrated in just a few 
neighbourhoods. The LM-I analysis illuminates similar spatial trends with the co-location of 
immigrant neighbourhoods relatively common in both cities. Isolated immigrant neighbourhoods 
are rare. Interestingly, single group clusters are most prevalent in both sites (neighbourhoods 
identified as an immigrant cluster for just one ethnic group). Thus, contrary to previous research, I 
find Australian neighbourhoods differentially attract certain ethnic groups.  
There are two key potential explanations for these findings. First, this spatial patterning may 
reflect in-group preferences and the desire to settle with culturally similar people thereby limiting 
interactions with other ethnic groups (Emerson et al., 2001). This is most evident amongst the 
English only speaking group who tend to avoid neighbourhoods popular for Asians, Europeans and 
‘Others’. Interestingly, this finding is consistent with the settlement patterns of whites in 
segregation studies in the United States (Emerson et al., 2001). Another potential explanation for 
these segregation patterns is the varying ability of different immigrant groups to compete for space 
due to unequal access to economic capital (Morill, 1991). There is evidence to suggest some 
immigrant groups in Australia possess fewer resources than others. In particular, immigrants who 
speak ‘Other’ languages appear to settle predominantly in neighbourhoods stigmatized by high rates 
of disadvantage and crime. On the other hand, immigrants who speak English only tend to reside in 
neighbourhoods with low levels of disadvantage, particularly in Sydney. This trend points to greater 
access to economic capital amongst this group. Stage 1 of Study 3 therefore suggests that some of 
the mechanisms which drive segregation patterns in the United States may apply to the Australian 
context.   
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After determining these spatial trends, I explored their consequences for violent crime. The 
results suggest that immigrant segregation has a different effect on violent crime across the two 
cities. In Brisbane, no statistically significant relationship remains once the context of the 
neighbourhood is considered. This finding is consistent regardless of the segregation measure 
utilised or group under examination. As a relatively new immigrant destination, it is likely that 
levels of residential segregation do not reach the threshold necessary to impact violent crime in 
Brisbane. These findings align with Feldmeyer and colleagues (2017) research in the United States 
which found no direct relationship between immigrant segregation (measured by isolation and 
exposure) and violence at the census place level. However in Sydney, the relationship between 
immigrant segregation and crime is far more complex and dependent on the measure of segregation 
employed and the group under examination. When accounting for neighbourhood features, the 
segregation of certain immigrant groups, namely immigrants who speak Asian languages, is 
associated with significantly less violent crime. In contrast, the uneven residential distribution of 
immigrants who speak European languages is linked to more neighbourhood violence. Yet the 
spatial co-location of European neighbourhoods has no significant effect on crime. This variance 
reinforces the need to consider multiple groups and measures when examining the effect of 
segregation on crime at the neighbourhood level. Indeed, further research is needed in order to 
better understand the reasons why the segregation of various immigrant groups differentially 
impacts neighbourhood crime.  
The broader neighbourhood context 
It is important to recognise that when examining the spatial distribution of crime, immigrant 
concentration and diversity account for only a small amount of the overall variation. Rather, other 
factors such as disadvantage and land use play a much more instrumental role in explaining violent 
crime across neighbourhoods. The evidence presented here suggests disorganised neighbourhoods, 
characterised by disadvantage, diversity and residential instability (Shaw & McKay, 1942) tend to 
experience the greatest share of violent crimes. For the most part, the neighbourhood factors linked 
to violent crime are fairly consistent across both sites and across all three studies that comprise this 
thesis. Disadvantage in particular emerged as a strong predictor of violent crime. In both cities, I 
find increasing disadvantage within a neighbourhood over time21 is associated with an increase in 
violent crime. Further still, I find reported incidents of violent crime are higher in more 
disadvantaged neighbourhoods when compared to areas with lower levels of disadvantage. These 
                                               
21 In Sydney, this was significant in the Study 2 models only when disaggregating the immigrant concentration measure 
by ethnic groups and controlling for diversity.  
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findings are consistent with previous scholarship (Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Krivo & Peterson, 
1996; Lee et al., 2001; Sampson, Morenoff & Raudenbush, 2005).  
There is also some evidence to suggest residentially unstable neighbourhoods encounter 
more crime. From a social disorganisation view, the findings suggest renters may be less invested in 
the community and in turn, less willing to intervene in neighbourhood crime. However, the other 
key measure of residential instability - those at a different address five years ago - is not associated 
with more crime in either site. This is likely because changes in the population (particularly in the 
Brisbane context) do not necessarily represent an unstable residential population. Instead, the 
presence of new residents may point to population growth and urban renewal. This point is further 
reinforced by the protective effect of increasing population density in the two cities. Land use is 
also consistently associated with violent crime across the three studies. In both Brisbane and 
Sydney, residential neighbourhoods appear to present fewer opportunities for violent crime.   
8.3  Theoretical implications  
To date, the bulk of empirical immigration-crime scholarship has focused on testing 
concentration effects over diversity effects (see for exception Feldmeyer et al., 2016; Graif & 
Sampson, 2009; Kubrin et al., 2016). Given that social disorganisation theory is more concerned 
with the effect of ethnic diversity on crime (rather than the effect of ethnic concentration) testing 
these diversity effects is important when evaluating the efficacy of this theory. Although there is a 
tendency to conflate concentration and diversity measures, it is important to recognise that they tap 
into two very different aspects of neighbourhood life. As such, there are reasons to believe these 
two processes will differentially impact neighbourhood crime. According to the revitalisation thesis, 
the presence of co-ethnics may insulate communities from crime by strengthening social networks 
and providing residents with a “protective shell” of resources (Harris & Feldmeyer, 2013, p. 203). 
Ethnic diversity on the other hand (which immigration directly contributes to) is likely to have the 
opposite effect. Social disorganisation theory predicts higher crime in more ethnically diverse areas. 
This is because cultural differences between immigrant groups, language barriers and in-group 
preferences cause residents to “hunker down,” and avoid neighbourly interactions (Feldmeyer at al., 
2016; Putnam, 2007; Wickes et al., 2013b). As such, residents in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods 
are less likely to look out for their neighbours and intervene in social problems. In turn, this lack of 
informal social control leads to higher crime.  
The findings of this thesis are consistent with such arguments and previous scholarship 
(Feldmeyer et al., 2016). In the Australian context, ethnic group concentration is not linked to more 
crime and in some cases can reduce crime. However, ethnic diversity is associated with greater 
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neighbourhood crime. In both cities, neighbourhoods with a higher average level of language and 
religion diversity encounter more violent crime while at the same time, areas with a higher average 
concentration of certain immigrant groups experience less violent crime. These findings therefore 
highlight the divergent effects of ethnic concentration and diversity on neighbourhood violence. 
This suggests that each theory’s hypothesised effect of immigration on violent crime can occur 
simultaneously. Measuring ethnic concentration and diversity effects is thus important in order to 
more fully understand how immigration impacts neighbourhood structures in ways that both 
promote and inhibit crime.  
Like the United States, the findings indicate that immigrant concentration does not lead to 
higher violent crime in Australian neighbourhoods. Whether this relationship is due to a process of 
revitalisation is unclear and requires further investigation. From a revitalisation perspective, it is 
expected that immigrant neighbourhoods exhibit particularly strong social networks which help 
foster shared expectations for informal social control (Feldmeyer et al., 2017). As a result, 
immigrant neighbourhoods should experience less crime. The relationship between immigration and 
crime is thus theorised to be indirect. However, the measures included in this thesis (similar to most 
previous scholarship) do not explicitly test the effect of immigrant concentration on the 
neighbourhood social processes important for the regulation of crime (such as collective efficacy). 
Rather the analyses provided here model the effect of immigrant concentration (and diversity) on 
crime alongside a series of neighbourhood controls. As such, these models test the direct effect of 
immigration on crime when holding disadvantage, land use and other key predictors of violence 
constant. While the findings suggest that immigrant concentration is not linked to more crime 
(regardless of how it is conceptualised), these results do not explain why this relationship exists. 
Whether or not immigration actually shapes collective efficacy (or other neighbourhood social 
processes) and thus indirectly impacts crime is unknown. 
However, this is a limitation of immigration-crime scholarship more broadly. To date, only a 
handful of studies have tested the indirect effect of immigration on crime (see for example, 
Burchfield & Silver, 2013; Feldmeyer et al., 2017; Kubrin & Desmond, 2015). Further still, these 
studies find limited support for the argument that immigrant neighbourhoods possess particularly 
strong social ties and high levels of collective efficacy. Kubrin and Desmond (2015, p. 13) suggest 
these results “raise more questions than they answer.” Specifically, if immigrant neighbourhoods do 
not exhibit particularly high levels of social capital, what explains the protective effect of immigrant 
concentration on crime? This missing link in the current study and indeed the lack of 
conclusiveness in the emerging international literature makes it difficult to determine whether the 
protective effect of immigration on crime in Australian neighbourhoods is due to a process of 
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revitalisation. I note this as an important area for future research.  
Beyond the revitalisation thesis, there are other explanations which may explain the 
protective effect of immigration on crime in both Australia and the United States. In particular, the 
push/pull factors which influence migratory decisions may account for some of the similarities 
found across the two contexts (Tonry, 1997). As most immigrants in Australia are highly skilled 
and secure employment before arrival, the foreign born population in this setting largely represents 
the “motivated immigrant” outlined in the selection effects thesis (DIBP, 2015). The point based 
program of migration effectively selects immigrants who have high stakes in conformity and 
possess a strong desire to avoid contact with the criminal justice system. Likewise, the United 
States attracts a large volume of immigrant workers, (albeit low skilled) as well as immigrants 
hoping to reunite with close family members. Despite notable differences in socio-economic and 
legal status, immigrants in both settings are pulled to the host country in search of a better 
livelihood for themselves and their family, motivated by the prospect of achieving upward social 
mobility. By adding to the share of the population who is particularly responsive to deterrent 
mechanisms and thus less likely to offend, increased immigration is unlikely to lead to higher 
neighbourhood crime in these contexts (Sampson, 2008). However in other countries like Germany, 
a large proportion of immigrants are pushed from their country of origin as a consequence of 
conflict/humanitarian crisis. Such groups often lack both social and economic resources upon 
arrival, face high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment and experience high levels of posttraumatic 
stress (Kubrin et al., 2016; Martens, 1995; Tonry, 1997). These circumstances make these groups 
particularly vulnerable to crime. Further still, their presence in neighbourhoods may shift social 
structures in ways that generate crime (for example, by exacerbating levels of neighbourhood 
disadvantage).  
Such arguments are consistent with the group specific effects identified in this thesis. For 
the most part, immigration is not associated with more neighbourhood crime - even when 
disaggregating by language and religion or when looking at measures of growth, concentration or 
segregation. This lack of variability in the findings across different ethnic groups is not particularly 
surprising. Despite considerable differences in immigrant ethnicity, most immigrant groups entering 
Australia are economically motivated (Spinks, 2016). For example, visa category data indicates that 
immigrants from Asia (particularly China and India) are mainly entering Australia via the skilled 
stream (DIBP, 2014a; 2015a; 2016a). Thus despite their social and cultural distance from the native 
population, the increasing presence of Asian immigrants actually reduces crime in some cases (for 
example, Indian immigrants in Brisbane and Chinese immigrants in Sydney). These findings 
therefore provide some preliminary evidence that the push/pull factors which drive migratory 
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decisions may have important consequences for crime and explain some of the variation found 
across different ethnic groups.  
Yet as it stands, the most commonly employed theoretical models used to explain the 
immigration-crime relationship (such as social disorganisation theory and the immigration 
revitalisation thesis) do not sufficiently address the variability in motivations for migration (Tonry, 
1997). Research which evaluates the immigration-crime connection in a cross cultural, comparative 
framework is thus needed in order to further understand how the broader processes of immigration 
and immigration policy at the national level differentially influence crime outcomes within cities 
and neighbourhoods. 
8.4 Policy implications  
Taken together, the results of this thesis suggest that immigration does not directly increase 
violent crime. Nevertheless, the presence of particular immigrant groups in a neighbourhood is 
linked to heightened perceptions of crime and disorder and greater fear of crime (Hooghe & De 
Vroome, 2016; Wickes et al, 2013a). Reassuring residents of the benefits of immigration (and 
indeed dispelling the myth of the criminogenic effects of immigration) is thus worthwhile to ensure 
immigrant concentration does not indirectly impact neighbourhood crime as a result of these 
anxieties. Yet current rhetoric and action by the Australian government does nothing to expunge 
these fears. Announcing changes to Australian citizenship requirements earlier this year 
(immigrants must now be a permanent resident for four years rather than 12 months and pass an 
English proficiency test), Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull requested only “Australian patriots” 
apply (Kelly, 2017). These changes (and the language used to discuss immigration issues more 
broadly) are thinly veiled attempts by the Turnbull government to appear tough on border protection 
and national security issues. However, such rhetoric only further reinforce perceptions of 
immigrants as threats, cause the public to question the intentions of immigrants and provides a 
significant barrier to integration by delaying access to citizenship (Hainmueller, Hangartner & 
Pietrantuono, 2015).  
The results of this thesis suggest communities characterised by indicators of social 
disorganisation (i.e. disadvantage, diversity and instability) experience the greatest share of violent 
crime. An extensive body of research suggests that collective efficacy can help insulate 
communities from violence – regardless of the socio-demographic conditions of the neighbourhood. 
In other words, even in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, high levels of collective efficacy can reduce 
the occurrence of violent crime (Sampson et al., 1997). In essence, collective efficacy comprises 
two parts: (1) social cohesion and trust and; (2) a perceived willingness to intervene in local 
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problems. With this in mind, community organising programs which work to strengthen social 
networks and encourage informal social control amongst residents may help reduce crime in high 
risk communities. Given the crime-generating effect of ethnic diversity, finding opportunities to 
promote cultural awareness and celebrate local traditions within ethnically diverse neighbourhoods 
may help dissolve the cultural barriers between residents and lay a foundation for community 
members to reach the level of mutual understanding and trust required for informal social control. 
Ideally, such programs should be run by local residents rather than imposed by external agencies 
and focus on empowering the community to take part in decision making processes (Wickes, 2017). 
In fostering collective efficacy, scholars argue social ties alone are not enough to prevent 
crime. Sabol, Coulton, and Korbin (2004) suggest it is not only important to foster bonds between 
residents in disadvantaged neighbourhoods but to also engage external agencies who can provide 
institutional support from government and police. Ohmer (2016, p.684) argues that “although social 
capital and social cohesion are considered conditions for collective efficacy, residents must take 
action for collective efficacy to be realised.” This means that for crime reduction to occur, residents 
must also be encouraged to intervene. Yet to date, there have been few attempts by researchers 
translate this theory into practice (see for exception Ohmer, Warner & Beck, 2010; Ohmer, 2016).  
For the most part, studies tend to find that neighbourhood crime prevention programs work 
best in low crime, middle class neighbourhoods (Hirschfield & Bowers, 1997). Effectively 
implementing such initiatives in crime prone, disadvantaged areas (i.e. the places that need this type 
of intervention the most), is much more challenging (Sampson, 2012). One program with promising 
results focused on improving attitudes towards intervention in a low income neighbourhood in 
Atlanta (Ohmer et al., 2010). As part of the program, residents were involved in a series of training 
seminars which focused on encouraging intervention in community problems in addition to teaching 
conflict resolution techniques. While the sample size of the program was small, the pre-post test 
showed a significant increase in attitudes towards intervening suggesting participants were more 
likely to intervene in community problems following involvement in the program. Building on this 
work in a more recent study, Ohmer (2016) implemented a multi-stage program in a racially diverse 
low income neighbourhood in Atlanta. Focusing specifically on building capacity for collective 
action, the findings of the program revealed participants perceived higher levels of social capital 
and social cohesion and were also more willing to intervene in local problems after their 
involvement in the training program and the community project. Drawing on this research, similar 
programs could be implemented in high-risk Australian neighbourhoods such as Fairfield and 
Woodridge which are characterised by high rates of disadvantage, diversity and crime.   
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8.5 Limitations and future research   
While this thesis advances immigration-crime scholarship in several, important ways, it is 
not without its limitations. First, the results presented here are largely dependent on the unit of 
analysis chosen: the state suburb. While Australians tend to perceive their state suburb as their local 
neighbourhood (Mazerolle et al., 2007), it is important to recognise that these findings may vary 
across different geographies. This potential variability is referred to as the Modifiable Areal Unit 
Problem (MAUP) and consists of two key components: (1) the scale effect and (2) the zonation 
effect (Openshaw & Taylor, 1979; Wong, 2004). The scale effect refers to variations in the findings 
at different geographic scales. For example, if we employ a smaller unit of analysis such as the SA1 
(similar to the block group in the United States) or a larger unit of analysis such as the local 
government area, would similar relationships unfold? Considering crime is highly clustered not 
only across neighbourhoods but within, if the unit of analysis is too large, empirical analyses may 
misrepresent the immigration-crime association (Hipp, 2007). As the concentration and segregation 
of ethnic groups is a multi-scalar phenomenon (Fowler, 2016), future research should consider and 
compare the immigration-crime connection at various geographic scales to better understand how 
(and potentially why) these relationships vary at different spatial granularities.  
The zonation effect flags the potential for differences in the results when comparing unit 
boundaries at the same spatial scale (Wong, 2004). This is particularly important for this thesis as I 
relied on administrative boundaries which were delineated for non-research purposes. As such, 
these boundaries may not accurately reflect the spatial concentration of immigrant groups but rather 
artificially divide an immigrant area into multiple neighbourhoods. Advances in statistical and 
mapping techniques offer new avenues for overcoming the limitations of administrative boundaries. 
Arguing against the use of nonoverlapping boundaries, Hipp and Boessen (2013) introduced 
egohoods as an alternative strategy for defining neighbourhoods. Conceptualised as “waves 
washing across the surface of the city,” their findings show that the egohood approach can better 
explain the positive relationship between inequality and crime compared to block groups or census 
tracts (Hipp and Boessen, 2013, p. 289). Incorporating such an approach in future immigration-
crime research is worthwhile, particularly given the tendency for immigrant neighbourhoods to be 
co-located.   
It is also important to note that the results of this thesis do not represent the offending rates 
of particular immigrant groups. I cannot conclude that certain immigrant groups offend at a higher 
or lower rate than others - any suggestion of this would be an ecological fallacy. Rather, data that 
disaggregates the overall violent crime measure by offender immigrant status is required to more 
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fully understand the immigration-crime relationship. An important question for future research is 
whether or not there is racial/ethnic invariance in the effect of immigration on crime in Australia. In 
other words, does immigrant concentration, growth or segregation impact the offending rates of all 
immigrant groups (as well as natives) equally? Evidence from the United States suggests variability 
between groups exists (Feldmeyer & Steffensmeier, 2009; Lee et al., 2001) yet these questions are 
rarely explored in other contexts.  
Like many other immigration-crime studies to date (Akins et al., 2009; Feldmeyer, 2009; 
Feldmeyer & Steffensmeier, 2009; Kubrin & Ishizawa, 2012; Kubrin & Ousey, 2009; Lee & 
Martinez, 2002; Martinez et al., 2010; Martinez et al., 2008), this study focused solely on violent 
crime. Yet evidence suggests that the immigration-crime relationship varies depending on the crime 
type under examination (Bell et al., 2013; Kubrin et al., 2016; Stansfield, 2014). In particular, some 
argue that immigrant concentration is associated with more instrumental forms of offending (such 
as robbery and theft) compared to expressive crimes (such as assault and homicide) (Bell et al., 
2013). Examining other crime types and how the results compare is an important area for future 
Australian research. Moreover, this study relied on an aggregated measure of violent crime 
comprised of all homicides, assaults and robberies within a given neighbourhood. Given the 
different opportunity structures for different crime types, Andresen and Linning (2012) argue 
against using broad categories when considering spatial variations in crime. However, violent crime 
is a relatively rare event, particularly in the Australian context. This aggregation was therefore 
necessary in order to avoid a large number of zero cell counts in the dependent variable. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognise the use of this broad crime measure is a potential 
limitation of the study.  
As mentioned in section in 8.3, I did not consider the indirect effects of immigration on the 
community social processes important for the regulation of crime. Also worth noting is that I did 
not consider how immigration indirectly impacts levels of poverty, diversity and residential 
instability within a given neighbourhood. Whether or not increased immigration changes 
neighbourhood structures in a meaningful way and this in turn influences crime is unclear.  This is 
particularly important given the relatively strong association between the immigrants who speak 
‘other’ languages and violent crime. These immigrants (more so than other groups) appear to be 
settling in highly disadvantaged neighbourhoods with a history of high crime rates. Employing 
modelling strategies which test for the indirect effects on immigration on crime will further improve 
our understanding of the immigration-crime nexus.   
While this study is longitudinal and employs data from over three time points, I was not able 
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to account for the endogeneity/selection bias in immigrant settlement location. In other words, the 
modelling strategy employed does not address the potential for crime patterns to shape immigration 
patterns or for immigrants to self-select into already low crime neighbourhoods. This is problematic 
as we know that immigrants are not randomly distributed across the city but rather select certain 
communities for settlement. In some cases, immigrants with fewer resources may be left with little 
choice but to settle in high crime neighbourhoods while other immigrant groups may purposely 
avoid moving into such areas (MacDonald et al., 2013). Such issues with endogeneity are widely 
recognised by immigration-crime scholars as a potential limitation of this research (Bell et al., 2013; 
MacDonald et al., 2013; Ousey & Kubrin, 2014). Better accounting for the challenges posed by 
endogeneity is an important avenue for future immigration-crime research.  
Rather than focusing solely on the ethnic background, future research should also consider 
the circumstances under which immigrants arrive as well as employment and education status - this 
will help disentangle the effect of poverty from the effect of ethnicity. In a similar vein, making use 
of visa category data will potentially offer an improved understanding of variations in the 
immigration-crime relationship across different contexts. It is likely that an immigrant population 
who en masse move for work or family reunification will differentially impact crime rates 
compared to an immigrant population who are forced to migrate. Yet to date, few studies 
empirically test this assumption (see for exception Bell et al., 2010; Jaitman and Machin, 2013; 
Stansfield, 2014). Tapping into the push/pull factors which drive migratory decisions is thus an 
important next step for future immigration-crime research.  
Finally, this thesis focuses on a relatively small temporal window spanning from 2001 to 
2011. To better understand how changes in immigration impact changes in violent crime over time, 
extending this time frame in future studies is worthwhile. In doing so, such research could examine 
the extent to which the same relationships hold over large spans of time that transcend various 
economic and political cycles (Adelman et al., 2017) – although it is noted that challenges with data 
concordance make this a difficult task.   
8.6 Concluding comments  
With 244 million people currently residing outside of their country of birth (United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), 2015) and the number of persons forcibly 
displaced by violence and conflict at the highest recorded level since World War II (UNHCR, 
2015), this line of research helps us understand the implications of increased immigration on 
neighbourhood crime. While the general public may fear that increased immigration will increase 
crime rates (Fetzer, 2000; Haller et al, 2009; Mayda, 2006; McLaren & Johnson, 2007; Sides & 
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Citrin, 2007), the findings of this thesis suggest such concerns are largely unjustified. While ethnic 
enclaves are often viewed as undesirable and associated with a range of social problems (Markus et 
al., 2009), I find ethnic group concentration is not linked to more violent crime. In fact, some ethnic 
group concentrations may actually operate as a protective shield against neighbourhood violence, at 
least in the Australian setting. Yet the differential effect of concentration and diversity indicates that 
the two measures tap into very different components of neighbourhood life. Thus immigration may 
simultaneously be impacting neighbourhood structures in ways that both positively and negatively 
impact violent crime. Further work is therefore needed to advance the study of these dynamics at 
the local level in order to develop policy responses that prevent crime in high risk neighbourhoods 
where the population may be struggling to effectively regulate unwanted behaviour.  
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